






The Determinants of Capital Structure  



















This thesis is submitted in total fulfilment  
of the requirements for the degree of  





School of Business 
 
 
University of Ballarat 
 
PO Box 663 
University Drive, Mount Helen 










Traditional financial theories see capital structure as a result of mainly financial, 
tax and growth factors (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). But corporate governance 
theories (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and business strategy theories (Barton & 
Gordon, 1988) suggest that ownership structure and ownership concentration, 
product diversification and asset specificity may also influence capital structure. 
Focusing on the examination of the determinants of capital structure in Chinese 
listed companies, this research goes beyond financial factors and considered 
business strategy and corporate governance approaches, and their impact on 
capital structure, in a transitioning Chinese context where institutions, expertise 
and regulatory processes are different to, but converging on, Western 
approaches. 
A panel data set of 1,098 Chinese listed companies for the period of 1991 to 
2000 was collected from published sources, and conventional and innovative 
econometric methodologies were used to model a range of relationships between 
capital structure and its financial and non-financial determinants. The statistical 
approaches used in this study included Ordinary Least Squares Model and also 
Linear Mixed Model, which is a powerful tool to examine panel data where 
independence of explanatory variables is not assumed. The analysis also 
involved Hox’s model building procedures to measure model fit.   
The capital structure of listed companies in both the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
and the Shanghai Securities Exchange is positively related to a firm’s tax rate, 
iii 
 
growth and capital intensity and negatively related to a firm’s profit and size. 
Other financial factors such as tangibility, risk and duration are non-significant. 
The capital structure of listed companies, particularly in the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, is positively related to product diversification and negatively related to 
asset specificity. The capital structure of listed companies in the Shanghai 
Securities Exchange is positively related to government ownership and ownership 
concentration of the largest shareholder and negatively related to legal person 
ownership and ownership concentration of the ten largest shareholders. 
The data and modelling support financial and non-financial determinants of 
capital structure. In particular, information asymmetry, business diversity and 
asset specificity have a significant impact on capital structure. In addition the 
empirical work in the study supports agency cost explanations of debt and equity.  
Finally the research demonstrates that the two main financial markets in China, 
Shenzhen and Shanghai, have operated differently but are converging towards a 
common norm.  
The research contributes to the general field of capital structure and provides 
valuable insights into the nature of the Chinese firm and the evolution of the 
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The growth and development of a firm depend crucially on that firm’s access to 
and sources of financial capital. This is an extensively researched area in 
developed market economies (Harris & Raviv, 1991; Swanson, Srinidhi & 
Seetharaman, 2003). The research reported in this thesis investigates these 
issues in a Chinese context.  
Over the past 30 years, a changing and increasingly market-oriented corporate 
sector has driven growth in the Chinese economy at an average rate of 9.6% per 
annum to 2005, and firms’ profits as a percentage of GDP have risen from 2.99% 
in 1990 to 4.42% in 2000 and 7.87% in 2005 (China State Statistical Bureau, 
2006, pp. 20, 24, 140). Over this same period, financial policies, capital 
structures, institutions, managerial behaviour and knowledge –– all factors 
determining the ‘nature’ of the Chinese firm — have evolved (Hovey & Naughton, 
2000; Harvie & Naughton, 2000; Hovey & Naughton, 2007). From this 
environment of rapid change, diverse business models and evolving ownership 
structures, an important question arises: what has happened to the fundamental 
relationships between debt levels and the financial and non-financial factors that 




This thesis addresses this question and examines the determinants of capital 
structure of Chinese listed companies over the period from 1991 to 2000. The 
research aims to identify the factors that influence the choice of debt or equity by 
these companies given the institutional context of the rapidly changing and 
transitional economy of China.  
This introductory chapter describes the research and its purpose, and its potential 
contribution to knowledge. It begins with a brief examination of the theoretical and 
empirical background to the topic of capital structure and discusses some 
important institutional factors relevant to China. The chapter then poses the 
research question and possible methodological issues and concludes with an 
outline of the overall structure of the thesis.  
1.2. Capital Structure Literature 
The topic of capital structure in Western, developed and market-based 
economies has been studied extensively for more than 60 years, yet it remains a 
puzzle to scholars (Harris & Raviv, 1991; Swanson, et al, 2003). 
Theories of capital structure first emerged in the 1950s, among them the seminal 
studies of Durand (1952) and Modigliani and Miller (1958). Durand’s (1952) 
‘relevance theory’ stated that capital structure affects the value of firms because 
of the impact that the relative different costs of debt and equity have on the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). In contrast, the ‘irrelevance theory’ of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) explained that capital structure does not affect the 
value of firms under perfect market conditions because it is the return to assets 
rather than the costs of capital that determine the value of the firms.  
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Since 1958, the study of capital structure has expanded, and the research 
literature has evolved in three directions. The first is the traditional financial 
approach to the study of capital structure. Trade-off theory emerged from this 
approach, which was developed on the basis of Modigliani and Miller’s 
irrelevance theory by considering a number of imperfect market conditions. It 
states that, in imperfect markets, firms determine their optimal capital structure by 
finding the balance between debt benefits and debt costs. This theory considers 
mainly the impact on capital structure of corporate tax (Modigliani & Miller, 1963), 
personal tax (Miller, 1977), non-debt tax shields (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980) and 
bankruptcy costs (Baron, 1974; Warner, 1977). Signalling models took a different 
perspective from Modigliani and Miller’s theory by considering the impact of 
information asymmetry on capital structure. Myers and Majluf (1984) treated debt 
or equity as a signal of information to markets and developed the pecking order 
theory. This theory argued that firms often finance investments in the order of 
using retained earnings, debt and then equity due to asymmetric information in 
different financial funding instruments, such as internal funding versus external 
funding and debt funding versus equity funding.  
The second major direction of the research into capital structure is the corporate 
governance approach. Jensen and Meckling (1976) regarded debt and equity as 
part of a corporate governance mechanism. They developed the agency cost 
theory to relate the principal-agent problem of corporate governance to capital 
structure. Agency cost theory examines the impact on capital structure of the 
agency cost of debt arising from the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
creditors and the agency cost of equity arising from the conflict of interest 
between shareholders and managers. 
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The third, and most recent, direction of research into capital structure is the 
business strategy approach. Business strategy models of capital structure aim to 
link a firm’s strategy with its capital structure. These models emphasise the 
alignment of business strategy with financing decisions (Barton & Gordon, 1988; 
Kochhar, 1998). Notable research using this approach comes from two dominant 
standpoints: product diversification and transaction cost economics (TCE). Lowe, 
Naughton and Taylor (1994) and Jordan, Lowe and Taylor (1998) examined the 
impact of product diversification on capital structure. Williamson (1988) and 
Kochhar (1996) used transaction cost economics to examine the impact on 
capital structure of various transaction costs of debt and equity with respect to 
asset specificity.  
In general, the theories mentioned above have developed from research carried 
out in the context of Western market economies (Chittenden, Hall, & Hutchinson, 
1996; Hall, Hutchinson, & Michaelas, 2000, 2004). Extensive empirical studies 
have recently been undertaken in an effort to apply these theories within the 
framework of developing and transitional economies. This thesis attempts a more 
specific focus by situating an examination of capital structure in the context of 
listed companies in China.  
1.3. The Chinese Institutional Context 
Since the seminal works of Durand (1952) and Modigiliani and Miller (1958), the 
nature of managerial capitalism, governance mechanisms and processes, 
financial institutions and capital markets has changed significantly in Western 
economies. While some of these changes are mirrored in China, others are not.  
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Arguably, China differs from both developed and developing countries in a 
number of respects. Prior to 1978, the Chinese economy was centralised and 
planned, and the market mechanism was suppressed. The financial system had 
no financial institutions or markets beyond those provided by the state and those 
operating informally. After 1978, reform of the Chinese economy and financial 
system made possible a change of capital structure for state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) (Wang, 2007). However, the direction of the economic and financial 
reforms was uncertain, as political and ideological issues were debated in the 
context of conflict between the socialist nature of Chinese firms and an 
independent financial system (Shen, 1992). 
In some ways, the Chinese corporate sector is the epitome of market capitalism 
at work (Xu & Wang, 1997); however, in other ways, Chinese firms and banks are 
still essentially part of a ‘socialist market system’. This is manifested in the 
dominant government ownership of most firms, the consequently immature 
institutions of corporate governance (Hovey, 2004; Naughton, 2005), the 
management of credit policy by government with its implications for credit 
allocation regimes (Wang, 1995), and the listing and trading regulations that 
influence the equity market mechanisms (Wang, 1995). These factors may have 
influenced the choice between debt and equity by Chinese listed companies 
(Chen & Xue, 2004). 
The policy function of the People’s Bank of China (China’s central bank) was not 
separate from the commercial function until 1984. Since then, a number of 
financial institutions have been developed and restored. Although this has 
created and promoted debt facilities for SOEs, it has been within the institutional 
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context of the government ownership of both firms and commercial banks (Shen, 
1995). Debate on the socialist nature of Chinese banks has continued until very 
recently, when Chinese banks were listed on stock markets. Foreign banks are 
now allowed to enter the Chinese banking market, and Sino-foreign joint 
ownership of Chinese banks is permitted.  
The institutional context of the Chinese banking system has influenced the credit 
arrangements of Chinese firms. Chinese SOEs are financed more by bank loans 
(77% of total corporate debt) than corporate bonds (1% of total corporate debt), 
and more by short-term debt (45% of total corporate debt) than long-term debt 
(20% of total corporate debt) (Chen & Xue, 2004). 
Securities markets were non-existent until the establishment of the Shanghai 
Securities Exchange (SHX) in 1991 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZX) in 
1992. The development of these capital markets enabled some well-selected 
SOEs to be incorporated as joint stock companies, thus creating opportunities for 
equity funding for SOEs, but within the Chinese institutional context of strong 
government regulations on listing, trading and market operation (Shen, 1993a, 
1993d).  
The institutional context of Chinese stock markets has influenced ownership 
structure and ownership concentration (Hovey & Naughton, 2003). The 
combination of the government ownership of non-tradable government-owned-
shares (G-Share) and the legal person ownership of non-tradable legal-person-
owned shares (L-Share) accounts for, on average, 50.468% of total shares of a 
listed company, while individual ownership of tradable shares (A-Share) accounts 
for 36.44%. Domestic share ownership is far greater than foreign share 
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ownership, which accounts for only 2.23% of total shares. Foreign-owned shares 
are listed as B-Share, designated as tradable only among foreign investors. Non-
tradable shares account for 56.19% of the total shares of a listed company, while 
tradable shares account for 39.38%. The ownership concentration is high. Share 
ownership by the largest single investor accounts for 43.49% of the total shares 
in Chinese listed companies, while the three largest investors account for 55.8%, 
and the ten largest investors account for 61.41% (Chen and Xue, 2004). 
Supporting data on the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies 1992-
2003 is presented in Table A1.1 on p. 267 of the Appendix. 
Whilst Chinese financial institutions and markets are underdeveloped, they are 
also heavily interfered with by the government. As a result, the relative costs of 
debt and equity have been distorted. Some Chinese studies have reported that, 
in China, equity cost is much lower than debt cost (Gao, 2000). Huang and Zhang 
(2001) estimated the cost of equity at only 2.5%. Later, Lu and Ye (2003) revised 
the cost of equity to 5%, which is still lower than a standard bank lending rate. 
These scholars argued that Chinese firms’ strong preference for equity financing 
may be due to this distortion in costs between debt and equity. 
In a Chinese tax regime favouring government-owned companies, managers may 
not have to decide on an optimal capital structure with focus on tax benefit of debt 
(Wang, 2004). Bankruptcy of government-owned companies is extremely difficult 
and highly unlikely, so Chinese companies are under no threat of bankruptcy 
from taking excessive debt (Chen & Xue, 2004). These institutional factors may 
affect the capital structure of Chinese listed companies differently than would be 
expected according to traditional financial theories of capital structure. 
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It is important that business strategy theories of capital structure as applied to 
Chinese listed companies are tested within the appropriate context. In China, 
product markets and asset markets are, as yet, not well-established. In addition, 
Chinese companies are threatened neither strongly nor openly by market 
competition, and are therefore not particularly sensitive to the implications of 
product strategy and asset strategy when decisions on capital structure are 
made, despite a high degree of business diversification (Fan, Huang, Oberholzer-
Gee, Smith, & Zhao, 2007).  
In the Chinese institutional context, because listed companies and banks are both 
owned by the government, the conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders and between shareholders and creditors must be a particular focus 
in any test of corporate governance theory (Hovey, 2004). When, as is the case 
in China, the agency cost of equity and the agency cost of debt are important 
issues, corporate governance factors such as ownership structure and equity 
structure may influence the capital structure of listed companies (Hovey, Li, & 
Naughton, 2003; Marsden, Naughton, Veeraraghavan, & Zhu, 2005). 
1.4. Chinese Capital Structure Patterns 
China has reformed her economy over the 30-year period of time since 1978. 
One of the key economic reforms that has taken place is the reform of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). The most significant element in SOE reform has been 
the change from a dominant reliance of SOEs on government funding to the debt 
funding of financial institutions (since 1984) and the equity funding of financial 
markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen (since 1991) (Wang, 1999, 2007).  
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Since then, the capital structure of SOEs has witnessed significant change. The 
importance of debt financing in capital structure has increased. The proportion to 
GDP of Chinese firms’ outstanding loans has increased from 97.96% in 1991 to 
117% in 2003. Equity financing has also grown rapidly. The market capitalisation 
of listed companies in relation to GDP has increased from 3.89% in 1991 to 
52.52% in 2000. Data reflecting the change in corporate finance in China from 
1991-2005 is presented in Table A1.2 on p. 268 of the Appendix. 
In the process of this change, what is interesting is that like other developing 
countries, China’s listed companies have a low ratio of debt to equity when 
compared to companies in developed nations. The ratio of debt to equity in 
developed countries stands at an average of 2.861, while in developing countries 
the ratio of debt to equity is, on average, only 1.790. Table A1.3, on p. 269 of the 
Appendix, presents additional data on financial leverage in developed and 
developing countries in 2001. 
The ratio of liabilities to total assets in Chinese listed companies is at an average 
level of 55.44% (or a debt to equity ratio of 1.244) from 1992 to 2003 ( see Table 
A1.4 on p. 270 of the Appendix). Of this 55.44%, the short term debt is 42.64%. 
More and more Chinese listed companies have a debt to total asset ratio of less 
than 50% (575 companies in 1999, and 676 in 2000) (see Table A1.5 on p. 271 of 
the Appendix.) 
In addition, the nature of the ‘pecking order’ — which, in developed countries, 
involves using internal funding first, debt funding second, and equity funding last 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984) — becomes a ‘reverse pecking order’ in China, with equity 
funding first, debt funding second, and internal funding last. Data on developed 
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countries for the period from 1970 to 1985 (see Table A1.6, on p. 271 of the 
Appendix) show that, except for Japan and Italy, the major source of funding is 
internal retained earnings, which accounts for 72%, 66.9%, 55.2% and 54.2% in 
the UK, USA, Germany and Canada, respectively. 
The data for the developed countries for the period from 1984 to 1991 (presented 
in Table A1.7 on p. 272 of the Appendix) demonstrate that this pecking order 
remained from 1984 to 1991 (77% in USA, 67% in Germany, and 51% in UK.  
The data for China (presented in Table A1.8 on p. 272 of the Appendix) shows 
that, both profitable and unprofitable companies used internal funding at an 
average level of 14.95% and -3.38%, debt funding at an average level of 34.44% 
and 55.15%, and equity funding at an average level of 50.61% and 48.23%, 
respectively over a period from 1995 to 2000.  
The change from a planned economy to a market economy in China has provided 
a new dimension to the understanding of the capital structure puzzle (Liu, 1999; 
Chen, 2004; Chen & Xu, 2004; Wang, 2003; Tong & Green, 2004; Chung, 2006; 
Huang & Song, 2006; Qian, Tian, & Wiranto, 2007; Lei, 2007). The changing 
institutional context has influenced the capital structure of Chinese listed 
companies from 1991 to 2000, thus making a study on the determinants of capital 
structure of Chinese listed companies not only an important research area per se, 
it is also significant because it may illuminate the moderating role the institutional 
context of the Chinese listed companies could have on their behaviour and 
observed capital structure choices.  
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1.5. Research Questions 
Traditional financial theories see capital structure as the result of mainly financial, 
tax and growth factors (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). Corporate governance theories 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and Business strategy theories (Barton & Gordon, 
1988, however, suggest that other factors may also influence capital structure. 
Focusing on the Chinese context, this research moves beyond the conventional 
approach and includes models of capital structure that recognise the importance 
of business strategy and corporate governance as well as financial factors. These 
different perspectives will be used to help examine the fundamental research 
question:  
What are the determinants of capital structure in Chinese listed companies 
over a period of change and transition between 1991 and 2000? 
Within this fundamental question, there are two important secondary questions: 
What is the relative impact of financial factors, strategy factors and 
governance factors on capital structure? 
and 
Are the observed relationships consistent with the theory and empirical 
evidence derived from studies in developed market economies? 
1.6. Research Objectives 
A number of factors have guided the nature and direction of this work: 
• The importance of capital structure in the development of firms 
• The continued interest of scholars in this work, and, with that, the 
ambiguity of their findings 
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• The rapidly changing nature of China as an open, market-based economy, 
and the impact that internal and institutional developments have on capital 
structure and the development of firms 
With these motivations in mind, this research sets out to achieve a number of 
objectives: 
1. To establish a multi-disciplinary theoretical framework incorporating 
financial, business strategy and corporate governance factors in order to 
examine the determinants of capital structure of Chinese listed companies. 
The study will apply trade-off theory and pecking order theory in the 
traditional financial approach as the basis of the framework. In addition, 
the current study will go beyond this and incorporate the product 
diversification view and transaction cost economics (TCE) theory in the 
business strategy approach and the agency cost theory in the corporate 
governance approach; 
2. To review the process of Chinese SOE reform from the perspective of the 
theoretical framework in order to identify the Chinese institutional factors 
that may affect the capital structure and assess the relevance of capital 
structure theories for the Chinese firms; 
3. To design, on the basis of the theoretical framework, multi-variable and 
multi-level statistical models of capital structure using data collected from 
1,098 companies over a period of 10 years and to test the hypotheses in 
line with relevant theories; 
4. To design, on the basis of the theoretical framework, research 
methodology using both ordinary least square models and linear mixed 
models and to estimate the significance of various statistical models; and 
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5. To investigate the empirical evidence for the determinants of capital 
structure, on the basis of the theoretical framework, particularly the impact 
of financial variables, product diversification, asset specificity, ownership 
structure and ownership concentration on capital structure. 
1.7. Some Challenges to the Research  
Any researcher in this area will be confronted with a number of challenges in 
methodology and data, particularly in a study within the Chinese context. The first 
challenge is the quality and availability of data. Although it has become easier to 
obtain data in recent years, the financial data for the early years of the 1990s is 
limited — at least in electronic format. The data used in this thesis has been 
taken from six volumes of hardcopy information on Chinese listed companies. 
These data were manually typed into the database with several check-ups. While 
this effort was laborious, it was undertaken to ensure that the data would be as 
accurate as possible.  
The second challenge is the definition of dependent variables. Normally, capital 
structure is defined as the ratio of debt to equity (DE) and the ratio of debt to total 
asset (DTA). Debt includes short-term debt and long-term debt. Total debt which 
includes both short-term and long-term debt is part of total liabilities. In Chinese 
firms, short-term debt is far greater than long-term debt in the debt structure; in 
addition, the corporate bond market is very underdeveloped, with a very small 
portion of corporate bonds in total liabilities. For these reasons, total liabilities 
have been used instead of short-term or long-term debts. Also, debt and equity 
can be measured in either book value or market value. In the Chinese context, 
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the market value of debt and equity could be distorted by the underdevelopment 
of financial markets. The capital structure in this research is defined as the ratio 
of total liabilities to equity (DE) and the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (DTA) 
in book-value terms.  
The third challenge in this research is the identification of proxies for some of the 
independent variables. The proxies for financial variables are not as difficult as 
the proxies for business strategy and corporate governance variables. The 
information of product list and asset description is used to code the listed 
companies according to the estimated degrees of product diversification and 
asset specificity. The information on the percentage distribution of various types 
of shares is used to define the proxies for ownership structure and concentration. 
These proxies are in line with the current research of other scholars in the field. 
The final challenge is that the data is in a panel format including cross-sectional 
observations over time. In the panel data, the multicollinearity problem can be 
exacerbated by not only a possible correlation among variables but also by a 
possible autocorrelation between years (Arellano, 2003; Baltagi, 2005). Although 
most research uses the conventional ordinary least square regression (OLS) 
method in this field, this research uses a relatively new method: linear mixed 
model (LMM) (Verbeke, 2000). By doing so, the multicollinearity problem can be 
addressed, and, in addition, the results of OLS and LMM can be compared. 
1.8. Contribution to Knowledge 
This study seeks to make the following contributions:  
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1. Most studies on the capital structure of Western and Chinese companies 
have used a single and narrow theoretical approach. This study, in 
contrast, attempts to apply multi-disciplinary theories to examine the 
determinants of capital structure and will therefore contribute to 
broadening the perspective of study in examining the capital structure and 
the behaviour of firms. 
2. Most studies of Chinese capital structure have applied Western capital 
structure theories without closely examining the relevance or irrelevance of 
these theories when applied to the Chinese institutional context. This study 
attempts to examine the Chinese institutional context and discuss the 
impact of Chinese institutional factors that may affect capital structure. It 
therefore contributes to enhancing the empirical value of studying capital 
structure in the case of Chinese listed companies.  
3. Most studies of capital structure have adopted a conventional OLS model 
to estimate capital structure determinants. This study uses, in addition, a 
multi-variable, multi-level LMM to examine the determinants of Chinese 
listed companies. Most studies of Chinese capital structure have examined 
the Chinese capital structure determinants without looking at the market 
variations in China. This study examines all companies listed on the 
Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets jointly and separately. Therefore, 
this study contributes to developing and using a sophisticated method of 
examining the capital structure determinants of Chinese listed companies.  
This study takes a rigorous approach to designing the multi-disciplinary 
framework of capital structure theories, links various theoretical approaches to 
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the Chinese institutional context, and adopts a sophisticated statistical 
methodology to examine the capital structure determinants of Chinese listed 
companies, thus allowing researchers to examine the nature of the Chinese firm 
and market at a time of change and transition.  
1.9. Thesis Structure 
The thesis has seven chapters (see Figure 1.1: Thesis Structure on p. 19). 
Following this chapter, Chapter Two provides the literature review and explains 
previous work in the area of capital structure and how these studies are relevant 
to the thesis. The chapter also reviews current studies in capital structure of 
Chinese listed companies. The chapter reviews the literature with a focus on the 
three areas of capital structure theories: corporate finance, business strategy and 
corporate governance, and aims to develop a theoretical framework for modelling 
the theoretical hypotheses on capital structure determinants.  
Chapter Three explains the institutional context in which the Chinese listed 
companies have been developed and some institutional factors which may affect 
the capital structure of the Chinese listed companies. It reviews the process of 
reforming the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to the listed companies in China. 
The chapter aims to provide an assessment of the Chinese institutional context 
for its relevance to the focus of research from the three theoretical approaches 





Chapter Four defines the hypotheses and explains how they are modelled. This 
chapter develops four models in line with three sets of theoretical hypotheses 
according to the capital structure theories outlined in Chapter Two and their 
relevance for the Chinese institutional context discussed in Chapter Three. This 
chapter aims to design statistical models using ordinary least square models and 
linear mixed models to test theoretical hypotheses of capital structure.  
Chapter Five discusses the methodology and data, and explains how the data is 
processed. In addition, the variables are defined and statistical models to be 
estimated are identified. The chapter discusses how linear regression models 
(OLS) are estimated by the least square methods and how linear mixed models 
(LMM) with fixed and random effects are estimated by the maximum likelihood 
ratio. This chapter describes how the statistical fit of models is examined.  
Chapter Six reports on the empirical findings of the models tested. The chapter 
presents, analyses and compares the results of OLS and LMM between four 
statistical models using two dependent variables in three markets. This chapter 
aims to identify the determinants of capital structure of Chinese listed companies.  
Chapter Seven outlines the contributions that this research makes to the study of 
capital structure in the case of Chinese listed companies, discusses some 
limitations to the research and makes some suggestions for future study. This 
chapter aims to highlight the extent to which the current study on the capital 
structure of the Chinese listed contributes to the study of capital structure in 
general and the study of the Chinese capital structure in particular.  
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1.10. Concluding Remarks 
The rapidly changing nature of the Chinese economy makes it not only valuable 
but imperative to examine the factors that may influence the way Chinese listed 
companies fund their operations for future growth. Given the different and 
changing institutional and market conditions in China, it is necessary and 
constructive to include business strategy and corporate governance explanations 
of capital structure in addition to the financial approach taken in this study. For 
this purpose, an intensive panel of data has been collected and an innovative 
methodology has been designed to address the research questions. This 
research not only provides a test of the capital structure ‘puzzle’, but it also 
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Chapter 1  Poses the research question: what are the determinants of capital structure of Chinese listed companies? 
Chapter 2  Reviews the literature from three theoretical approaches: financial approach (trade-off theory [TOT] and pecking order theory [POT]), 
business strategy approach (product diversification view [PDV] and transaction cost economics [TCE] theory), and corporate governance 
approach (agency cost theory [ACT]). 
Chapter 3  Discusses the Chinese institutional context of Chinese listed companies in relation to financial markets and institutions, product and asset 
markets and owneyrship structure and ownership concentration. 
Chapter 4:  Models the hypotheses in terms of Model 1 (financial variables), Model 2 (financial and business strategy variables), Model 3 (financial 
and corporate govyernance variables) and Model 4 (all variables). 
Chapter 5  Discusses the data and methodology in relation to two statistical methods (OLS: ordinary least square model, and LMM: linear mixed 
model) using two dependent variables (LDE: log of debt to equity ratio, and ARCDTA: arcsin square root of debt to total asset ratio) for 
three data sets: the SZX data set, the SHX data set and the joint data set of SZXSHX. 
Chapter 6  Reports and discusses the results of the four statistical models using the OLS and LMM methods with the LDE and ARCDTA dependent 
variables for the SZX, SHX and SZXSHX data sets in relation to the combined market SZXSHX, the SZX market and the SHX market. 




CHAPTER TWO  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
Within the area of corporate finance, the investigation of ‘ideal’, optimal and 
actual capital structures is a mature research field. Over fifty years ago, Durand 
(1952) asserted that the choice of capital structure of a firm could be influenced 
by the relative costs of debt and equity, and therefore the value of a firm could be 
affected by the net balance of relative costs of debt and equity in the chosen 
structure of capital. Durand’s ‘relevance theory’ was based on only a number of 
hypothetical scenarios. Later in the same decade, Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
developed a formal theory of capital structure. Using theoretical models, they 
presented their ‘irrelevance theory’, that is the capital structure of a firm does not 
affect the value of a firm under perfect market conditions.  
Since these early capital structure studies, a large number of theoretical as well 
as empirical studies in this field have emerged. Over time, the theoretical 
paradigm has shifted gradually from financial approaches to non-financial 
approaches, from country-based studies to regional studies, from developed 
economies to developing economies, and from market economies to transitional 
economies. (See Table A2.1 on pp. 273-274 of the Appendix). This chapter 
synthesises and classifies the most significant research literature on capital 
structure from the perspectives of how corporate finance, corporate business 
strategy and corporate governance considerations might influence the capital 
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structure of firms. Later in the chapter, some hypothesised relationships are 
developed and presented regarding the contribution of these factors to variations 
in the capital structures of firms. 
2.2. Overview of Early Capital Structure Literature: The Impact of Capital 
Structure on the Value of Firms  
The study of capital structure was pioneered by financial researchers in the 
1950s. It focused on an examination of the relationship between capital structure 
and the value of a firm. The key research issue in the financial literature focuses 
on the debate between the traditional ‘relevance theory’ of Durand (1952) and the 
modern ‘irrelevance theory’ of Modigliani and Miller (1958).  
2.2.1. Durand’s Relevance Theory: The Impact of Relative Costs of Debt and 
Equity on the Value of Firms  
According to Durand’s (1952) traditional theory of capital structure, the value of a 
firm can be affected by its capital structure. This theory is based on three key 
points:  
a. Net Income Approach: Debt is normally cheaper than equity; therefore, 
when more debt is mixed with equity, the weighted average of the cost of 
total funds including both debt and equity becomes lower, thereby 
increasing the value of a firm. 
b. Net Operating Income Approach: When more debt is used, the cost of 
equity is increased because shareholders demand a risk premium for 
higher debt financing. As a result, the weighted average of the cost of total 
funds including both debt and equity becomes higher, thus decreasing the 
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value of a firm. The benefit of lower cost in debt funding can partially or 
totally offset the increased cost of equity, thereby impacting on the value of 
a firm.  
c. Optimal Capital Structure Approach: The impact of capital structure on the 
value of a firm depends on a net balance between the benefit of debt 
financing (cost reduction) and the increased cost of equity (risk reduction). 
The result of the hypothetical analysis is that there may be an optimal 
capital structure where the value of a firm can be maximised, or the cost of 
capital minimised by adjusting the ratios of debt to equity.  
The traditional approach, therefore, focuses mainly on the relative costs of debt 
and equity and their associated impact of capital structures on the value of a firm. 
Durand’s (1952) research pioneered the study of capital structure; however it 
provides only a hypothetical framework of various scenarios, with the focus on 
the right hand-side of company’s balance sheet or on the cost difference between 
different financing instruments; that is, debt and equity.  
2.2.2. Modigliani and Miller’s Irrelevance Theory: The Impact of Capital 
Structure under Perfect Market Conditions on the Value of Firms 
In their seminal paper, Modigliani & Miller (1958) demonstrated that under perfect 
market conditions, capital structure (debt-equity ratio) has no effect on the value 
of a firm, and that the value of a firm is mainly determined by the return of assets 
regardless of the mix of capital structure. Their arguments were based on the 
following famous propositions in perfect market conditions (the Modigliani and 
Miller model, or the MM model): 
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• The market value of a firm is determined by capitalising the firm’s expected 
return appropriate to the risk class of assets independent of the firm’s 
capital structure (Modigliani & Miller, 1958, p. 268);  
• The price per dollar worth of expected return must be the same for all 
shares of any given class (Modigliani & Miller, 1958, p. 267); and  
• The average cost of capital to any firm is completely independent of its 
capital structure and is equal to the capitalisation rate of a pure equity 
stream in its risk class of assets (Modigliani & Miller, 1958, p. 268). 
According to the MM model, it is the return on assets (the left-hand side of a 
firm’s balance sheet) that determines the value of a firm not the capital structure 
or the mix of funding (the right-hand side of a firm’s balance sheet). Therefore, 
the market value of a firm is independent of its capital structure. As a result, the 
value of a firm with debt and the value of a firm without debt must be the same. If 
they are not the same, arbitrage between these two firms will take place through 
a home-made leverage process which will result in the same value for both firms.  
The MM model of capital structure was established on the basis of the analysis of 
two financial behaviours: (1) the arbitrage behaviour of investors in the face of 
different values of firms in the same risk class to prove that the values of leverage 
and un-leveraged firms cannot be dissimilar; and (2) the risk-averse behaviour of 
investors in the face of different risks of debt and equity to prove that the cost of 
equity will be increasing along with the debt ratio.  
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2.2.3. The Challenge of Imperfect Markets 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) challenged the traditional theory of Durand (1952) by 
stating that capital structure does not affect the value of the firm, but only under 
perfect market conditions. According to the definition of a perfect market 
(Swanson, et al., 2003, p. 25), the following conditions are necessary:  
a) Markets can have no ‘friction’ (i.e., no transaction costs, no taxes, no 
regulatory restrictions and all assets must be traded on a level playing 
field); 
b) Product and security markets must be competitive in that producers supply 
goods at the average cost and everyone in the security market is a price 
taker where there is no bankruptcy;  
c) Firms and individuals can borrow and lend at the same risk-free rate;  
d) Information must be simultaneously available to all individuals at no cost;  
e) Individuals are rational utility maximisers.  
However, the reality of business is that markets are far from perfect. The 
significant contribution of Modigliani and Miller’s landmark research is that it has 
since provoked a rapid development of research into the determinants of capital 
structure and their impact on the value of a firm in imperfect market conditions. 
Although financial markets in Western economies are seen as efficient in terms of 
information on price and values, according to the efficient market hypothesis, 
institutional and market conditions do vary greatly between markets, economies 
and countries (Hall, Hutchinson, & Michaelas, 2004). China is a case in point 
where market conditions are not only imperfect, but also distorted to some extent. 
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The value of the early capital structure literature is significant. It provides a 
platform for understanding the capital structure puzzle. However, it is limited in 
that it focuses on the sole objective of a firm’s maximisation of the value of that 
firm. Although firms aim to maximise their value (and therefore the return to 
shareholders) according to rational economics, the objectives of firms vary with 
economic systems and social institutions. China, once again, can be a case in 
point where government-owned firms may maximise growth, size or social 
welfare rather than value.  
2.2.4. Post-MM Models of Capital Structure Research 
Deciding on the capital structure of a firm is a choice between debt financing and 
equity financing so as to best achieve the business objective. This decision-
making process necessarily involves three main decision-makers: the managers 
(who run the firm), the shareholders (who invest equity funds in the firm), and the 
creditors (who provide debt finance to the firm). Thus, the capital structure of a 
firm may be influenced jointly by these decision-makers’ considerations of various 
factors. In a survey of capital structure theories, Harris and Raviv (1991, p. 299), 
categorised the following four groups of determinants:  
1. Ameliorate conflicts of interest among various groups with claims to the 
firm’s resources, including managers (the agency approach);  
2. Convey private information to capital markets or mitigate adverse selection 
effects (the asymmetric information approach);  
3. Influence the nature of products or competition in the product/input market 
(product market approach); or  
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4. Affect the outcome of corporate control contests (corporate governance 
approach) (Harris & Raviv, 1991, p. 299).  
In a more recent literature survey (Swanson, et al., 2003, pp. 10-11), the scope of 
capital structure determinants was broadened to include a wider range of factors; 
including corporate tax, personal tax, bankruptcy, agency costs, corporate 
governance, signalling, ownership structure, macroeconomic variables, flotation 
costs, government regulation and others. 
The literature on capital structure is very comprehensive. The extensive research 
that scholars have undertaken over time aims to explain the ‘puzzle’ of capital 
structure under imperfect market conditions (Myers, 1984). However, as Myers 
comments, ‘there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice, and no reason 
to expect one’ (p. 81). Ismail and Eldominiaty (2004) explained that ‘the practice 
of capital structure formation decision varies … a firm can move from one theory 
to another or use more than one theory at a time ... it is easily observable that two 
or more theories of capital may exist and influence corporate financing strategy at 
the same time’ (p. 2, 12).  
This literature review with respect to the research question in the Chinese 
institutional context focuses on three groups of factors in three theoretical 
approaches according to five relevant capital structure theories as follows:   
Group 1: The Financial Approach 
• Factors affecting tax benefits and bankruptcy costs in using debt according 




• Factors leading to asymmetric information between Insider investors 
(internal funding) and outside investors (external funding) and between 
creditors (debt funding) and shareholders (equity funding) according to the 
Pecking Order Theory (POT) (Myers & Majluf, 1984)  
 
Group 2: The Business Strategy Approach 
• Factors relating to product diversity and asset specificity in relation to their 
impact on capital structure according to the product diversification view 
(Barton & Gordon, 1988; Jordan et al., 1998; Lowe et al., 1994) and 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1988); 
and  
Group 3: The Corporate Governance Approach 
• Factors affecting debt agency cost and equity agency cost according to 
Agency Cost Theory (ACT) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
2.3. Financial Approach: The Impact of Financial Variables on Capital Structure  
The financial approach to the study of capital structure is mainly based on TOT 
and POT. TOT considers two main factors — tax and bankruptcy — and focuses 
on the balance between the financial benefits of tax deductibility of debt interest 
and the financial costs of bankruptcy in relation to debt financing. It is assumed 
that imperfect market conditions such as tax arrangements and bankruptcy 
possibilities affect the balance between debt benefits and debt costs and 
therefore capital structure (see Table A2.2 on p. 275 of the Appendix.) 
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2.3.1. Trade-Off Theory (TOT): The Impact of Debt Benefits and Costs on 
Capital Structure 
The MM model, based on perfect market conditions, was relaxed initially by one 
condition: tax. Debt has benefits in increasing the value of a firm due to the tax 
deductibility of debt interest. Modigliani and Miller (1963) introduced the corporate 
income tax effect into their model and demonstrated that, in the event of tax, the 
capital structure has a positive impact on the value of a firm after taking into 
account the interest costs being tax-deducted. In a further refinement, Miller 
(1977) incorporated the personal income tax rate into this equation and found that 
the corporate tax benefit of debt could be reduced or offset by this tax rate. In 
another study, DeAmgelo and Masulis (1980) considered the impact of non-debt 
tax shields such as depreciation, investment tax credits and depletion allowance 
and argued that the corporate tax benefit of debt could be increased or expanded 
as a result of these non-debt tax shields. These three pieces of study focus on 
the examination of tax benefits of debt. 
Most scholars agree that debt has benefits and, more importantly, also agree that 
tax benefits are not inexhaustible. Otherwise, it would be beneficial to finance 
company operations 100% by debt (Swanson, et al., 2003, p. 158). However, 
debt has costs as well. The inclusion of bankruptcy costs in a study of capital 
structure by Baron (1974, p. 178) produced the bankruptcy theory of capital 
structure. Bankruptcy theory argues that the more debt is issued, the greater the 
risk to equity (higher cost of equity), but also the greater the likelihood of 
bankruptcy and the higher the costs of bankruptcy (Baxter, 1967).  
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Bankruptcy costs include both direct and indirect costs. Direct costs of bankruptcy 
include the legal and administrative costs of liquidation and reorganisation. 
According to Warner (1977), this cost is on average 1% of the market value of the 
company seven years before bankruptcy, and 2.5% of the market value of the 
company three years before bankruptcy. Indirect costs of bankruptcy include the 
impaired ability to conduct business and the tendency to under-invest. According 
to Altman (1984), both direct and indirect bankruptcy cost could be as high as 
11% to 17% of the total value of the firm up to three years prior to bankruptcy. 
Some empirical studies suggest that large companies tend to have higher debt 
because their bankruptcy costs are relatively lower than small companies. 
Trade-off theory (TOT) hypothesises that some factors representing debt benefits 
have a positive impact on debt level and other factors representing debt costs 
have a negative impact on debt level. According to TOT, the choice of capital 
structure depends on the net impact of positive factors offsetting negative factors 
(see Table A2.2 on p. 275 of the Appendix). TOT argues for the existence of the 
optimal capital structure where a firm’s value is maximised by developing a 
balance between the present value of both debt tax shields and non-debt tax 
shields and the present value of bankruptcy costs arising from financial distress. 
2.3.2. Pecking Order Theory (POT): The Impact of Information Asymmetry on 
Capital Structure 
Pecking order theory (POT) is based on the hypothesised existence of 
information asymmetry between shareholders, managers and creditors when 
either debt or equity is used. POT (Myers & Majluf, 1984) assumes that insiders 
(either managers or existing shareholders) are privately and better informed 
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about the future returns and investment opportunities than outside investors 
and/or than creditors. Considering the information asymmetry between inside and 
outside investors and between creditors and shareholders, POT rejects the 
existence of an optimal capital structure and argues that firms normally follow a 
pecking order in corporate finance; that is, preferring internal funding instead of 
external funding and preferring debt funding instead of equity funding.  
Myers (1984) explained that this pecking order is due to the fact that information 
is not symmetrical when it comes to the arrangement of debt and/or equity. 
Creditors are not necessarily well-informed on how creditworthy the debtors are, 
and shareholders are not necessarily well-informed on how managers are 
working in their best interests. When contracting with an agent who has superior 
information, an uninformed agent faces the consequences of adverse selection 
because he does not know if the relevant characteristics of the informed agent 
are good or bad. This is what Akerlof (1970) described in his example of used 
cars market as the problem of ‘lemons’. Adverse selection occurs as a result of 
managers, equity holders and creditors holding asymmetric information.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) further explained that the issuing of equity could be a 
negative signal to investors. The under-investment occurs when equity is used in 
the event of information asymmetry due to severe underpricing and possible 
rejection of projects with high net present value. They argued, therefore, that the 
issuing of debt could be a positive signal to investors, and using internal funds or 
debt avoids the underinvestment problem (Harris & Raviv, pp. 306-311). 
According to Ross (1977), the use of debt provides a signal (information) to 
outside investors on the perceived good performance by that company.  
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POT differs from TOT in the interpretation of the impact of a firm’s profit, size and 
growth on capital structure. TOT states that profit, size and growth are positively 
related to capital structure because they are all proxies for high debt-related tax 
benefits and/or low debt-related bankruptcy costs. However POT argues that the 
same characteristics can be negatively related to capital structure due to the 
existence of information asymmetry. 
The financial approach on the basis of TOT and POT has made many 
contributions to the study of capital structure, but it has a number of limitations. 
Swanson et al. (2003, p. 6) pointed out that ‘most of the financial statement 
numbers move together over time, and there will be multicollinearity because the 
accounting equation (assets = liabilities + equity) will naturally result in variables 
explaining each other’. Another concern is that capital structure adjustment to 
achieve the optimum capital structure can be very costly in imperfect markets, 
particularly so in a dynamic trade-off situation. This approach restricts the 
analysis to the impact of financial determinants on capital structure and ignores 
the implications of non-financial factors — business strategies in objectives, 
values and goals of firm’s decision makers (owner, creditor and manager) — on a 
firm’s capital structure, as well as the impact of a conflict of interest between and 
among shareholders, managers and creditors on a firm’s capital structure. Real 
business context indicates to us that the choice of debt or equity cannot and 
should not be made simply by balancing debt benefits and debt costs without 
doing this in the various environments of the firm’s business strategies and 
corporate governance arrangements.  
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2.4. Corporate Governance Approach: The Impact of Agency Costs on 
Capital Structure 
In the 1970s, the research on financial determinants extended to include the 
rapidly growing area of corporate governance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Corporate governance is concerned with the establishment of mechanisms to 
align different interests of stakeholders and minimise the conflict of interest 
between and among stakeholders. The conflict of interest or principal-agent 
problem is the key issue in corporate governance theory. This classical agency 
theory problem was originally posed by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means (1932), 
who observed that, in a large corporation, ownership and control were often 
separated, and this separation is subject to moral hazard, adverse selection and 
agency cost. 
2.4.1 Agency Cost Theory (ACT) 
The corporate governance approach is based on agency cost theory (ACT). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the first to examine capital structure from the 
agency cost perspective. The essence of the agency theory is based on the 
assumption that agents may not always act in the interests of principals, thus 
leading to misalignment between the interests of agents with those of principals 
and resulting in the loss in return to the principals. ACT considers the impact of 
agency costs on capital structure in the corporate governance context of various 
interest conflicts between shareholders and managers and between shareholders 
and creditors when either debt or equity is used.  
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Jensen and Meckling Meckling (1976, p. 308) defined the agency cost as 
including ‘(1) the monitoring expenditures of the principal, (2) the bonding 
expenditure by the agent, and (3) the residual loss)’. Swanson et al. (2003, p. 94) 
explained the agency cost in more detail as including the total cost of creating 
and structuring contracts, including monitoring costs, bonding costs, and the 
residual loss of opportunities that may have been beneficial in the absence of 
conflict of interest between shareholders and managers due to separation of 
ownership from management. Williamson argued that these agency costs are 
mainly ex ante costs arising from incentive alignments. He suggested that some 
ex post agency costs such as the maladaption costs incurred when transactions 
drift out of alignment should be included. All these agency costs are reflected in 
the cost imposed on the company through monetary demands of the principals.  
2.4.2. Agency Cost of Equity 
Agency cost of equity arises from the conflict of interest between shareholders 
and managers. When managers of a listed company decide to raise capital for an 
investment project from equity finance, shareholders supply equity finance to 
companies with the expectation of a return. The managers of the company are 
the agents in relation to the shareholders who are the principals. The principals 
(the shareholders) are supposed to receive the expected return, and their agents 
(the managers) are supposed to deliver these returns. Whether the agents act 
fully in the interest of the principals emerges as a question according to agency 
cost theory. Managers know that the benefit of equity financing goes entirely to 
shareholders if a business goes well, but the cost of achieving a maximum return 
is high and is borne entirely by managers if a business goes bad. 
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Managers may misuse the funds from new shareholders for non-pecuniary 
consumption, with the expectation that these costs would be shared by new 
shareholders. When managers do not manage firms in the interests of 
shareholders, the returns to shareholders will be discounted, and the loss of profit 
is the agency cost of equity. The cost of effort to prevent the loss of profit from 
happening — such as management compensation and/or management 
ownership — is also part of the agency cost. When shareholders as principals are 
aware of these agency problems associated with managers as their agents for 
their investment, they can push up the prices of equity to compensate for the 
agency costs. Increases in equity prices are additional costs to the company in 
equity finance. This is described as the agency costs of equity to the company. 
Shareholders may use the threat of exit to make sure that the agency cost is 
minimised. A number of interest-alignment measures, such as buy-out, share 
options, external directors, and so on, can be used to minimise the agency cost. 
These corporate governance instruments are not discussed directly in this thesis. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) also found that there is an agency problem between 
the existing owner-managers and the new owners in relation to equity finance. In 
equity finance, the existing owner-managers are the agents, and new investors 
tend to be the principals. When owner-managers dilute their ownership by issuing 
outside equity, they may be induced to pursue greater non-pecuniary benefits so 
that they can share the cost with the new owners. This is described as ‘the effects 
of incentive dilution from issuing new equity’, or the agency cost of equity 
financing. As new owners become aware of this agency problem, they demand a 
higher return to investment, thus pushing up the equity cost. There is an inverse 
relationship between the capital structure and the costs of equity including the 
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agency cost of equity; that is, the lower the debt-equity ratio, the higher is the cost 
of equity. When this inverse relationship exists, there is an equity agency cost. 
Jensen (1986) also demonstrated that, in the case of an agency problem 
associated with new equity finance, debt could be used as a governance device 
to reduce agency cost in equity financing (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). This is because, under the debt arrangement, managers are 
obliged to make repayments out of available cash flow to creditors. More 
importantly, the bankruptcy threat by the lenders would normally prevent 
managers from undertaking wasteful actions, thus reducing the agency cost of 
equity finance. If they spend the free cash on wasteful expenditures, the 
repayment schedule may be unlikely to be met. In the case of default, debt-
holders may take the firm to bankruptcy court and obtain a claim over its assets. 
In such cases, managers would lose their decision rights and employment 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Warner, 1977; Castanias, 1983).  
2.4.3. Agency Cost of Debt 
Agency cost of debt arises from the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
creditors. When shareholders of a listed company decide to raise capital for an 
investment project from debt financing, the creditors supply funds to the company 
with the expectation of a return. The shareholders of the company are agents, in 
relation to the creditors who are the principals. The principals (creditors) are 
supposed to achieve the expected return and their agents (shareholders) are 
supposed to deliver these returns. Shareholders know that the benefit of debt 
financing goes entirely to shareholders if the business goes well, but the cost of 
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achieving a maximum return is high and is fully borne by creditors if a business 
goes bad. Also, shareholders know that debt-financing can be a mechanism to 
discipline managers. Shareholders may wish to undertake more debt by taking on 
riskier projects; however, managers dislike taking more debt and tend to take on 
less risky projects.  
When shareholders do not behave in the interest of creditors, the returns to 
creditors will be discounted as a result of bankruptcy to debtors. The cost of effort 
in preventing this loss is also part of the agency cost of debt. Unless the interests 
of share-holders are aligned with the interests of debtors, shareholders will not 
maximise the return to debt in the creditors’ interests. The loss of profit or 
underperformance of a loan is the direct agency cost of debt. In order to prevent 
shareholders from behaving in this way, an indirect agency cost occurs. 
When creditors as principals are aware of these agency problems associated with 
shareholders as agents for their investment, they can push up the prices of debt 
to compensate for these agency costs. Increases in debt prices are the additional 
costs to the company in debt finance. These are the agency costs of debt to the 
company. There is a positive relationship between capital structure and the costs 
of debt including the agency cost of debt; that is, the higher the debt-equity ratio, 
the higher is the cost of debt. When this positive relationship exists, there is a 
debt agency cost. Debt-holders may use the threat of declaring the bankruptcy of 
a firm to make sure that the agency cost is minimised.  
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2.4.4. The Trade-Off between Agency Costs of Equity and Debt 
The important argument behind the corporate governance approach is that the 
capital structure decision is not only a financial decision but also a choice of 
corporate governance arrangement to minimise the agency costs or the conflicts 
of interest between stakeholders: mainly shareholders, managers and creditors. 
In the case of a debt agency cost problem, equity could be used as a governance 
device to reduce agency cost in debt financing. This is because under the equity 
arrangement, shareholders will bear and share more and more of the cost of 
failure with creditors. Creditors may be at ease with their loans. In the case of an 
equity agency cost problem, debt could be used as a governance device to 
reduce equity agency cost. This is because under the debt arrangement, 
managers will be disciplined to comply with the debt repayments.  
The balance between the agency costs of equity and debt is the key to deciding 
the desired level of capital structure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). A firm tends to 
use more debt when the debt agency cost is lower than the equity agency cost. 
However, when more debt is used, the debt agency cost may rise to match the 
equity agency cost. A firm tends to use less debt when the debt agency cost is 
higher than the equity agency cost. When more equity is used, the equity agency 
cost may rise to match the debt agency cost. The adjustments between debt 
finance and equity finance according to the changing relative agency costs 
between debt and equity can influence a firm’s capital structure (see Table A2.3, 
on p. 276 of the Appendix.) 
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2.5. Business Strategy Approach: The Impact of Product Diversification and 
Asset Specificity on Capital Structure 
In the 1980s, research on capital structure broadened to a business strategy 
approach, which considered the impact of product diversification and asset 
specificity on capital structure. The linkage of business strategy with capital 
structure was originally established by Barton and Gordon (1988). Business 
strategy is defined by the scope of a firm and the implications of business 
diversification strategy on capital structure (Barton & Gordon, 1988). The 
business strategy approach to the study of capital structure is based mainly on 
the proposition that decision on capital structure is related to the strategic 
attitudes of a firm’s decision-makers, such as their pursuit for control of risk, 
flexibility, and freedom in the decision-making process. The choice of capital 
structure is basically a strategic decision. The strategy approach is detailed in 
modelling the relationship between the capital structure and the various financial 
contextual indicators — such as profit, size, cash flow, business risk, and so on 
— in different strategic environments. 
Business strategy approach is based on two perspectives: the product 
diversification view and transaction cost economics (TCE) theory. The product 
diversification view focuses on the relative benefits of the choice between 
specialisation (cost reduction) and diversification (risk reduction). This viewpoint 
highlights the implication of product diversification strategy for capital structure 
with a respect to the degree of its resulting risk diversification, and argues that 
product diversification is positively related to capital structure (Lowe et al., 1994; 
Jordan et al., 1998). TCE focuses on the relative transaction costs of the choice 
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between ‘to make’ (using internal funds) or ‘to buy’ (using external funds) and/or 
between debt or equity. TCE relates the impact of asset specificity to capital 
structure with a view to the difference in transaction costs of various types of 
asset. It is argued that asset specificity is negatively related to capital structure 
(Vilasuso & Minkler, 2001).  
2.5.1 Product Diversification View 
Product diversification view is based mainly on the assumption that the decisions 
about capital structure may reflect on the perceived risk of a firm’s decision-
makers. The broader the scope of the business, the less the risk a manager 
perceives; the narrower the scope of business, the greater the risk. Thus, higher 
debt levels could be perceived as sustainable when the business is diversified. 
According to this viewpoint, the choice of capital structure decision is a balance 
between specialisation (cost reduction) and diversification (risk reduction) (see 
Table A2.4 on p. 277  of the Appendix). 
The benefit of specialisation in business is the cost efficiency arising from 
economies of scale. However, the cost of specialisation is the increase in 
business risk, which attracts less debt finance. Specialisation strategy often relies 
on a greater use of internal funding and equity funding. When firms move from a 
specialisation strategy to a diversification strategy, the benefit of specialisation is 
reduced together with the risk of specialisation. In return, the benefit of business 
diversification is reduced risk, which may attract more debt finance, while the cost 
of business diversification is the reduced cost efficiency in economies of scale. 
Diversification strategy often relies on greater use of debt funding.  
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The business strategy view of capital structure is complex because it is firmly 
established that capital markets and managers may take a different view of 
diversification. Managers often prefer it, and recent research by Baysinger and 
Hoskisson (1990); Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson (1992); Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim 
(1997); and Lyandres (2008) suggests that if capital markets require a reduction 
in diversification, managers require higher financial remuneration. At the same 
time, within capital markets, debt markets might regard diversification with more 
leniency than equity markets as they seek a minimum, not a maximum, return 
through dividends or capital growth. Through this balance of factors, it is 
reasonable to assume that in China, where company diversification is more often 
a dominant strategy than it is in the West, diversification and higher debt levels 
will be positively associated. 
In work undertaken by Barton and Gordon (1988), diversification measures —
single product, dominant product, related products and unrelated products — 
derived from Rumelt (1974) were used. Here, it is assumed that the debt-equity 
ratio increases with the degree of business diversification and decreases with the 
degree of business specialisation. The strategy balance in relation to the choice 
of capital structure arrives at the point where the benefits of specialisation and 
diversification and the costs of specialisation and diversification are ideally 
balanced. 
2.5.2. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
The classical transaction-cost problem was posed by Ronald Coase (1937). He 
argued that transaction cost differences between markets (to buy) and 
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hierarchies (to make) were principally responsible for the decision either to use 
markets for some transactions or adopt hierarchical forms of organisation for 
others (Williamson, 1996, p. 172). Debt is regarded as ‘buy’, while equity is 
regarded as ‘make’ (Kochhar, 1996). Transaction cost economics states that the 
use of financing instruments (‘buy’ or ‘make’) depends on the nature of the asset 
to be invested (Williamson, 1988) because transaction costs vary with the degree 
of asset specificity in the event of liquidation.  
If an asset is highly specific to a particular use, and therefore highly non-
deployable, creditors feel that they are vulnerable to expropriation by 
shareholders and managers due to their lack of control. In addition, the salvage 
value of the physical assets with high specificity in the event of bankruptcy is 
small. Therefore, debt cost tends to be high to cover this transaction cost, due to 
the creditors having no control over the management of the assets, thus 
discouraging firms to use debt finance at high debt cost. Equity finance is 
preferred as a governance device through direct control to reduce the transaction 
cost of debt.  
Equity financing is, however, less preferred as a governance device to benefit 
from less transaction cost in the case of general assets. If an asset is highly 
generic to an alternative use, and therefore highly deployable, creditors feel that 
they are less vulnerable to expropriation by shareholders and managers, and the 
salvage value of the physical assets with low specificity in the event of bankruptcy 
is large. Therefore debt cost tends to be low; thus debt finance is encouraged.  
43 
 
According to TCE, the capital structure decision choice is a balance between the 
costs and benefits of using general assets or specific assets (see Table A2.5 on 
p. 278  of the Appendix.) 
The benefit of using general assets is that they are deployable in the event of 
resale for liquidation (low transaction cost), but the cost of use is a lack of 
sophistication in technology and its associated improvement in production and 
quality. The benefit of using specific assets is the enhancement of technology 
and, therefore, production as well as product quality, but the cost of use is that 
they are less deployable than general assets and therefore their resale value will 
be lower than general assets (high transaction cost). As a result, it is assumed 
that the debt-equity ratio decreases with the degree of asset specificity and 
increases with the degree of asset generality (See Table A2.5 on p. 278 of the 
Appendix). 
2.6. Interactions of Factors in the Three Approaches 
The choice of debt or equity is a balance between the benefits of using debt or 
equity and the costs of using debt or equity in relation to interactions among and 
between financial, business strategy and corporate governance factors (see 
Table A2.6 on p. 279 of the Appendix.) 
2.6.1. The Integration of Agency Cost Theory and Information Asymmetry 
Theory  
Agency cost theories argue that firms tend to chose and adjust their capital 
structure in such a way that marginal equity agency cost equals marginal debt 
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agency cost (Myers, 1977). It is very important to note that the agency costs of 
debt and equity are reflected in total debt costs and total equity costs, and that a 
firm’s objective in financing is to minimise the total cost of financing in 
determining the capital structure. The proponents of information asymmetry argue 
that the existing shareholders may prefer the use of internal financing and debt 
financing in order to avoid new issues and to lower the share price or reduce the 
agency cost of equity financing (Myers & Majluf, 1984).  
Brennal and Kraus (1987) disagreed with Myers and Majluf and tried to combine 
agency cost theory with the information asymmetry argument. Agency costs can 
interact with information signals because debt-equity ratios will send either good 
or bad signals to investors. A high debt-equity ratio sends a signal of a better than 
expected performance to investors (Ross, 1977, 1978). This is because as firms 
use more debt, the agency cost of equity financing is reduced. However, the 
negative information is that a high debt-equity ratio will lead to a high rate of 
bankruptcy with low control. It will increase the agency cost of debt financing, 
which will give a negative signal (Grossman & Hart, 1982, pp.107-140). A high 
debt-equity ratio will also invite mergers and takeovers (Stiglitz, 1972). Low debt-
equity ratio sends a signal of a worse than expected performance to investors 
(Ross, 1977, 1978). This is because as firms use less debt, the agency cost of 
equity financing is increased. However, the positive information is that a low debt-
equity ratio will lead to a low rate of bankruptcy with high control (Harris & Raviv, 
1988, 1990, 1991). In addition, a low debt-equity ratio will prevent mergers and 
takeovers (Stiglitz, 1972).  
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Within the framework of the agency cost theory and the information asymmetry 
hypothesis, there may be a convergence to an optimal capital structure where the 
marginal agency cost of debt is equal to the marginal agency cost of equity, and 
where the total information cost is minimised (See Table A2.7 on p. 280 of the 
Appendix.) 
2.6.2. The Integration of Agency Cost Theory and Transaction Cost 
Economics  
Williamson (1988) was one of the first scholars to suggest integrating agency 
theory and transaction cost economics as a means of examining the capital 
structure determinants of a firm. He challenged the agency cost theory (1996, p. 
180) by pointing out that ‘rather than regard debt and equity as “financial 
instruments”, they are better regarded as different governance structures’, and he 
attempted to incorporate both agency cost theory and transaction cost economics 
in an analysis of capital structure despite the vast differences  
Agency cost theory argues that the capital structure of a firm is determined by the 
relative agency costs between debt financing and equity financing according to 
the degree of control over cash flow. Transaction cost economics argues that a 
firm’s capital structure is determined by relative transaction costs between market 
or outside transactions (undertaking debt) and hierarchical or inside transactions 
(issuing equity) according to the degree of specificity of assets in which funds are 
invested. When agency cost theory and transaction cost economics are 
combined in an analysis of the capital structure, we may find a trade-off between 
debt financing and equity financing as follows. 
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In the case of an asset with high specificity, the transaction cost of debt is greater 
than that of equity, so equity is preferred to debt. When more equity is used, the 
agency cost of equity is greater than that of debt, so the cost of equity will rise. In 
case of an asset with low specificity, the transaction cost of debt is smaller than 
that of equity, so debt is preferred to equity. When more debt is used, the agency 
cost of debt is greater than that of equity, so the cost of debt will rise. The optimal 
capital structure is where both the agency costs and the transaction costs of both 
debt and equity are minimised. The key factors determining the optimal capital 
structure are the control over the cash flow and the asset specificity. 
What may determine the capital structure of a firm is the type of asset the raised 
funds are used to invest in according to transaction cost economics. If funds are 
used to invest in an asset with a high degree of specificity, the salvage value of 
the asset in the event of bankruptcy becomes small because the asset with high 
specificity can hardly be used for alternative purposes. If funds are used to invest 
in an asset with a low degree of specificity, the salvage value of the asset in the 
event of bankruptcy becomes large because the asset with high specificity can be 
used for alternative purposes. Creditors and shareholders are sensitive to the use 
of their funds. When their funds are invested in an asset with high specificity, 
creditors and shareholders may increase the prices of debt and equity to 
compensate for the loss in the salvage value of the asset, thus causing higher 
costs of debt and equity to the company. Due to the differences between 
creditors and shareholders in control over these assets, the additional costs will 
affect debt finance more than equity finance. This is why equity is preferred to 
debt in the case of assets with high specificity, or vice versa.  
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When debt and equity are used in an asset with high specificity, both debt and 
equity transaction costs may occur, causing debt costs to rise faster than equity 
costs, thus leading to a change in relative demand for debt and equity; When 
debt and equity are used in an asset with low specificity, both debt and equity 
transaction costs may not occur, causing debt costs to fall faster than equity 
costs, thus leading to a change in relative demand for debt and equity; The 
adjustments between debt finance and equity finance according to the changing 
relative costs (including transaction costs between debt and equity) can be the 
determinants of the firm’s capital structure (see Table A2.8 on p. 281 of the 
Appendix.) 
After comparing agency cost theory with transaction cost theory, Kochhar (1996) 
found that the difference between the two theories is based on the governance of 
free cash flow (according to agency cost theory) versus the governance of 
resources (according to transaction cost theory). Kochhar’s study tended to 
support transaction cost economics in determining the capital structure. Vilasuso 
and Minkler (2001) found that agency cost theory and transaction cost theory are 
supplementary to each other, while Kochhar (1996, p. 724) found that, on a 
conceptual basis, the transaction cost perspective is more appealing than the 
agency theory viewpoint. However, the empirical study of Vilasuso & Minkler 
(2001) demonstrated both agency costs and asset specificity as significant 
determinants of a firm’s capital structure in the transportation industry and the 
printing and publishing industries, thus supporting the view that agency cost 




2.6.3. The Integration of Financial, Business Strategy and Corporate 
Governance Factors 
According to financial theories such as trade-off theory, debt financing or equity 
financing provide various benefits and costs with respect to different 
environments of tax regimes and bankruptcy pressures. According to the 
information asymmetry hypothesis, the issuance of debt or equity gives good or 
bad signals to investors or creditors. According to the product diversification view, 
debt or equity is related to product diversification strategies; according to 
transaction cost economics, debt financing or equity financing incur different 
transaction costs with respect to the degree of asset specificity; and according to 
agency cost theory, debt financing or equity financing incurs different agency 
costs with respect to different corporate government arrangements. There may 
be extensive interactions of capital structure determinants among the three 
theoretical approaches to the study of capital structure with respect to the 
interactive balances between and among financial benefits versus costs, 
diversification benefits versus specialisation costs, low versus high transaction 
costs, and debt agency costs versus equity agency costs (see Table A2.6 on p. 
279 of the Appendix.)  
In conclusion, the following points are made: 
1. High debt level or low equity level may be simultaneously related to the 
following benefits and costs being interacted among financial, business 
strategy and corporate governance considerations:  
• high financial tax benefits and high bankruptcy costs; 
• a positive signal to investors and a negative signal to creditors;  
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• high diversification benefits and high efficient costs;  
• low transaction costs with general asset or high transaction costs 
with specific asset; and  
• low equity agency cost and high debt agency cost. 
2. High equity level or low debt level may be simultaneously related to the 
following benefits and costs being interacted among financial, business 
strategy and corporate governance considerations:  
• high bankruptcy costs and low financial tax benefits; 
• a positive signal to creditors and a negative signal to investors;  
• low efficient costs and low diversification benefits;  
• low transaction costs with general asset and the loss of a possible 
low transaction cost with specific asset;   
• low debt agency cost  and high equity agency cost. 
 
The choice of debt or equity could be influenced by a complex process of 
balances between benefits and costs arising from a particular set of combined 
financial, business strategy, corporate governance factors. This process involves 
interactions among shareholders, managers and creditors with respect to their 
responses to financial market conditions, perceived business risks and corporate 
governance arrangements (see Table A2.6 on p. 279 of the Appendix.).  
2.7. Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Studies 
Different theoretical approaches examine the determinants of capital structure 
from different perspectives. The financial approach examines the capital structure 
determinants from the perspective of a firm’s specific financial characteristics. 
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The business strategy approach and the corporate governance approach 
examine the capital structure determinants from the perspective of these financial 
characteristics in various business strategy environments and corporate 
governance arrangements. It would be interesting to analyse the interactions 
between and among financial, strategy and governance factors. However, given 
the scope of the topic, these interactions will not be considered in this research.  
2.7.1. Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Studies: Financial Approach 
In the financial approach to the study of capital structure, trade-off theory (TOT) 
hypothesises that capital structure is related positively to debt benefits and 
negatively to debt costs. Empirically, the proxies to test the hypotheses of TOT 
are based on a firm’s financial variables such as tax rate, size, profit, tangible 
asset, growth, capital intensity, risk, duration, and so on. Titman and Wessel 
(1988) hypothesised and tested the positive relationships of tax rate, size, profit, 
tangible asset, growth and capital intensity with debt level and the negative 
relationship of risk with debt level (Tables A2.9a and A2.9b on pp. 282-283 of the 
Appendix.). 
Tax rate has a predicted positive impact on debt. A company facing a high 
effective corporate tax rate has a need for, or will benefit from, taking up more 
debt to maximise the tax deduction of the debt interest. It is hypothesised that 
there is a positive relationship between effective corporate tax rate and capital 
structure (Modigliani & Miller, 1963). The works of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
and Chiarella et al. (1991) in the context of Western economies show that the 
debt-equity ratio is affected positively by the tax rate. In the event of personal tax, 
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the debt benefit of corporate tax will be reduced. It is hypothesised that that there 
is a negative relationship between personal tax rate and capital structure (Miller, 
1977). The study by Kane et al. (1984) supports Miller’s argument. In the event of 
non-debt tax shields, the debt benefit of corporate tax will be reinforced. It is 
hypothesised that there is a negative relationship between non-debt tax shields 
and capital structure due to the substitution effect between the use of debt tax 
shields and the use of non-debt tax shields (DeAmgelo & Masulis, 1980).  
A firm’s profitability has a predicted positive impact on debt level. A company with 
high profit has an opportunity and/or need to take up more debt to maximise the 
tax benefit of debt interest deduction. Also, profitability is a proxy for low 
possibility of bankruptcy. The hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship 
between profitability and capital structure. Long and Malitz (1985) found a 
positive relationship between profitability and debt level. However, Kester (1986) 
did not find this positive relationship. 
A firm’s size has a predicted positive impact on debt level. A large-sized company 
is less likely to become bankrupt, and therefore attracts more debt. The 
hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between size and capital 
structure. Rajan and Zingales (1995) evidenced this positive relationship between 
company size and the possibility of bankruptcy from their analysis of the 
international data, concluding that large firms are less likely to become bankrupt. 
Warner (1977) and Ang et al. (1982) studied the negative relationship between a 
company’s value and the direct bankruptcy costs and found that large firms tend 
to have less bankruptcy costs.  
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A firm’s growth potential has a predicted positive impact on debt level. A 
company with fast growth has great potential for revenue growth and, therefore, 
has high credit-worthiness to take up more debt. The hypothesis is that there is a 
positive relationship between growth and capital structure. According to Kester 
(1986) a firm experiencing fast growth tends to borrow more than can be 
internally generated for growth. Lenders are also willing to lend to firms in fast 
growth. The debt-equity ratio increases with the growth of the firm’s sales 
revenue.  
A firm’s tangibility has a predicted positive impact on debt level. A company with 
more tangible assets would need to have more collateral assets to service debt in 
the event of bankruptcy and, therefore, would have a greater ability to attract 
more debt. The hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between 
tangibility and capital structure.  
A firm’s capital intensity has a predicted positive impact on debt level. A company 
with greater capital intensity has more collateral assets to sell in order to service 
debt and, therefore, has a greater ability to take up more debt. The hypothesis is 
that there is a positive relationship between capital intensity and capital structure. 
Friend and Lang (1988), Long and Malitz (1985) and Anderson (1990) all found 
that firms with high capital intensity (high ratio of fixed asset to current asset) tend 
to have a high debt-equity ratio. However, Grodon (1988) argues for a negative 
relationship, because high capital intensity means a high operating leverage, thus 
a higher risk of future income and therefore a greater concern of creditors for the 
risk of default.  
53 
 
The volatility in a firm’s earnings has a predicted negative impact on debt level. A 
company with high risk or great volatility in earnings is more likely to go bankrupt, 
and therefore has low credit-worthiness for debt. The hypothesis is that there is a 
negative relationship between risk and capital structure. The studies of Bradley 
and Kim (1984) and Friend and Lang (1988) show that the debt-equity ratio is 
negatively affected by earnings risk. This is because high earnings risk casts a 
doubt on the firm’s ability to pay interest and affects debt levels. High earnings 
risk also means a higher bankruptcy risk to creditors.  
The duration of a firm’s existence has a predicted positive impact on debt level. 
The longer the history a company has in the market stands for a better reputation 
to attract debt and also gives rise to a lower likelihood of bankruptcy. The 
hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between duration and capital 
structure. Diamond (1989) and Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) argued that a 
company’s good track record is important for credit rating, and therefore ‘good 
reputation’ is a valuable asset. These arguments are the basis for the expected 
positive relationship between duration and debt level. 
In the financial approach to the study of capital structure, POT differs from TOT in 
predicting the hypothesised relationships of a firm’s profit, size and growth with 
debt level. TOT assumes that a firm’s profit, size and growth give benefits to debt, 
and therefore they are positively related to debt level. POT assumes that a firm’s 
profit, size and growth are negatively related to debt level due to associated 
information asymmetry.  
POT explains that a company with greater profit may have less need to borrow 
because of sufficient internal funds available for use. The hypothesis is that there 
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is a negative relationship between profit and capital structure. Myers and Majluf 
(1984) and Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990) found that firms with high cash flow 
tend to have a low debt-equity ratio because more cash flow to firms means less 
debt is required. The studies of Friend and Lang (1988), Kester (1986) and 
Titman and Wessels (1988) all support POT. Whether the coefficient of the profit 
variable carries a positive sign or a negative sign will make a testing case 
between TOT and POT.  
POT explains that a large-sized company gives rise to greater information 
asymmetry and therefore attracts less debt. The hypothesis is that there is a 
negative relationship between size and capital structure. Based on the study of 
Friend and Lang (1988), the size of the firm affects the debt-equity ratio 
positively, because a large-sized firm tends to be diversified in its business and 
has a greater separation of ownership from management, thus more debt is 
preferred. But Barton and Gordon (1988) argue for a negative relationship 
because of management’s preference for maximum flexibility and freedom in 
decision-making through equity financing. Whether the coefficient of the size 
variable carries a positive sign or a negative sign will make a testing case 
between TOT and POT.  
POT explains that a company of fast growth is normally expected to have 
potentially sufficient internal funds; and therefore this company prefers using 
internal funds over external funds. The hypothesis is that there is a negative 
relationship between growth and capital structure. Whether the coefficient of the 
growth variable carries a positive sign or a negative sign will make a testing case 
between TOT and POT.  
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2.7.2. Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Studies: Business Strategy 
Approach 
In the business strategy approach to the study of capital structure, the product 
diversification view predicts a positive relationship between product diversification 
and debt, and transaction cost economics predicts a negative relationship 
between asset specificity and debt.  
Barton and Gordon (1988) pioneered this approach, which was developed further 
by Lowe et al. (1994) in their study of capital structures in Australian firms, and 
later by Jordan et al. (1998) in their study of capital structures in small UK firms. 
Both studies found a strong positive relationship between product diversification 
and capital structure. Pek Yee Low (2004) examined the effects of international 
and product diversification on capital structure of 232 firms from 30 countries. 
Results for the full sample show that international diversification is negatively 
related to financial leverage, but further analyses indicate that this is mainly 
attributable to US firms. For non-US firms, the researchers failed to find a 
significant relationship.  
Results also show that product diversification is positively related to financial 
leverage, indicating that such diversification allows firms to reduce their risks, 
thereby enabling firms to carry higher debt levels. Menéndez-Alonso (2003) 
studied the effect of diversification strategy on firms’ capital structure using a 
panel data analysis of a sample of 480 Spanish manufacturing firms during the 
period 1991-1994. Co-insurance effect and transaction cost arguments help to 
explain a positive relation between firm debt ratio and firm diversification, while 
agency theory predicts a negative relation. This study did not find a significant 
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relationship between firm leverage and the degree of firm diversification, using 
different debt ratios and the revenue-based Herfindahl index and the entropy 
measure as proxies of firm diversification. This evidence contrasts with previous 
studies for US and Australian markets that suggest a positive relation, according 
to the co-insurance effect and transaction cost explanations. The study of 
Vilasuso and Minkler (2001) supports the negative relationship between asset 
specificity and debt. 
2.7.3. Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Studies: Corporate Governance 
Approach 
In the corporate governance approach to the study of capital structure, agency 
cost theory predicts that companies with high ownership concentration and great 
control tend to have a high debt level and therefore greater debt agency cost, and 
that companies with low ownership concentration and less control tend to have a 
low debt level and therefore greater equity agency cost.  
Berle and Means (1932) projected a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and company performance due to shareholders’ stronger control 
over management or less agency cost of equity. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
evidenced this positive relationship in their study. However, Pound (1988)  
argued that the high ownership concentration may impact on  
company performance negatively due to the possible insider control  
via the collusion between large shareholders and managers at the expense  
of small shareholders. In this case, the relationship between ownership 
concentration and company performance is reversed to be negative.  
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McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Leech and Leahy (1991) evidenced this 
negative relationship in their study. Ang et al. (2000) investigated the relationship 
between agency costs and management ownership and found that the 
relationship is inverse.  
2.8. Empirical Studies on Chinese Capital Structure  
The English language literature on the study of the capital structure of Chinese 
listed companies is limited. The earliest working paper on the relationship of 
ownership structure, corporate governance and the performance of firms was 
produced by Xu and Wang (1997). They examined 954 listed companies in the 
three-year period from 1993 to 1995 using the OLS method. Their study 
established that ownership structure and corporate governance affected Chinese 
firms’ performance, particularly in relation to the significant positive role of legal 
person ownership. Their study evidences the negative impact of government 
ownership on corporate performance. 
Liu (1999) argued that ownership structure is not important in explaining the 
capital structure of Chinese listed companies. He studied 522 Chinese listed 
companies for a period of five years from 1993 to 1997. Liu used OLS to examine 
the impact of industry classification, financial variables (such as tangibility, size, 
growth rate and profitability) and ownership concentration on capital structure. He 
concluded that the factors that influence debt ratio in China are similar to those in 
developed countries, and that the capital structure of Chinese companies is 
mainly impacted by agency and bankruptcy costs, but not so much by the 
ownership structure. This study evidences the problem of agency cost within the 
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framework of trade-off theory, although it did not emphasise enough the impact of 
the agency problem on capital structure from a corporate governance 
perspective. 
Huang and Song (2002) examined 954 listed companies using averaged data for 
the period from 1994 to 2000. Their study supported the findings of Liu (1999) 
that the forces working on firms’ capital structure in other countries also work in a 
quite similar way in China. Huang and Song argued that, contrary to Myers’ 
argument, asymmetric information became the second-order effect, and the 
agency cost between insider shareholders and outside shareholders became the 
first-order effect. He concluded that his study suggested that the trade-off theory 
seemed to better explain the capital structure of Chinese listed companies. This 
study also evidenced the agency problem, although, once again, this problem 
was not discussed from the perspective of corporate governance.  
Veronika Hui Wang (2003) studied the capital structure of 43 Chinese listed real 
estate companies in 2002 and found that these companies have a lower leverage 
level, a lower long term debt ratio, and a higher equity over fixed assets ratio. She 
explained that these capital structures characteristics are due to the 
underdeveloped bond market and the unique mixed ownership structure. She 
went on further to conclude that the static trade-off model is more powerful than 
the pecking order theory in explaining the features of capital structure in the 
Chinese listed real estate companies because, she argued, firstly the strong 
equity preference of Chinese listed companies does not match the pecking order 
theory; and, secondly, the evidence shows that the mixed ownership structure 
affects a firm’s capital structure, and this matches with trade-off theory. Although 
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this study evidences the impact of mixed ownership structure on capital structure, 
the strong implication of this result for the impact of ownership structure on capital 
structure is ignored. 
Xue and Chen conducted two separate studies on capital structure. In 2003, they 
examined the panel data on the capital structure of 88 firms in the period from 
1995 to 2000, and in 2004 they examined the panel data again on the capital 
structure of 720 listed companies in the period from 1997 to 2003. In the 2003 
study, they argued that ‘neither the trade-off model nor the pecking order 
hypothesis … provides convincing explanations for the capital structure choice of 
the Chinese firms’. They also found that ‘the capital structure decision of Chinese 
firms seems to follow a “new pecking order” – retained profit, equity and debt’. 
The findings revealed that the Chinese capital structure choice is a result of low 
corporate income tax rate (33% for listed companies and 55% for SOEs); little 
possibility of bankruptcy (due to government ownership of listed companies and 
banks, fixed interest rate and poor bank credit management); an undeveloped 
corporate bond market (bond financing as 1% of total direct and indirect 
financing); and high agency costs (due to dominant government ownership, 
increasing legal person ownership, weak individual ownership and little 
management ownership).  
Later, in the 2004 study, Xue and Chen used static panel data models and found 
that the relationship between debt ratio and government ownership ratio is not 
linear. This relationship is positive when the government ownership ratio is lower 
than 53.73%, and the relationship turns negative when the government 
ownership ratio is higher than 53.73%. They concluded that their investigation 
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had revealed that the capital structure of Chinese listed companies seems to 
support the pecking order theory. These two studies by the same authors have 
strongly acknowledged the impact of Chinese institutional factors on capital 
structure and, in particular, evidenced the impact of information asymmetry on 
capital structure with respect to pecking order theory. 
Tong and Green (2004) studied 50 large Chinese listed companies in 2002 using 
the models of Allen (1993) and Baskin (1989) and found a significant negative 
relationship between leverage and profitability and a significant positive 
relationship between leverage and dividend level. Based on these two results, the 
authors concluded that their study supported the pecking order hypothesis. This 
study again evidences the impact of information asymmetry on capital structure. 
Chung and Lian (2006) studied 308 Chinese listed companies for the period from 
1998 to 2005 and used the financial constraint hypothesis to estimate the impact 
of asymmetric information where firms tend to under-invest in the event of 
asymmetric information, and used the agent cost hypothesis to estimate the 
impact of agency cost where firms tend to over-invest in the event of agency cost. 
Their study found that Chinese firms’ investment policy was influenced by both 
asymmetric information and agency costs, and the net effect of these two factors 
led to nearly 34% loss of investment efficiency. They argued that the increase of 
cash flow and long-term debt helps to alleviate financial constraint and the 
problem of asymmetric information, and that those firms with fewer assets and 
low proportions of state-owned shares suffer less from agency problems. In 
actual fact, Chinese firms take low debt and are of high state-owned shares, 
therefore these firms suffer severely from the problems of both asymmetric 
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information and agency costs. They pointed out that, in particular, the agency 
cost problem in China is evidenced by three facts: managers in most listed 
companies neither hold a non-trivial amount of shares nor earn considerable 
salaries and bonuses; a considerable number of state-controlled listed companies 
select managers from a group of formerly administratively affiliated cadres or ex-
SOE managers; and Chinese listed companies still lack efficiency and mature 
corporate governance mechanisms. Their study has contributed to the study of 
capital structure of Chinese listed companies from new perspectives by 
attempting to measure the negative impact of information asymmetry and agency 
costs on investment efficiency.  
A review of selected English-language literature on the capital structure of 
Chinese listed companies in various periods from 1990 to 2004 reveals that the 
researchers in this field are in debate on two issues: (1) whether trade-off theory 
or pecking order theory is relevant to the case of the Chinese capital structure; 
and (2) whether the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies is relevant 
to their capital structure. Tong (1999) and Huang & Song (2002) argued that TOT 
is applicable to the Chinese case; whereas Tong & Green (2004) counter-argued 
that TOT is not relevant to the Chinese case. Chen and Xue (2004) argued that 
neither TOT nor POT is applicable to China, but they later found that POT is 
relevant to the Chinese case. Despite these disagreements, most scholars of 
Chinese capital structure agree that the capital structure of Chinese listed 
companies may be impacted by Chinese institutional factors such as information 
asymmetry, imperfect market conditions and agency costs. Their studies are in 
line with the observations in the review of the SOE reform process presented in 
the next chapter.  
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On the basis of these observations and with the empirical studies in mind,  
it is necessary at this stage to look at the possible moderation of the impact of 
these institutional factors on the hypothesised relationship of financial, business 
strategy and corporate governance factors with capital structure (see Table 
A2.10a and Table A2.10b on pp. 284–285 of the Appendix.)  
2.8.1. Financial Approach in the Chinese Context 
The empirical studies on Chinese capital structure have produced inconsistent 
results. Liu (1999) discovered that industries that are more asset-intensive have a 
high debt ratio, and that the debt level increases with size, tangible assets and 
growth rate and decreases with profitability. Huang and Song (2002) found that 
leverage increased with size, profit volatility, tangibility, and institutional shares, 
and that leverage decreased with profitability, non-debt tax shields. Chen and Xu 
(2004a) found that capital structure is positively related to size, growth and 
tangibility, and is negatively related to tax, profit, risk and non-debt tax shields. 
Qian, Tian and Wirjanto (2007) summarised that firm size, tangibility and 
ownership structure are positively related to a firm’s leverage ratios, while 
profitability, non-debt tax shields, growth and volatility are negatively related to a 
firm’s leverage ratios.  
The impact of tax on debt in the Chinese context is different from that in the 
theoretical hypothesis. In theory, tax is expected to be positively related to debt. 
However, the work by Chen and Xu (2004a) is the only piece of study to find that 
tax is negatively related to debt. In theory, non-debt tax shields are expected to 
be negatively related to debt. Huang and Song (1999) and Chen Xu (2004a, 
63 
 
2004b) found that the relationship is negative. These results show that Chinese 
companies are more motivated to use non-debt shields to reduce tax instead of 
debt, probably due to the low tax rate and/or weak tax incentive to companies to 
borrow more.  
Chinese listed companies are specially selected for their listing in stock markets. 
Some scholars argue that a firm’s profit is used more as a positive factor for the 
issuing of equity rather than the issuing of debt. The impact of profit on debt in the 
Chinese case is different from that in the theoretical hypothesis according to TOT, 
but it is consistent with the theoretical hypothesis according to POT. All studies 
(Liu, 1999; Huang & Song, 2002; Chen & Xu, 2004a, 2004b; Qian, et al., 2007) 
found that profit is negatively related to debt, probably due to the problem of 
information asymmetry.  
Most listed companies are large in size. Large companies are perceived as ‘safe’ 
in China, and therefore are advantaged in getting loans. Also governments 
always support big companies in terms of credit policies. In addition, the 
possibility of bankruptcy may not be closely related to a firm’s size because 
bankruptcy is not likely for government-selected listed companies. In this 
institutional context, the relationship between size and debt level can be 
hypothesised as positive. However, the managers of large companies with 
dominant government ownership tend to maximise size rather than return to 
shareholders. Size could be a negative factor from the perspective of poor 
corporate governance. The studies of Lu and Xin (1998), Liu (1999), and Chen 
and Xu (2004a, 2004b) support the positive relationship. However, the studies of 
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Hong and Shen (2000), Zhang, Zhu and Wu (2000), Chen (2005) and Qian et al., 
(2007) are contrary and support the hypothesis of a negative relationship.  
Chinese listed companies are growing at the same rate as the Chinese economy. 
A firm’s growth could be a positive factor for the issuing of equity, not just a 
positive factor for the issuing of debt. Of the literature reviewed, all studies except 
for Qian et al. (2007) supported a positive relationship between growth and debt. 
Most listed companies have more tangible assets than unlisted companies. 
However, the quality of these assets is questionable. Further, Chinese companies 
do not have much in the way of intangible assets which can also be treated as 
collateral assets. China’s assets market is yet to be developed. Due to these 
reasons, the impact of a firm’s tangibility on capital structure may not be as easily 
ascertained as hypothesised in theory. Early studies (Lu & Xin, 1998; Hong & 
Shen, 2000; Zhang, Zhu, & Wu, 2000) found no relationship between collateral 
assets and debt level. Later, the results of the study of Wang and Tang (2002) 
support the hypothesis of a negative relationship between collateral assets and 
debt level. While more recent studies (Chen & Xu, 2004a, 2004b) found a positive 
relationship between collaterals and debt level.  
In theory, capital intensity is positively related to debt. However, Barton and 
Gordon (1988) argued for a negative relationship because high capital intensity 
means a high operating leverage, so a higher risk of future income and therefore 
a greater concern of creditors for the risk of default. This relationship needs to be 
studied as there is no piece of study on this factor in the Chinese situation. 
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Some loans are made to listed companies, not upon the basis of a proper 
assessment of a firm’s risk, but according to the requirements and/or instructions 
of central and/or local governments. Governments are the largest owners of listed 
companies and banks in China. Therefore, the relationship between a firm’s risk 
and debt level may not be clear. Huang and Song (2002) found that risk is 
positively related to debt, while Chen and Xu (2004b) and Qian (2007) found that 
risk is negatively related to debt. Chinese stock markets are newly established, 
and therefore a company’s durability in the market may not be a significant factor 
for capital structure choice.  
2.8.2. Business Strategy Approach in the Chinese Context 
Literature on the business strategy approach to the study of capital structure in 
the Chinese context is very limited, and so studies on this very important area are 
yet to be developed. Addressing this knowledge gap is one of the intended 
contributions of the current research. It is particularly important because, as 
earlier references (Fan et al., 2007) have shown, diversification levels in China 
are higher than in Western countries. Diversification is an important strategy in 
the emerging economy. 
2.8.3. Corporate Governance Approach in the Chinese context 
Xu and Wang (1997) found that the key characteristic of Chinese listed 
companies is the dominant ownership of government. Their data revealed that 
the government holds around 60% of shares, and the share ownership of 
directors and managers is only 0.017%. Their empirical study related the 
inefficiencies to government ownership, and argued that the influence of 
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individual ownership on a firm’s profitability is insignificant. They found a positive 
relationship between the ownership concentration in legal person shares and a 
firms’ performance of profitability. Liu (1999) argued that ownership structure is 
not an important factor. 
The main relationships indentified in the research literature on Chinese capital 
structure are summarised in tables A2.10a and A210b on pp. 284-285 of the 
Appendix. 
2.9. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has reviewed the capital structure literature and emphasised that 
study of capital structure needs to examine the financial characteristics of firms in 
their associated environments of business strategy and corporate governance. 
Five capital structure theories — trade-off theory (TOT), pecking order theory 
(POT), the product diversification view, transaction cost theory (TCT) and agency 
cost theory (ACT) — have been discussed in relation to their implied capital 
structure determinants. On the basis of both theoretical predictions and empirical 
studies, summaries are presented (in tables A2.9a, A2.9b, A2.10a, and A2.10b 
on p. 282–285 of the Appendix) to illustrate that the choice of capital structure 
may be related to the factors affecting the following: 
• Relative benefits and costs between debt and equity (TOT) and relative 
information asymmetry between debt and equity (POT) in the financial 
approach;  
• Different strategic environments of product diversification and asset 
specificity (TCT) in the business strategy approach; and 
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• Different corporate governance environments of ownership structure and 
ownership concentration (ACT) in the corporate governance approach. 
The theoretical framework outlined in this chapter is that shareholders, managers 
and creditors interact with one another in relation to their influences on the capital 
structure decision by considering the costs and benefits of debt and equity, their 
business strategies and perceived risks, and their conflicts of interest and its 
mitigation of the conflict. The impact of these factors on capital structure is 
subject to the variations in the market and institutional conditions between 
countries. 
The next chapter situates the research topic within the Chinese institutional 
context, where the implication of reform measures for the capital structures of 
Chinese listed enterprises will be discussed and the institutional factors 




CHINESE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPITAL STRUCTURE DETERMINANTS 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a number of studies were reviewed that illustrated  
how choices between debt and equity may be impacted by a number of  
factors in theory. We might expect these factors to be potentially important  
in China, given the speed of transition of the economy and the integration  
of political and market influences over the operation and decision-making 
processes of the listed companies; for instance, in the form of dominant 
government shareholdings, the possible imperfections in the knowledge and  
skills of managers, their boards and corporate government mechanisms, 
government-owned debt providers and underdeveloped equity markets.  
These factors together could lead to major information asymmetries,  
poor corporate governance and a number of institutional factors affecting  
the operations of financial markets and institutions, product and asset  
markets, and firms. 
In this chapter, the institutional context of Chinese listed companies  
will be explored, together with the implications for capital structure determinants. 
First, the process of Chinese enterprise reform since 1978 will be reviewed  
to provide contextual background, then some general theoretical  
issues on economic and enterprise reforms will be discussed,  
next the implications of the reform measures for the shaping of the  
69 
 
capital structures of these enterprises will be ascertained, and  
finally the institutional factors that may influence capital structure will  
be highlighted. 
3.2. Centralisation of Management in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 
1949-1978 
The Communist Party took power in China in 1949. Since then, Chinese firms 
have undergone three stages of fundamental changes: the centralised 
management system of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) between 1949 and 
1978; the reformed and decentralised management system of SOEs between 
1979 and 1989; and the corporatisation of SOEs between 1990 and the present. 
Historically, the majority of currently listed companies were SOEs. To examine 
the operations of Chinese listed companies today, it is necessary to review how 
SOEs were managed during the centralised planned economic system of the past 
and examine why and how SOEs were reformed. Of note as well is that the 
enterprise reform in China was not carried out using a ‘big bang’ approach, thus 
some traces of the old centralised system remain in the operations of listed 
companies today. 
Before the 1979 economic reform, all firms in China were state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), which were owned, financed and managed by the various 
levels of the government. Under this system, all SOEs’ earnings were submitted 
to the government according to the principles of ‘public ownership’ and ‘the 
unified national budget’, and all financial expenses were borne by the government 
through government budgetary appropriations subject to production plans and 
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through government’s bank credit allocations subject to credit plans. Investment 
projects of SOEs were financed according to national construction plans, and all 
investment funds were allocated to firms according to national investment plans.  
In the planned and centralised economic system, the capital structure of SOEs 
did not exist because there was no distinction between equity and debt. All 
financial funds came from and belonged to the government. There were neither 
financial institutions nor financial markets. As a result, a firm’s choice of finance 
was determined by government policies rather than by factors specific to firms, 
such as corporate finance, corporate business strategy and corporate 
governance. 
Within the Chinese institutional context, SOEs during this period appear to  
have occupied a stage similar to the hypothetical infant stage of a  
firm’s development in a market economy where there is no separation between 
ownership and management. In the case of SOEs, the government was  
owner and manager. However, when it comes to ownership, a fundamental 
difference exists between a planned economy and a market economy.  
In the Chinese planned economy, firms were publicly or government-owned, 
while in a market economy firms are privately owned. The principal-agent 
problems still occurred in the planned economy because, despite there being  
no legal separation of ownership from management in SOEs, the owner was  
not in fact the direct manager. SOEs were actually managed by officials 
appointed by the government. The efforts of these government-appointed 
managers were not linked directly to the financial performance of firms.  
These government-appointed managers as agents of the government may  
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or may not act entirely in the interest of the government as the owners.  
The government as owner did not act as a profit maximiser in any sense  
similar to the market economy. 
The cost to the economy of the centralised financial system for SOEs was huge, 
and it was reflected in various forms of hidden problems. From the financial 
perspective, SOE managers did not need to take into account how the cost of 
financial resources could be minimised or how the efficient use of financial 
resources could be maximised, because the financial resources came free from 
the government. Furthermore, the central government decided on fundings, not 
on the basis of economic principles but on the basis of politics or policies. The 
problem of waste in financial resources was severe. 
SOE managers were always motivated to seek the largest financial allocation 
wherever possible in order to maximise their status of rank, and excessive 
investment was the norm of the day. Verification of the ‘true needs’ of SOEs was 
extremely difficult for the central government. Once funds were allocated, SOE 
managers no longer cared about the performance of funds. In addition, 
performance measures were not only very poor, but also very costly for the 
central government to monitor. Inefficient use of financial resources was rampant, 
and it was clear that economic growth had become severely compromised by this 
ineffective allocation and use of financial resources. 
From a business strategy perspective, managers of SOEs had little to worry 
about because they understood that inputs as well as outputs were planned by 
the government. The central planning system determined the mix of inputs and 
the diversification of outputs. Thus, managers of SOEs were not facing any 
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market pressures (these were replaced by plans) only the pressures of their 
superiors’ instructions, orders and demands. This lack of a need for a business 
strategy had a severe impact on the capital budgeting of SOEs.  
From a corporate governance perspective, there were severe principal-agent 
problems. These occurred in the context of public ownership where the 
government acted as the principal of the firms, and the managers were appointed 
by the government as its agents. Particular problems included ‘soft’ budgets, 
waste, quantity at expense of quality, quantity at expense of variety, false 
reporting, red-tape and bureaucracy. Agents at all levels of these firms often 
sacrificed the interests of government as the principal. All of these represented 
the agency costs of SOEs. 
Data from Chinese official government sources (Chinese Statistical Bureau’s 
yearbooks, 1978-1980) show that in the late 1970s, the Chinese economy was on 
the brink of collapse. Productivity declined sharply and in a period of ten years 
(from 1966 to 1976), the return to funds used in government-owned enterprises 
declined from RMB$34.5/$100 to RMB19.03/RMB$100. Returns to investment 
dropped from RMB$46.6/RMB$100 to RMB$29.1/RMB$100; the return for 
RMB$100 of output reduced from RMB$21.7/RMB$100 to RMB$12.6/RMB$100. 
The funds used to produce RMB$100 of output increased from 
RMB$23.5/RMB$100 to RMB$369/RMB$100. Investment became inefficient. The 
completion rate declined from 83.7% in the period of the first five-year plan (1953-
1957) to 59.9% in the period of the third five-year plan (1966-1970), and to 61.4% 
in the period of the fourth five-year plan (1971-1975). The investment period was 
lengthened. The average length of an investment project was 6.5 years in the 
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period of the first five-year plan, and it increased to 8.8 years in the period of the 
third five-year plan, then to 10.7 years in the period of fourth five-year plan. The 
new production capacity per investment project (for example, coal mining) 
decreased from 1.795 million tons in the period of the first five-year plan to 1.314 
million tons in the period of the third five-year plan, then to 0.838 million tons in 
the period of fourth five-year plan. The investment recovery period lengthened 
from five years in the period of first five-year plan to 25 years in the period of 
fourth five-year plan. 
3.3. Decentralisation of Management in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 
1979-1989 
Enterprise reform in China began in 1979. The key focus of the reform was to 
stimulate the motivation and enhance the responsibility of the management of 
SOEs. This was to be achieved through various incentive schemes in order to 
overcome the afore-mentioned problems in the planning system. Reform took 
place over several stages, gradually and steadily, without following a particular or 
pre-prepared blueprint. The reform measures in these later stages were often 
developed in the process of facing and overcoming problems encountered in 
earlier stages. All measures were outcomes of interaction between the 
government as owners, the executives as managers and the banks as creditors.  
The first measure of the reform was the ‘Decentralisation of Powers and Grants 
of Benefits’. In 1978, the State Council issued ‘Some Regulations on Broadening 
Autonomous Management Powers to Government-Owned Enterprises’, and 
‘Regulations on Implementing Profit Retention in Government-owned 
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Enterprises’. Under these regulations, the central government as owner of the 
SOEs deregulated managerial authority to the managers of SOEs. Mandatory 
production targets were reduced to a very small number of products that were 
essential to the basic needs of the economy.  
In 1984, the issuing of the ‘Provisional Regulations on the Enlargement of 
Autonomy of State Industrial Enterprises’ allowed the managers of SOEs to set 
prices, determine output sales, and decide on input purchases when producing at 
above-quota levels. In 1985, the same managers were allowed to produce 
according to market needs for their own benefit, as long as they fulfilled 
government plans. By 1992, the SOE managers gained more autonomous 
powers, ranging from production, marketing and employment to wage 
determination. During the 1980s, this autonomy was increased greatly in the 
1980s. The base profit retention rate increased from 7% in 1980 to 39% in 1989, 
and the marginal retention rate increased from 11% in 1980 to 27% in 1989. 
Autonomy in production decision and wage decision increased even more. Data 
detailing this increased autonomy is presented in Table A3.1, on p. 286 of the 
Appendix.  
As a result of the delegation of greater managerial powers to the managers of the 
enterprises, firms ended up keeping more revenue to themselves, but 
government revenue from firms was reduced. To overcome the problem of 
increased government deficit, the government introduced a new measure of the 
reform: the ‘Replacement of Profit by Tax’. It was hoped that both the interests of 
the government and firms could be expected to be protected in the deregulated 
environment. The sources of government revenue were changed from 40.11% 
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contributed by firms’ profit submission in 1980 to 91.55% contributed by 
government tax in 1989 and 70.85% in 1998. Firms ceased submitting their profit 
to the government totally in 1994. Government borrowing as a source of revenue 
increased from 3.96% in 1980 to 13.68% in 1989 and then to 25.33% in 1998. 
Detailed data on both these points can be found in Table A3.2a and Table A3.2b, 
on pp. 287-288 of the Appendix. Government non-budgetary revenue which was 
under the control of the local governments increased from the amount equivalent 
to 53.48% of budgetary revenue in 1980 to 91.19% in 1988. (See Table A3.3 on 
p. 289 of the Appendix).   
Accordingly, there was a significant change in the sources of funding to new 
capital construction between 1981 and 1998. The government-budged source of 
funding declined sharply from 28.07% in 1981 to 8.26% in 1989 and then to 
4.17% in 1998. In the same period, the source of own funding in firms increased 
from 55.45% to 56.93% and then to 67.42%; the foreign source of funding 
increased from 3.78% to 6.63% and then to 9.11%; and the loan funding 
increased from 12.69% to 17.31 and then to 19.30% (See Table A3.4 on pp. 290-
291 of the Appendix).  
In the same period, there was a fundamental change in the significance of 
external funding to the capital construction owned by ‘all’ (the government). The 
external funding, outside the government budget, to the government-owned 
capital construction increased significantly from 46.30% in 1980 to 73.10% in 
1989 and then to 95.87% in 1998, while the internal funding, within the 
government budged, decreased from 53.70% to 26.90% and then to 4.13% (See 
Table A.3.5 on p. 292 of the Appendix).  
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Despite these fundamental reforms, such as the increased autonomy in business 
operation of SOEs (Table A3.1, on p. 286.), the replacement of profit remittance 
with tax payments (Table A3.2a and Table A3.2b, on p. 287-288), the 
encouragement to the local governments in raising their own funds outside the 
government budget (Table A3.3, on p. 289),  the greater use of firms’ own funds 
and loan funds in capital investments (Table A3.4, on p. 290-291), the greater 
use of local governments’ own funds outside the government budget in capital 
investments (Table 3.5, on p. 292), there was no fundamental change in the 
government ownership of these investment projects that were funded by firms’ 
own funds and local governments’ own funds.  
Public ownership, which represented government ownership, declined from 
81.89% in 1980 to 61.28% in 1989, and then increased to 65.95% in 1998. In the 
same period, the collective ownership increased from 5.05% to 13.78% and then 
to 19.35%, and the individual (private) ownership increased from 13.06% to 
24.95% and then declined to 17.02% (Table A3.6, on p. 293)  
These reforms gave rise to a number of problems in the SOEs.  The replacement 
of profit by tax severely distorted the behaviour of managers in pursuing short-
term benefits at the expense of long-term goals. The managers of SOEs tried 
everything possible to minimise the tax obligation by focusing on the short-term 
benefit. To address this problem, the government introduced the ‘3-year 
Managerial Responsibilities Contract System’ as another new measure of the 
reform. The contract was signed by government representatives and managers of 
SOEs in relation to a firm’s tax obligation to the government.  The responsibility 
contract system was effective in overcoming the problem of emphasising short-
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term gains. However the negotiation between government departments and their 
representatives was laborious. In addition, the responsibility contract system was 
not an impersonal institutional arrangement. It was subject to much personal 
discretion in relation to profit sharing and therefore corruption.  
Another problem was that the managers of SOEs were excessively interested in 
making investments because under the responsibility contract system, firms’ 
investments were still financed by the appropriations from their earnings. The 
SOEs therefore chose to minimise their tax obligations by over-investing. To 
overcome this problem in the contract system, the government introduced the 
‘Replacement of Government Appropriations by Loans from Banks’ in 1984.  
The institutional context of the Chinese SOEs during this stage seems to be 
different from the previous centralised stage, although ownership is still not 
legally separated from the management of SOEs. However, the interest of the 
government as owner was being increasingly separated from the interest of the 
managers. In the context of public ownership of SOEs, the principal-agent 
problems that existed in the planned system became more serious with the 
advent of the various reform measures. The interest of the government as owner 
was severely sacrificed by the managers of the SOEs in a number of ways. 
From the financial perspective, financial factors began to affect the choice of debt 
in the reformed firms, and they began to respond to the costs of borrowed funds. 
They were forced to respond to the factors affecting profit and loss. Due to the 
fact that stock markets were not yet in existence, the reformed firms had no 
formal capital structure. As discussed previously, capital funding still came from 
the government-owned financial institutions. Sources of firms’ investment funds in 
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capital construction from the government’s budget changed from 28.07% to 
4.17% in 1998. Firms were mainly financed by loan financing (19.3%), foreign 
investment (9.11%) and their own funds (67.42%) in 1998 (see Table A3.4 on p. 
291 of the Appendix). The sources of investment funds in government-owned 
firms changed significantly from government budget (77.69%) to non-government 
budgetary funding (95.87%) in 1998 (see Table A3.5 on p. 292 of the Appendix). 
The government changed the sources of funding in firms without changing the 
ownership of these funds of firms. Investment projects owned by the government 
decreased slightly from 81.89% in 1980 to 65.95% in 1998. In this context, firms 
were more concerned with the cost of short-term funding from financial 
institutions than the cost of long-term funding from governments (see Table A3.6 
on p. 293 of the Appendix). 
From the business strategy perspective, firms began to respond to market 
conditions in assets markets and product markets. In the reformed institutional 
context, they had to decide on the types of inputs to use in order to reduce input 
costs as well as the types of products to produce in order to increase revenue, 
thus achieving more retained profits.  
In this reformed institutional context, ownership and management were not 
separate. However, a conflict of interest emerged between the government (as 
owner) and the managers with great agency costs. On the one hand, the 
managers were under pressure from the government as owner of the firms to 
make a profit; on the other hand, managers had their own interests to consider — 
including the interest of their employees. Because they were beginning to use 
borrowed funds from banks, the firms had to consider the interests of the 
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creditors’. Thus, the conflict of interest between the government and the 
managers became complicated by another conflict of interest; namely, between 
owners and creditors, and managers and creditors. In the Chinese context of 
government ownership of both the banks and the firms, the firms tend to collude 
with the banks to act at the expense of the government.  
Keister (2004) conducted a through investigation of the impact of enterprise 
reform on the capital structure of 769 Chinese SOEs over the period from 1980 to 
1990. She adopted high-dimensional multivariate probit analysis and optimal 
matching technique, and used the single, multicategorical variable to define the 
capital structure of SOEs based on five common external borrowings: bank loans, 
interfirm loans, interfirm investment, public debt and foreign funds. She regressed 
each of these five dependent variables with retained earnings, size, profits, 
market development and with spatial exposure to capture the effect of 
geographical proximity on influence between firms. Her results (2004, pp. 145-
158 show the following: 
1. Retained earnings increase the likelihood of borrowing externally.  
2. Geographic propinquity increased similarity in borrowing. 
3. Poor market development decreased diversification of capital structure. 
4. Four distinct financial trajectories emerged from the changes of capital 
structure: most (65%) SOEs moved from government funding to bank 
funding; some (17%) SOEs used the bank funding as a transition to other 
forms of funding; some other (11%) SOEs avoided banks to get to non-
bank funding; and the remaining (7%) SOEs continued to rely on both 
bank and non-government funding.  
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She concluded that, unlike Western companies that borrow less when profit is 
high, Chinese SOEs used high profit and therefore high retained earnings to 
signal financial well-being to creditors to increase financial autonomy from the 
government. This pattern of change in capital structure was subject to imitation 
and market development, and most SOEs borrowed first from banks and then 
gradually made a transition to other forms of external credit. As of today, the debt 
level of SOEs that are not listed on the stock exchanges (where equity funding is 
not possible) is very high — higher than that of the SOEs that are listed. The 
existence of different interests and the continuing adjustment of interests among 
the participants of the firms (owners, managers and creditors) were the 
fundamental driving forces influencing the choice of financial behaviours of firms. 
3.4. Corporatisation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 1990 to the Present 
By the early 1990s, the government had recognised the principle-agent problem 
arising from the non-separation of government ownership from the management 
of SOEs in the context of partial reform measures and, consequently, the 
‘corporatisation program’ for SOEs was officially introduced (Burton, et al., pp. 42-
45, 52-53). The Chinese economists who supported the ‘ownership reform’ 
argument blamed the economists who followed the decentralisation argument for 
the failures of decentralisation measures and put forward the proposition of 
separating the ownership by government from the management by executives.  
During 1990 and 1991, some limited liability private companies were converted 
from SOEs, and stock exchanges were established in Shanghai and Shenzhen. 
In 1991, several large SOEs were transformed into joint-stock companies and 
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listed on stock exchanges. In 1992, the Enterprise Bill of Rights guaranteed non-
interference by the state in SOE operations by granting fourteen specific rights. 
Provincial regulations were issued for limited liability companies and joint-stock 
(limited liability stock) companies. In 1993, Company Law was passed to 
establish a legal framework for the corporatisation and corporate governance 
structure of SOEs, and in 1994 this law became effective (Burton et al., pp. 42–
45, 52-53). This law and other measures have assisted in the effort to make 
China's practices conform to internationally-accepted structures of corporate 
governance. In 1993, there were 183 companies listed on China's stock 
exchanges — either at Shanghai or Shenzhen — and, by 1996, there were over 
500 listed companies. By the end of 2000, the number of listed companies 
exceeded 1,100. 
Chinese companies operating in the corporatisation stage of enterprise reform 
appear similar to current versions of Western companies, where ownership and 
management are separate. However, effectively separating (government) 
ownership of SOEs from management was not simply a case of creating a 
structural framework to support this separation. The dilemma for designing any 
corporate governance structure is the problem of ‘how to make corporate 
executives accountable to the other contributors to the enterprise whose 
investments are at risk while still giving those executives the freedom, incentives, 
and control over resources for competitive purposes’ (Blair, 1995, p. 3). An 
appropriate solution must include these measures for implementing managerial 
constraints as well as incentives.  
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In China, ‘the State, or its agents. carry out “shareholder” functions otherwise 
performed by private owners in market economic systems’ (World Bank, 1997a, 
p. 1). This characteristic alone does not constitute the problem. The problem in 
China is complicated by political implications, which foster management's 
dependence on — rather than its separation from — the ownership. For example, 
many industrial managers of the mid-1980s owed their jobs to the personal 
connections they held with bureaucratic superiors and depended on these 
connections for bail-outs from serious economic problems that plagued their firms 
(White, 1993, p. 135). The corporatisation altered the status of the SOEs away 
from ‘political institutions’ toward ‘economic entities’ (You Ji, 1998, p. 163). In 
order to be effective, any proposed solution must include a mechanism to make 
the state's ownership one of limited liability so that the management can be held 
accountable for its losses. The Chinese government has already begun to work 
on this ownership aspect of SOE reform, and one scholar suggests that ‘currently 
gouyou minying, or state-owned but privately or corporately run, has become the 
guideline for China's enterprise reform’ (You Ji, 1998, p. 163).  
A number of studies has been conducted on the relationship between the reform 
of SOEs and their performance. A World Bank report (World Bank, 1997a, p. 28) 
on Chinese management of enterprise assets did not find that the reform process 
had improved SOE performance greatly. Before enterprise reform, the most 
pervasive problem facing the SOEs was their low productivity. In 1996, the SOEs 
still reported losses equivalent to one percent of that year's GDP. Losses were 
permanent and represented a lot of capital, labour, and natural resources that 
could not be regained. By not maximising productivity, the SOEs presented a 
credible threat to the sustainability of economic growth. The World Bank report 
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also pointed out that there were other factors affecting the performance aside 
from the SOE reform. One problem was that the SOEs were burdened with the 
responsibility of providing social services to employees (who had guaranteed job 
security) and their families, including education, housing, and health care. As 
policy, the Chinese government subsidised the SOE losses. Furthermore, 
obsolescent technology used by the SOEs served as an obstacle to any 
innovation. Rooted in the complex web of Chinese communism, none of these 
problems had an easy solution.  
Some studies support the finding in the World Bank report that efficiency within 
the SOEs did not seem to be improving as a result of the deregulation and 
corporatisation reforms. In fact, statistics suggest that productivity and profitability 
were declining overall (Xu & Wang, 1997). The data show that the losses and the 
percentage of firms reporting losses were rising rather than declining. Many 
different explanations have been offered. Xu Xiaonan and Wang Yan (1997) 
examined the effects of ownership structure on the performance of stock 
companies and reported that the ownership structure (both the mix and 
concentration) had four significant effects on the performance of stock 
companies. Firstly, there is a positive and significant correlation between 
ownership concentration and profitability. Secondly, the effect of ownership 
concentration is stronger for companies dominated by legal person shareholders 
than for those dominated by the state. Thirdly, firms' profitability is positively 
correlated with the fraction of legal person shares, but it is either negatively 
correlated or uncorrelated with the fraction of state shares and tradable A-shares 
held mostly by individuals. Lastly, labour productivity tends to decline as the 
proportion of state shares increases (Xu & Wang, 1997, p. 2).  
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3.5.  Theoretical Issues of SOE Reforms 
The path of SOE reform and its associated problems in the areas of corporate 
finance, corporate business strategy and corporate governance originates from 
the differences in the reform theories of socialist economies. The Chinese 
gradualist approach to enterprise reform was criticised by the economists who 
support the ‘big-bang’ approach to the economic reform (Sachs et al., 1994, 
1995). They advocated a full privatisation of Chinese SOEs without any 
intermediary increases in the autonomy of these enterprises. This theory, first 
implemented in Poland, was orchestrated by Jeffrey Sachs et al. (1995), and it 
was highly effective. The theory, supported by Poland's positive experience, 
served as a model for Russia's marketisation, which although initially 
unsuccessful, recently — based on a strong resource sector — has become one 
of the world’s better economic performers among the BRIC countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China). 
Still, some scholars argue that this model is the best for cases such as China, 
although possibly with some modifications in the light of Russia's recent 
experience. The main aspect of ownership reform in this full privatisation model 
would be an emphasis on the transfer of ownership of SOEs from the state to 
private shareholders. Thus, advocates of this type of reform would extol the 
creation of Company Law as the key step in the right direction, and urge for larger 
and more radical and steps to be implemented.  
In opposition to the full privatisation argument is the argument for hardening 
budget constraint (Kornai, 1980). Proponents of this stance argue that if full 
privatisation is not enforced, there must be institutional reforms that could attempt 
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to harden the budget constraints facing SOEs. Wang suggests that ‘enlarging 
enterprise autonomy before privatisation amounts to giving property rights to 
“Communist-appointed managers” without ownership control to enforce a hard 
budget constraint’. These institutional reforms may come in many packages, 
perhaps the most obvious one being regulation of government subsidies to loss-
making SOEs. Janos Kornai (1980) is a main advocate of this theory.  
The trend in China toward decentralisation of SOE control to local governments 
has presented some potential for hardening budget constraint without 
privatisation. The World Bank claims that ‘the decentralization of management 
decisions boosted the productivity of the firms. But relative to the rest of the 
economy, state industrial enterprises languished, with slow growth and declining 
profits’ (World Bank, 1997b, p. 12). According to Chinese researcher Ding Ning 
Ning (1998, 2004, p. 3), ‘although such decentralization has increased the 
activism of local governments, the problem of soft budgetary constraint on SOE is 
not solved’. Thus, one possible mechanism for eliminating the soft budget 
constraint without full privatisation is stronger supervision by an entity such as the 
board of directors of a corporation in developed economies.  
Some theorists, led by Barry Naughton (1995), argue for facilitation of the entry of 
non-state-owned firms into the economy as a mechanism for increasing 
efficiency. Naughton cited this phenomenon as a trialed, experienced and 
successful means of breaking down the state's monopoly control. He commented 
that ‘the relatively fragmented and decentralised condition of China's planned 
economic system pre-reform thus contributed to a relatively rapid response to the 
possibility of entry … [that] led to an increase in competition and a realignment of 
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prices’ (Naughton, 1995, p. 474). Indeed, non-state-owned enterprises have 
entered the market with enthusiasm and with great efficiency compared to SOEs, 
to the advantage of the Chinese economy. Still, because SOEs are protected by 
the state, this solution does not address the problem of SOE inefficiency. ‘Non-
state-owned enterprise (NSOE) development in China is not reliant upon the 
privatization of the country's state-owned enterprise’ (Ding Ning Ning, 1998, 
2004, p.1).  
Another conservative option for reform is to focus on simply increasing 
managerial autonomy without reforming ownership structures. Wang Xiaoqiang 
advocates this policy. He argues that ‘privatisation is infeasible for many large 
state-owned enterprises in transition. Enterprise reform should focus on 
managerial autonomy rather than on ‘privatisation’ (Wang, 1996, p. 1). He 
suggests that this ownership reform would probably come through advocating the 
contract responsibility system, enterprise groups, joint ventures, and joint-stock 
companies. This argument is a based on the idea that modern corporate 
governance structures do not constrain management directly enough or to the 
extent that China's managers need to be constrained.  
3.6. Chinese Institutional Factors that May Affect the Choice of Capital 
Structure of Listed Companies 
Different reform theories offer different solutions. The problem in Chinese 
enterprise reform is that there is a lack of a systemic approach to actively 
incorporate the four theoretical approaches discussed above: the privatisation 
approach advocated by the ‘big bang’ theorists; the budget-hardening approach 
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advocated by the ‘gradualist’ theorists; the approach of promoting private sector 
economy advocated by the ‘replacement’ theorists; and the approach of 
broadening the autonomy of firms without changing the ownership advocated by 
the ‘incentive’ theorists. The key question that the SOEs face has not been 
addressed; namely, whether Chinese firms are responsible for the government or 
the market. These partial and conflicting reforms have served to shape the 
financial decision-making behaviour of the former SOEs, and now listed 
companies.  
3.6.1. Chinese Institutional Factors Affecting Financial Characteristics of 
Firms 
From the financial perspective, a number of Chinese institutional factors are 
important in capital structure decision-making for Chinese listed companies. 
The development of a debt market is extremely important for a firm’s choice of 
capital structure. A developed debt market helps determine a true cost of capital 
and, therefore, facilitates the establishment of an accurate product price to firms. 
The Chinese debt market is very underdeveloped, and credit rating agencies are 
not fully established. The dominant source of debt funding is bank loans; the 
corporate debt market is insignificant. Without a developed debt market — and a 
corporate debt market, in particular — it is very difficult to establish the market 
price of money; that is, an interest rate. Without a market-determined rate of 
interest, the cost of debt cannot be established. In the Chinese situation, the 
interest rate is also severely interfered with by the government-owned central 
bank, the People’s Bank of China.  
88 
 
The development of a stock market is extremely important for determining the 
choice of capital structure for firms. A developed stock market helps determine a 
true price of a share, and thus signals accurate price information on equity cost to 
investors. The Chinese stock markets were not voluntarily established as a club 
of stockbrokers; they were set up by the government. Securities brokers and/or 
firms are publicly (government) owned companies. They are operated according 
to the regulations of the Chinese Securities Regulation Committee (CSRC). 
Although, technically speaking, trading and operations are computerised, the 
regulations on listing and broker business are set out by the government. Share 
prices are frequently and severely interfered with by listing rules and broking 
business regulations. For example, company listings are approved by CSRC 
according to an annual quota. The most important listing requirement is the profit 
of SOEs. In 1996, to be eligible to be listed, an SOE must have made a profit in 
three continuous years, and the return to equity must have exceeded 10% for 
every one of three profitable years. The development of independent financial 
institutions is also extremely important for a firm’s choice of capital structure. 
Competitive and independent financial institutions are necessary to facilitate the 
development of a true capital price. In China, banks are owned by the 
government, and credit allocations are controlled by government policies and 
instructions. Credit worthiness assessment is very arbitrary, and the mortgage 
registry system has been established only very recently. 
The underdevelopment of debt market, stock market and financial institutions has 
distorted the costs of debt and equity. Chinese stock markets are ‘government-
policy-driven’ markets and very speculative. Financial institutions are 
government-operated departments and are very inefficient. Debt costs are 
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distorted upwards and stock values are distorted downwards. In China, there is a 
severe reversal in prices of debt and equity, where debt is more expensive than 
equity. Information asymmetry is also very severe among and between markets 
and institutions.  
3.6.2. Chinese Institutional Factors Affecting Business Strategies of Firms 
From the business strategy perspective, SOEs are becoming more responsible 
for their own decisions in obtaining inputs and marketing outputs according to 
market forces. Business strategy has become more important in their business 
decisions.  
Successful diversification is often driven by a leveraging of assets and 
competence across a range of businesses. In the case of China, the strength of a 
company is an important asset that allows it to access financial markets for equity 
and debt. In addition, the diversification of business is supported by extensive 
business networks, which facilitate entry by a company into a range of new 
product market areas. 
On the other hand, both product markets and input markets are often interfered 
with by government policies and regulations, Chinese firms are not able to 




3.6.3. Chinese Institutional Factors Affecting Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms of Firms 
From the corporate governance perspective, clearly-defined private ownership of 
firms and banks is essential to a firm’s choice of capital structure. A privately 
owned firm has to be responsible to its shareholders. The interest of a privately-
owned firm can be independent of the interest of a privately-owned bank. Checks 
and balances between firms and banks are clear through the loan assessment 
procedure, credit rating system and monitoring mechanisms. External bank 
control would be strong and effective.  
SOE reform has not changed government ownership of listed companies and 
banks in any way. The shares of a listed company are defined according to their 
owner. Shares owned by the government are ‘government shares’ (G-share) and 
not tradable. Shares owned by institutions’ and firms’ legal persons are ‘legal 
person shares’ (L-share) and only tradable among legal persons. Shares owned 
by individual citizens are ‘individual shares’ (A-share) and only tradable among 
Chinese citizens in the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets. Shares owned by 
foreign citizens are ‘foreign shareholders’ shares’ (B-share) and only tradable 
among foreign investors. Shares listed in Hong Kong and owned by Hong Kong 
citizens are ‘Hong Kong shares’ (H-share). Shares listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange and owned by Americans are ‘N-share’ and only tradable on American 
stock markets. The same share of a listed company has different values and 
different rights according to who owns them and where they are issued.  
Although reformed SOEs as a type of listed company are under a certain degree 
of pressure to minimise the cost and maximise the return of funds being raised 
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according to market forces, the fact that the Chinese listed companies are still 
dominantly owned by the government may have distorted the behaviours of firms 
in responding to market forces. The managers of these companies may not have 
to behave in a maximising or minimising manner in the interest of the 
government. The SOEs include banks, and they are also dominantly owned by 
the government. Banks loans to the listed companies are severely subjected to 
the government’s policy and administrative instructions. The lack of clear 
ownership of listed companies and banks has created the problem of ‘absence of 
ownership’.  
In this unclear-defined ownership structure, agency problems and transaction 
costs become complicated. The separation of ownership from management 
remains superficial because the government controls the dominant ownership 
and makes the appointments of most of the important managerial positions. The 
standard corporate governance model does not exist in substance. In this 
institutional context, the interests of owners (governments or government 
departments), managers (government representatives appointed by 
governments), and creditors (governments or government departments) are not 
independent, and they are often severely compromised by inside control via 
collusion between owners and managers or managers and creditors or owners 
and creditors, all to the advantage of the individuals in positions they hold. There 
are no checks or balances at all among owners, managers and creditors in the 
so-called corporate governance mechanism of Chinese listed companies.  
The initial intention of the government in these SOE reforms was to solve the 
bureaucratic problems that existed under the centralised financial system. 
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However, the reforms were aimed at separating government ownership from 
management in the SOEs, thus causing many exposed agency problems 
associated with the greater autonomous powers of the SOE managers. In 
addition, the development of debt and equity markets since the reform has made 
it possible for managers of SOEs to choose between debt finance and equity 
finance, thus causing some degree of transaction costs in the context of various 
degrees of asset specificity.  
When SOEs were both owned and managed by the government, there was no 
separation of government function from business function and no genuine 
separation of ownership from management. The unification of ownership and 
management in these circumstances caused enormous problems in the principal-
agent relationship and the transaction relationship. The ownership of everybody 
(via government ownership) has become an ownership of nobody. The ownership 
of all people lacked a concrete representation of ownership. The government, 
which claimed to represent the interests of all people, ended up being 
represented by government officials serving their own interests. The managers 
appointed by the government, who were supposed to operate firms in the 
interests of the government and therefore the interests of all people, sometimes 
represented their own interests and/or those of their employees. In this 
institutional context, the real owner of the firm is not known. The interests of all 
people, the government officials, the managers and the creditors are misaligned.  
This review and discussion on the path of SOE reform in China offers a number 
of observations on the institutional context that may impact on the capital 
structure of Chinese listed companies: 
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1. The Chinese ‘gradual’ approach to SOE reform has facilitated a relatively 
smooth but partial transition from a planned economy to a market 
economy, thus creating a lot of uncertainty in developing financial markets 
and financial institutions, product markets and asset markets, and the 
corporate governance in firms. This institutional context is related to the 
problem of information asymmetry that may affect the capital structure.  
2. The Chinese SOEs have experienced a journey from the incentive-based 
reform to the responsibility-based reform to the ownership-based reform, 
thus resulting in SOEs becoming opportunistic in benefiting (as well as 
suffering) from the reform measures. This institutional context is related to 
the problem of irrational decisions of firms that may affect the capital 
structure. 
3. The Chinese SOE reform lacks a systemic approach due to disagreements 
surrounding the reform strategy and its associated theories. Reform 
measures have solved some problems while creating others. This 
institutional context is related to the underdevelopment of markets in 
finance, product, and asset that may affect the capital structure; 
4. The Chinese SOE reform is not thorough, and it the process is slow and 
ongoing. Fundamental traces of the socialist and planned economy have 
been left in the institutional context of the reformed economy, namely 
dominant government ownership and high ownership concentration. This 
institutional context is related to the underdevelopment of corporate 




5. The institutional factors exist mainly in three areas: in the financial market 
conditions that may affect financial considerations of capital structure; in 
the product and asset market conditions that may affect the business 
strategy considerations of capital structure; and in the corporate 
governance mechanisms that may affect the agency cost considerations of 
capital structure.    
3.7. Concluding Remarks 
This review of Chinese enterprise reform has indicated that the Chinese listed 
companies carry historical traces of the planned economy, despite reform-based 
developments towards a market economy. The Chinese institutional context is of 
particular significance in three major areas where the capital structure decisions 
of Chinese listed companies may be distorted: 1) the under-development of 
financial markets together with information asymmetry in relation to the impact of 
financial variables on capital structure; 2) the under-development of product and 
asset markets together with little business strategy focus in relation to the impact 
of product diversification and asset specificity on capital structure; and 3) the 
dominant government ownership and limited ownership diversification in relation 
to the impact of agency costs of debt and equity on capital structure. The 
literature review in the previous chapter together with the discussion on the 
Chinese institutional context presented in this chapter provide us with a 






MODELLING AND HYPOTHESES 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter constructs the models of the hypothesised relationships between 
capital structure and the financial, business strategy and corporate governance 
determinants of capital structure. In this chapter, the generic term of capital 
structure is used. Capital structure can be measured in a number of ways, and 
this will be dealt with in the following chapter. In addition, as indicated in the 
introductory chapter, the data collected for this research covers multiple subjects 
(companies) over a number of years. Data arranged in this way is called panel 
data, and the specific methodological issues involved in handling panel data are 
discussed in the following section.  
In a data set which does not combine time series and cross-sectional 
observations, the conventional ordinary least square (OLS) model is sufficient to 
estimate the pooled effect of independent variables on dependent variables. 
However, given the nature of panel data, another statistical method is required. 
This research uses the linear mixed model (LMM), which captures fixed effects 
(effects assumed constant across all observations) and random effects (effects 
that are different for each company with respect to a particular year) from data 
arranged in a panel. LMM also enables the modelling of correlated random errors 
within each subject of a panel over time (Baltagi, 2005). 
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This chapter firstly discusses the nature and structure of the data, its 
arrangement as panel data, and the importance of separating time series and 
cross-section effects. The modelling of relationships using OLS and LMM is 
discussed, as are the implications of this for capturing the pooled, fixed and 
random effects. 
4.2. The Nature of Data and Various Effects 
Data sets that combine time series and cross-section observations are called 
panel data sets or longitudinal data sets (Arellano, 2003; Baltagi, 2005). These 
kinds of data sets normally provide rich sources of information but they require a 
different approach to statistical modelling. The structure of the data collected in a 
panel is illustrated in Table 4.1, below. 







































C1 1991 DV CV FF CV FF 
C1 … … … … … … 
C1 2000 DV CV FF CV FF 
       
C2 1991 DV CV FF CV FF 
C2 … … … … … … 
C2 2000 DV CV FF CV FF 
       
C3 1991 DV CV FF CV FF 
C3 … … … … … … 
C3 2000 DV CV FF CV FF 
       
C4 … … … … … … 
… … … … … … … 
97 
 
Data is collected on 1,098 companies (where c = 1,098) over a period of up to 10 
years (where j=10). There are four dependent variables to be considered (where 
Y=DVx4) in relation to eight financial covariates (where X=CVx8), seven business 
strategy fixed factors (where X=FFx7), four governance covariates (where 
X=CVx4) and nine year dummy fixed factors (where X=FFx9). 
Panel data can be represented as follows. Let Y be a matrix of dependent 
variables (4 DVs as capital structure) while X be a matrix of independent 
variables (8 financial CVs, 2 strategy FFs, 4 governance CVs, 9 year dummy 
FFs). The panel data is a matrix of {Ycj, Xcj}, in which each row is made up of the 
vectors Ycj and Xcj representing the data for a given subject represented by c, 
(i.e., company) in a particularly period of time represented by j, (i.e., year). N is 
the number of companies (1,098) and Tc is the number of years (10) of data for 






 or 1,098 companies times 
10 years (the total number (10,980 rows) of company-years represented in the 
data). This number of rows is a theoretical number because not all of the 1,098 
companies have the same duration of 10 years. The actual number of rows in the 
data set in this study is 6,647, which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
The number of columns is equal to the total number of Y and X variables (4 DVs 
+ 8 financial CVs + 7 strategy FFs + 4 governance CVs + 9 year dummy FFs = 
32 variables). This number of columns is an actual number in the data set in this 
study. 
If N=Tc, (i.e., the number of companies in the data set has the cross-sectional 
observations for the same number of years), the panel data set is described as a 
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balanced panel data. When there are some missing values in this panel data, it is 
regarded as an unbalanced panel data. If N>T (i.e., the number of companies in 
the data set is greater than the number of years), the panel data set is described 
as a wide-form panel data. If N<T (i.e., the number of companies in the data set 
is smaller than the number of years), the panel data set is regarded as a long-
form panel data (Arellano, 2003; Baltagi, 2005). In the panel of collected data in 
this thesis, N=1,098 and T=10, and it is treated as an unbalanced, wide-form 
panel data because 1) not all companies have observations for the same number 
of years, and 2) the number of companies in the data set is greater than the 
number of years.  
The panel data is modelled as follows: 
cjccjccjcj uXuXy εββ ++++= 00  Equation 4.1 
 
Where, for the model as defined in the above,    
y =a dependent variable (DV) 
X =a set of independent variables: both time-varying covariates (CV) and fixed factors (FF); 
c =1,...,1,098 companies; 
j =1,…,10 years; 
ycj =a dependent variable for company c in year j; 
Xcj =a vector of CV and FF for company c in year j; 
0β  = overall intercept (to be estimated); 
u0c = random component of intercept for company c (variance to be estimated) β  =a vector of unknown fixed coefficients or slopes with respect to CV and FF (to be estimated individually); 
uc =a vector of unknown random parameters with respect to CV for company c (variances and covariances of 
the distributions of these parameters to be estimated); 
cjε  = random error term for company c in year j; 
 
This regression model states that Ycj is a function of Xcj. Ycj is a dependent 
variable with respect to a company in a year and Xcj is an independent variable(s) 
with respect to a company in a year. In the conventional OLS method, Y is a 
function of X without considering the variations in effect of intercept, 0β , and/or 
slope, β ,  or without considering the variations in effect between companies 
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(between-subject effect) and between years (within-subject effect). In the 
regression result of OLS, the effects in intercept, 0β , and/or slope, β , are the 
pooled or averaged effects across companies and across years, regardless of 
variations between companies and years.  
For OLS to be a valid model, the following assumption is necessary: (1) the 
random errors, cjε , have constant variance across all companies and across all 














                                         Assumption 1 
 
OLS is called an ‘independence model’ because of the fulfillment of these two 
conditions in Assumption 1. With panel data, Assumption 1 is very likely to be 
violated because of the repeated observations over time for each company. As a 













                                                         
 
The Linear Mixed Model (LMM) is statistically able to handle this violation 
problem and enables fitting of the following two variance structures (Verbeke, 
2000): 
• The compound symmetry structure (CS) assumes that (1) the random 
errors, cjε , have constant variance across all companies in all categories 
and across all years, and (2) the random errors, cjε , for a particular 
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company across all years are correlated to the same degree, i.e., for all  














 Assumption 2 
 
• The first order autoregressive structure (AR1) assumes that (1) the 
random errors, cjε ,  have constant variance for all companies in all 
categories and across all years, and (2) the random errors, cjε , for a 
particular company across all years are correlated to a degree which 

















                                      Assumption 3 
 
Under Assumption 1, OLS and LMM with fixed effects only are conceptually 
equivalent (though estimated differently) when intercepts and slopes are fixed. 
Under Assumption 2 and Assumption 3, LMM is called a ‘dependence model’, 
and is likely to capture the fixed and random effects that OLS is unable to do 
(Verbeke, 2000). Table 4.2, below, lists these two effects under ‘Effects’. 
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Table 4.2: Framework of Model Fitting Methods 
Predictors Effects Correlated Error Structure 
  Assumption 1 Assumption 2 Assumption 3 




(Model 1) Fixed OLS/LMM RM/LMM LMM 
 Fixed + random LMM LMM LMM 
Financial + Business Strategy 
(Model 2) Fixed OLS/LMM RM/LMM LMM 
 Fixed + random LMM LMM LMM 
Financial + Corporate 
Governance (Model 3) Fixed OLS/LMM RM/LMM LMM 
 Fixed + random LMM LMM LMM 
Financial + Business 
Strategy+ Corporate 
Governance (Model 4) 
Fixed OLS/LMM RM/LMM LMM 
 Fixed + random LMM LMM LMM 
Note: RM is ‘repeated measures’ 
 
Based on the three theoretical approaches discussed in Chapter Two, four 
statistical models will be constructed (see section 4.3 of this chapter). With two 
effects for each model, there are eight effects: four effects are fixed effects, and 
four effects are fixed and random effects. Either OLS or LMM can deal with fixed 
effects, while only LMM deals with fixed and random effects. 
Under three model assumptions, there are three error structures. They are 
‘independence structure’ in Assumption 1, ‘compound symmetry structure’ in 
Assumption 2, and ‘first order autoregressive structure’ in Assumption 3. OLS can 
only fit ‘independence structure’. LMM can fit all three error structures (Verbeke, 
2000).  
In this framework of model fitting methods, there will be 24 fitting methods or 
models as a result of four models with two effects in three error structures. LMM 
can be used to fit all 24 models. For eight of the 24 models, there are alternatives 
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to LMM for estimating the same model: OLS for independence structures, and 
repeated measures analysis of variance (RMANOVA) for compound symmetry 
error structures. For 16 of the 24 models, there is no alternative to LMM. With 24 
models to run to find a best fit model, a proper procedure of model building is 
required. The Hox model building procedure (Hox, 1995) is used in this research, 
and it will be discussed in the following chapter (data and methodology). Also 
because compound symmetry error structures (RMANOVA) are less feasible for 
‘untidy’ panel data with unequal number of years, the first order autoregressive 
structure will be used in this study.  
LMM runs with four combinations of fixed and random intercepts and/or slopes 
(Verbeke, 2000), as shown in Table 4.3, below:  
Table 4.3: Matrix of Effects with Intercept and Slope 
  Slope (S)  
  Fixed (F) Random (R) 
Intercept (I) Fixed (F) FIFS FIRS 
 Random (R) RIFS RIRS 
Note:  FIFS = fixed intercept with fixed slope; FIRS = fixed intercept with random slope; RIFS = 
random intercept with fixed slope; RIRS= random intercept with random slope.  
 
In the OLS method, dependent and independent variables are treated as a 
pooled data set. The variations between subjects such as companies (random 
intercept for between-subject effect) and the variations between years (random 
slope for within-subject effect) are ignored. The regression result is the averaged 
estimate with one regression line with one fixed intercept and one fixed slope 





Figure 4.1: Regression Graph for OLS Method: FIFS 
 
The regression line in the above graph represents the results on the averaged 
pooled basis for all companies regardless of time periods. Although the OLS 
method is fundamentally different from the LMM method, the above graph can 
describe the regression results of the LMM method when both the intercept and 
slope are fixed.  
When the LMM method considers the variations between subjects such as 
companies (random intercept for between-subject effect) and/or the variations 
between years (random slope for within-subject effect) within the framework of 
various assumed error structures, the graphs will be different.  
When the intercept is fixed but the slope is random (FIRS), the graph is as 












Figure 4.2: Regression Graph for LMM Method: FIRS 
 
In the above graph, each regression line represents the results for each individual 
company allowing variations between years (not variations between companies) 
to occur in order to capture the within-subject effect.  
When the intercept is random but the slope is fixed (RIFS), the graph is as 
presented in Figure 4.3, below. 
 
Figure 4.3: Regression Graph for LMM Method: RIFS 
Dependent 
variable (Y) 














In the above graph, each regression line represents the results for each individual 
company allowing variations between companies (not variations between years) 
to occur in order to capture the between-subject effect. 
When both the intercept and the slope are random (RIRS), the graph is as 




Figure 4.4: Regression Graph for LMM Method: RIRS 
 
In the above graph, each regression line represents the results for each individual 
company allowing both variations between years and variations between 











The advantage of greater randomness in both the intercept and the slope is to 
capture both the between-subject effect and the within-subject effect. The 
disadvantage of doing this is to lose a lot of observations due to too many 
degrees of freedom. This operation is only allowed by a large data set. In this 
study with a very large data set, models have been run with the random intercept 
and random slope (RIRS) as well as the fixed intercept and fixed slope (FIFS). 
For simplicity, neither RIFS nor FIRS have been considered. Although the 
regression methods vary, the models are based on the same hypotheses 
discussed in the next section. The statistical package of SPSS v14 was used in 
the regression analysis. 
4.3. Modelling the Hypotheses of Capital Structure Using the OLS Method 
On the basis of the three theoretical approaches to the study of capital structure 
discussed in Chapter Two, four models are constructed with a view to facilitating 
the comparison between models for the measurement of model fit. The structure 
of modelling is summarised in Table 4.4, below: 
 
Table 4.4: Modelling Structure 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Financial variables (Time-varying) with year dummy variables included Included Included Included 
Business strategy dummy variables (Non-time-varying)  included  Included 





Firstly, Model 1 considers the impact of eight time-varying financial covariates, 
together with nine year dummy variables on capital structure, according to the 
financial approach. Then, Model 2 considers the impact of seven non-time-
varying fixed factors on capital structure, together with the financial variables, 
according to the business strategy approach. Next, Model 3 considers the impact 
of four time-varying covariates, together with the financial variables, according to 
the corporate governance approach. Finally, Model 4 considers the aggregate 
impact of all financial, business strategy and corporate governance variables on 
the capital structure. 
The four models are structured in this way so as to identify the best fit model that 
may be used to investigate the determinants of capital structure. Model 1 is the 
baseline model and considers financial variables and year dummy variables. 
Model 2 will be tested against Model 1 to see if it improves model fit in relation to 
the contribution of business strategy dummy variables to the impact on capital 
structure. Model 3 will be tested against Model 1 to see if it improves model fit in 
relation to the contribution of corporate governance variables to the impact on 
capital structure. Model 4 will be tested against Model 1 to see if it improves 
model fit in relation to the joint contribution of business strategy and corporate 
governance variables to the impact on capital structure. 
The Hox model testing procedure will be discussed in the following chapter. For 
the convenience of visual understanding, the modelling structure is detailed in 
Figure 4.5, overleaf. 
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Model 1 plus       Integrated  Model (Model 4)       Model 1 plus 
 CV & FF:               CV & FF  
Asset Model 1 plus     Corporate Governance Factors (Model 3)     Model 1 plus (+)product 
Specificity (-)  CV;              diversification 
And agency cost Model 1 plus   Business Strategy Factors (Model 2)   Model 1 plus agency cost and 
agency cost of equity (-)  FF:        FF: (+) of debt agency cost 
of equity (+)   assets   Financial Factors (Model 1)   (+)product   (+) of debt 
  GL (-) specificity (-) CV:    CV:  diversification (+) GOV   
  EQU10 (-)   tax (+)  (+) tangiblity   (+) EQU1   
    Asset1 (+) profit (+, -) Capital Structure 
(+) capital 
intensity (-) PROD1     
    Asset2 (-) size (+, -) DV: DE, LDE, DTA, ARCDTA (-) risk (+) PROD2     
    Asset3 (-) growth (+, -)   (+) duration (+) PROD3     
        Trade-Off Theory & Pecking Order Theory   (+) PROD4     
                  
        Theories of Product Diversification & Transaction Costs         
                  
        Agency Cost Theory         
                  
                  
 
Figure 4.5: Modelling Structure  
Note: 1) DV = dependent variable; CV = covariate or independent variable; FF = fixed factor or independent dummy variable.  
2) DE = debt-equity ration; LDE log of DE; DTA = debt to total asset ratio; ARCDTA = arcsin square root of DTA.  
3) ‘+’ (‘-‘) stands for a positive (negative) relationship between dependent variable and independent variable. 
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4.3.1.  Modelling Financial Variables (Model 1) 
Model 1 is a base model considering the impact of eight time-varying financial 








0  Equation 4.2 
 
where, for the model as defined above,    
ycj  =  capital structure response for company c in year j (j=1,..,10).  
xcj =  time-varying financial covariate f (f=1,..,8) for company c in year j (j=1,..,10) 
β = intercepts and slope coefficients for fixed effects (for which explicit individual estimates are produced) 
εcj = random error for company c in year j.  
 
 
Equation 4.2 hypothesises that the capital structure, ycj, with respect to a 








β  with respect to that company in that year. Eight financial 
covariates are effective tax rate (TXER), profitability (PROF), size (SIZE), growth 
(GROW), tangibility (TANG), capital intensity (CAPI), risk (RISK), and duration 
(DURA).  









 Equation 4.2a 
 
where, for the model as defined above,    
cjy   =  capital structure response for company c in year j (j=1,..,10). 





In order to examine the year-varying effect, we have included eight year dummy 







β for nine years of time series from 1992 to 2000 
(where 1992 year dummy variable is a reference variable) in Shenzhen Stock 







β  for ten 
years of time series from 1991 to 2000 (where the 1991 Year dummy variable is a 
reference variable) in Shanghai Securities Exchange (SHX). 







β  can be presented in an expanded form for 











 Equation 4.2b 
Where 92Y  is a reference dummy variable. 
 







β  can be presented in an expanded form for 












   Equation 4.2c 
Where 91Y  is a reference dummy variable. 
 
 

















0  Equation 4.2d 
 
where, for the model as defined above,    
ycj  =  capital structure response for company c in year j (j=1,..,10).  
xcj =  time-varying financial covariate f (f=1,..,8) for company c in year j (j=1,..,10) 
t = dummy variables for the factor time (year) 
β = intercepts and slope coefficients for fixed effects (for which explicit individual estimates are produced) 
εcj = random error for company c in year j.  
 
Equation 4.2d represents Model 1 which is a baseline model and examines  
the impact of financial variables and year dummy variables on the capital 
structure of the Chinese listed companies. This is a multi-variable regression 
model, and the functional relationship between each of the eight financial 
covariates and the capital structure is modelled on the basis of the following  
eight hypotheses. Each hypothesis is based on the assumption that all other 
covariates are held constant.  
Hypothesis 1.1:  Effective tax rate (TXER) is positively related to debt levels.  
According to trade-off theory, because debt interest is tax-deductible, a company 
facing a higher tax rate is expected to maximise the tax deduction benefit by 
taking more debt. The hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between 
TXER and capital structure (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Chiarella, 1991).  
Hypothesis 1.2: Firm’s profit (PROF) is either positively or negatively related to 
debt levels.  
According to trade-off theory, a company with greater profit has a greater 
financial capacity to repay debt and, therefore, is expected to be able to take 
more debt. The hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between PROF 
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and capital structure. However, according to pecking order theory, a company 
with greater profit may have less need to borrow more because of sufficient 
internal cash flow. The hypothesis is that there is a negative relationship between 
PROF and capital structure (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Chaplinsky & Niehaus, 1990; 
Friend & Hasbrouck, 1988; Friend & Lang, 1988; Kester, 1986; Titman & 
Wessels, 1988). Whether the coefficient of PROF co-variate carries a positive or 
a negative sign will be a testing case of the hypothesised relationship between 
PROF and capital structure either predicted by trade-off theory or pecking order 
theory. 
Hypothesis 1.3: Firm’s size (SIZE) is either positively or negatively related to debt 
levels.  
According to trade-off theory, a large-sized company is less likely to go bankrupt 
and, therefore, is expected to attract more debt. The hypothesis is that there  
is a positive relationship between SIZE and capital structure (Friend and Lang, 
1988). However, according to pecking order theory, a large-sized company gives 
rise to greater information asymmetry existing between internal and external 
finances, and therefore this company attracts less debt. The hypothesis is  
that there is a negative relationship between SIZE and capital structure (Barton & 
Gordon, 1988). Whether the coefficient of SIZE co-variate carries a positive  
sign or a negative sign will be a testing case of the hypothesised relationship 





Hypothesis 1.4: Firm’s growth (GROW) is either positively or negatively related to 
debt levels.  
According to trade-off theory, a company of fast growth has a greater potential  
for revenue growth, and therefore it is expected to be able to take more debt.  
The hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between GROW and  
capital structure (Kester, 1986). However, pecking order theory predicts a 
negative relationship, where the fast growth in revenue means less need to 
borrow due to a potentially sufficient internal cash flow. The hypothesis is  
that there is a negative relationship between GROW and capital structure. 
Whether the coefficient of GROW co-variate carries a positive sign or a  
negative sign will be a testing case of the hypothesised relationship between 
growth and capital structure predicted either by trade-off theory and pecking  
order theory. 
Hypothesis 1.5: Firm’s tangibility (TANG) is positively related to debt levels. 
According to trade-off theory, a company with more tangible assets has more 
collateral assets in the event of bankruptcy and therefore it is expected to attract 
more debt. The hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between TANG 
and capital structure. 
Hypothesis 1.6: Firm’s capital intensity (CAPI) is positively related to debt levels. 
According to trade-off theory, a company with higher capital intensity has more 
collateral assets and is expected to be able to take more debt. The hypothesis is 
that there is a positive relationship between CAPI and capital structure (Lang, 
1988; Long & Malitz, 1985; Anderson, 1990). However, Gordon (1988) argues for 
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a negative relationship because high capital intensity means a high operating 
leverage, so a higher risk of future income and therefore a greater concern of 
creditors for the risk of default. 
Hypothesis 1.7: Risk (RISK) is negatively related to debt levels. 
According to trade-off theory, a company subject to high risk is more prone to 
bankruptcy and therefore it will be expected to be less able to attract debt. The 
hypothesis is that there is a negative relationship between RISK and capital 
structure (Bradley, 1984; Friend & Hasbrouck 1988). 
Hypothesis 1.8: Firm duration (DURA) listed on the market is positively related to 
debt levels. 
According to trade-off theory, a company with a long history of business operation 
in the market is expected to have a better reputation than a company with a short 
history. A good business reputation will facilitate borrowing and reduce the 
likelihood of bankruptcy. The hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship 
between DURA and capital structure. 
4.3.2. Modelling Business Strategy Dummy Variables (Model 2) 
Model 2 is built upon Model 1 by including business strategy dummy variables. It 
is designed to examine the impact of product diversification and asset specificity 
together with financial variables on capital structure. According to the theories of 
product diversification and asset specificity, it is hypothesised that product 
diversification is positively related to capital structure, and asset specificity is 


























0                                Equation 4.3 
 
where, for the model as defined above,    
ycjkl  =  capital structure response for company c in year j (j=1,..,10) with product type k (k=1,..,4), and asset type 
l (l=1,..3).  
pc = non-time varying dummy variables for the fixed factor product type for company c 
a c = non-time varying dummy variables for the fixed factor asset type for company c 
β = intercepts and slope coefficients for fixed effects (for which explicit individual estimates are produced) 
εcjlk = random error for company c in year j with product k, and asset type l.  
 
Equation 4.3 models the hypothesis that capital structure is a function of product 
diversification and asset specificity, conditional on financial variables. The seven 























β  can be presented in an 



















0 432    
      Equation 4.3a 
where, for the model as defined above,    
ycjkl  =  capital structure response for company c in year j (j=1,..,10). 
a to c  =  coefficients of non-time-varying product dummy variables for company c.  
PROD1 is a reference dummy variable. 
 

































0    Equation 4.3b 
           
where, for the model as defined above,    
ycjkl  =  capital structure response for company c in year j (j=1,..,10). 
e to g  =  coefficients of non-time-varying asset dummy variables for company c.  
PROD1 is a reference dummy variable. 
ASSET1 is a reference dummy variable. 
 
Equation 4.3b represents Model 2 which is based on the following seven 
hypotheses, conditional on financial variables. 
 
Hypothesis 2.1: Product 1 (PROD1) is negatively related to debt levels.  
Product 1 represents companies that produce a ‘single product’. ‘Single product’ 
is a proxy for very low product diversification, and therefore a high business risk 
to creditors who provide debt. According to the theory of product diversification, it 
is hypothesised that there is a negative relationship between very low product 
diversification and capital structure. Product 1 is set as a reference dummy 
variable. 
Hypothesis 2.2: Product 2 (PROD2) is positively related to debt levels. 
Product 2 represents companies that produce a dominant product within their 
product portfolio. ‘Dominant product’ is a proxy for low-average product 
diversification and average business risk attracting more debt than in the case of 
PROD1. According to the theory of product diversification, the hypothesis is that 




Hypothesis 2.3: Product 3 (PROD3) is positively related to debt levels. 
Product 3 represents companies that produce ‘related products’ within their 
product portfolio. ‘Related products’ is a proxy for an average product 
diversification and therefore an average business risk attracting average debt. In 
comparison with PROD1, PROD3 is more diversified. According to the theory of 
product diversification, the hypothesis is that there is an average positive 
relationship between PROD3 and capital structure. 
Hypothesis 2.4: Product 4 (PROD4) is positively related to debt level. 
Product 4 represents companies that produce ‘unrelated products’. ‘Unrelated 
products’ is a proxy for high product diversification with a low business risk and is 
therefore able to attract more debt. In comparison with PROD1, PROD4 is more 
diversified. According to the theory of product diversification, the hypothesis is 
that there is a strong positive relationship between PROD4 and capital structure. 
Hypothesis 2.5: Asset 1 (ASSET1) is positively related to debt levels. 
Asset 1 represents companies that employ ‘very general assets’. According to 
transaction cost economics (TCE) theory, a company that employs general 
assets is expected to be able to take more debt due to the fact that general 
assets would be easier to resell in the event of bankruptcy. The hypothesis is that 
there is a positive relationship between Asset 1 and capital structure. Asset 1 is 





Hypothesis 2.6: Asset 2 (ASSET2) is negatively related to debt levels.  
Asset 2 represents companies that employ ‘less general assets’. According to the 
theory of transaction cost economics, a company that employs neutral or less 
general assets is expected to be less able to take more debt. This type of asset is 
more difficult to resell than a general asset in the event of bankruptcy. The 
hypothesis is that there is a negative relationship between ASSET2 and capital 
structure. 
Hypothesis 2.7: Asset 3 (ASSET3) is negatively related to debt levels. 
Asset 3 represents companies that employ a ‘specific asset’. According to the 
theory of transaction cost economics, a company that employs specific assets is 
expected to take less debt because a specific asset is very difficult to be resell — 
or, if it is sold, there will be a significant loss of value — in the event of 
bankruptcy. Compared with general and neutral assets, the hypothesis is that 
there is a negative relationship between ASSET3 and capital structure. 
4.3.3. Modelling Corporate Governance Variables (Model 3) 
Model 3 is built upon Model 1 by including four corporate governance variables. It 
is designed to examine the impact of ownership structure (government ownership 
versus legal person ownership) and ownership concentration (ownership of the 
largest shareholder versus ownership of the ten largest shareholders) on capital 
structure, conditional on financial variables. According to agency cost theory, the 
hypothesis is that, in the case of high ownership concentration of either 
government ownership or one-largest shareholder ownership, shareholders tend 
119 
 
to borrow more at the expense of the interest of creditors (agency cost of debt) 
or, in the case of high ownership concentration of either legal person 
shareholders or the ten-largest shareholders, managers tend not to borrow more 



















0                                                             Equation 4.4 
where, for the model as defined above,    
ycj  =  capital structure response for company c in year j (j=1,..,10)  
g cj =  time-varying corporate governance covariate g (g=1,..,4) for company c in year j (j=1,..,10) 
εcj = random error for company c in year j   
 
Equation 4.4 represents Model 3 which considers (conditional on financial 















β  can be presented in 















0  Equation 4.4a 
 
where, for the model as defined above,    
ycjkl  =  capital structure response for company c in year j (j=1,..,10). 




Equation 4.4a models the hypothesis that capital structure is (conditional on 





Hypothesis 3.1: The proportion of government shares to total shares (GOV) is 
positively related to debt levels.  
According to the ‘debt agency cost’ hypothesis, a company having high 
government ownership is expected to over-invest by taking more debt at the 
expense of the interest of creditors. The hypothesis is that there is a positive 
relationship between GOV and capital structure. A negative sign on the 
coefficient of the GOV variable implies the non-existence of debt agency cost.  
Hypothesis 3.2: The proportion of legal person shares to total shares (GL) is 
negatively related to debt levels. 
According to the ‘equity agency cost’ hypothesis, a company having high legal 
person ownership is expected to under-invest by taking less debt at the expense 
of the interest of shareholders. The hypothesis is that there is a negative 
relationship between GL and capital structure. A positive sign on the coefficient of 
the GL variable implies the non-existence of equity agency cost.  
Hypothesis 3.3:  The proportion of shares owned by the largest shareholder to 
total shares (EQU1) is positively related to debt levels.  
According to the ‘debt agency cost’ hypothesis, a company with high ownership 
concentration of the largest shareholder is expected to over-invest by taking more 
debt at the expense of the interest of creditors. The hypothesis is that there is a 
positive relationship between EQU1 and capital structure. A negative sign on the 
coefficient of the EQU1 variable implies the non-existence of debt agency cost.  
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Hypothesis 3.4: The proportion of shares owned by the ten largest shareholders 
to total shares (EQU10) is negatively related to debt level. 
According to the ‘equity agency cost’ hypothesis, a company with a high 
ownership concentration of the ten largest shareholders is expected to under-
invest by taking less debt at the expense of the interest of shareholders. The 
hypothesis is that there is a negative relationship between EQU10 and capital 
structure. A positive sign on the coefficient of the GL variable implies the non-
existence of equity agency cost.  
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    Equation 4.5 
where, for four models as defined above,    
ycjklgm  =  capital structure response for company c in year j (j=1,..,10) with product type k (k=1,..,4), asset type l 
(l=1,..,3), ownership type g (g=1,…,4) and a market type m (m=1).   
m = non-time varying dummy variable for the fixed factor market type m. 
εcjklgm = random error for company c in year j with product k, asset type l,  ownership type g and a market type m. 
 
 
Equation 4.5 is Model 4 and is built upon Model 1 by including both business 
strategy and corporate governance variables. Model 4 models the hypothesis that 
capital structure is a function of: 







β  and 9 









β  in the financial approach;   
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β  in the business strategy 
approach;  
3. four time-varying ownership structure and ownership concentration 







β  in the corporate governance 
approach; and 








β .  
4.4. Modelling the Hypotheses of Capital Structure Using LMM 
In addition to the OLS model, this thesis uses a linear mixed model (LMM) for the 
reasons discussed in 4.1. LMM is used to estimate the functional relationship 
between dependent variables and independent variables by capturing both the 
fixed effect and the random effects between companies and/or between years 
(Verbeke, 2000). 
4.4.1. Modelling Financial Variables Using LMM 
In the financial model (Model 1), OLS is transformed to LMM with random effect 





























0  Equation 4.6 
where, for four models as defined above,    
u = the intercept and slope coefficients for random effects (for which estimates of variances and covariances 
are produced) 
 

















4.4.2. Modelling Business Strategy Factors Using LMM 
In the business strategy model (Model 2), OLS is transformed to LMM with 






















































             
       Equation 4.7 
 
























ββββ and the random 

















4.4.3. Modelling Corporate Governance Variables Using LMM 
In the Corporate Governance Model (Model 3), OLS is transformed to LMM with 









































0    Equation 4.8 
 



















βββ  and the random effect 













4.4.4. Modelling All Variables in the Integrated Approach Using LMM 
In the integrated model (Model 4), OLS is transformed to LMM with random effect 















































































































































4.5. Concluding Remarks 
With panel data, the OLS method is not sufficient to capture the fixed and random 
effects of independent variables and their impact on dependent variables. The 
LMM method is required to do so. Four statistical models have been constructed 
by using both OLS and LMM, and these models are designed to articulate the 
relevant hypothesised relationships. The next chapter will discuss how these 




DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
5.1. Introduction 
Following the modelling of hypotheses in the previous chapter, this chapter 
explains how the data has been collected and how statistical models have been 
estimated to address the research questions. The chapter begins with a 
discussion on the nature of data from three perspectives: 1) the nature of the data 
when arranged as a panel, and a discussion of the problem of its autoregressive 
nature; 2) the specific measurement of the time-varying financial variables; and 3) 
the operationalisation of constructs that are not readily measured in financial 
reports. In this research, we have used non-time-varying dummy variables to 
measure product diversification and asset specificity and time-varying variables to 
measure ownership structure and concentration.  
It is also worth emphasising at this stage that as China has developed, the nature 
and scope of its accounting practices have changed and, increasingly, collection 
of accounting data has been undertaken using ‘Western’ accounting standards. 
The caveats for the representativeness and use of this data in this sort of work 
still stand.    
After discussing the nature of the data, the chapter will go on to construct the 
model building procedure using the Hox Five-Step Model Building Procedure and 
the model testing methods in order to identify the best fit models for the purpose 
of identifying the determinants of capital structure of Chinese listed companies.  
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5.2. Data Sources 
Although it has become easier to obtain data in recent years, Chinese financial 
data for the early years of the 1990s is limited, at least in electronic format. The 
data used in this thesis has been extracted from six volumes (in hardcopy format) 
of information on Chinese listed companies. Data from company annual reports is 
collected and summarised in a number of publications. Whilst these are prepared 
by different authors, their primary source is the same; that is, company annual 
reports being released to the stock exchanges. Hence, the full data set that 
covers the years 1991 to 2000 is made up of the secondary data from the 
following three sources.  
The first source is the Encyclopedia of Stocks in Shanghai Securities Exchange 
(SHX) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZX), 2001 [深沪股票大典]. It has two 
volumes. The first volume is for SHX, and the second volume is for SZX. The 
authors Zhu Yue Jin 朱悦进and Chen Quan Zao 陈全灶 claim that the original 
source of the data collected in the Encyclopedia is the published company annual 
reports covering the period 1998 to 2000. The data set includes 1,124 companies 
that were listed as of 30 April 2000. Of these, 608 were listed on SHX and 516 
were listed on SZX. The Encyclopedia was published by Yang Cheng Evening 
Daily Publisher 羊城晚报出版社 in 2001.  
The second source is the Encyclopedia of Stocks in Shanghai Securities 
Exchange (SHX) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZX), 2000 [深沪股票大典]. It 
has two volumes. The first volume is for SHX, and the second volume is for SZX.  
The author Xu Wei Guo 许维国 claims that the original source of the data 
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collected is the published company annual reports covering the period from 1997 
to 1999. The data set includes 937 listed companies, of these 479 are companies 
listed on SHX and 458 are companies listed on SZX. The Encyclopedia was 
published by Yang Cheng Evening Daily Publisher 羊城晚报出版社 in 2000.  
The third source is the China Encyclopedia of Stocks [中国股票大全]. It has two 
volumes: the first volume is for the Shanghai Securities Exchange (SHX) and the 
second volume is for the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZX). The authors Li Jiang 
Xin 李建新 and Zhao Shi Ping 赵世平 claim that the original source of the data 
collected is China Securities Daily, Shanghai Securities Daily and Securities 
Times covering the period from 1991 to 1996. The data set includes 597 
companies that were listed on SZX and SHX as of 1 May 1997. Of the companies 
listed, 315 were listed on SHX, and 282 on SZX. The Encylopedia was published 
by Guangdong Economics Publisher 广东经济出版社 in Guangdong in 1997.  
To ensure the accuracy and comparability of the data, a laborious effort was 
made in comparing different sources over the same year, and no significant 
difference in the data was found. Hence, in the complete data set for the period 
from 1991 to 2000, the data for 1998-2000 is from the first source, the data for 
1997 is from the second source, and the data for 1991–1996 is from the third 
source.  
In addition to the availability of data, it is necessary to comment on the quality of 
data collected. The companies in the data set for the purpose of this study are 
listed companies. There are many differences in business operations, ownership 
structures, capital structure decisions, and reporting systems between listed and 
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non-listed companies. The added advantage of data from the group of listed 
companies is that they use international accounting standards and are subject to 
relatively strict information disclosure requirements. They have received a similar 
degree of autonomy in their business operations. The data on the Chinese listed 
companies is, obviously, subject to the problem of selection bias (Xu & Wang, 
1997). Chinese listed companies represent a very carefully selected group of 
firms in China. To be listed on the Chinese stock market, companies are 
generally well-performing financially. They all tend to be large in size and have 
gone through the same process of incorporation required by the government. The 
results from the analysis of this data set cannot be interpreted as general results 
that apply to all firms in China. 
Because financial institutions may have different business models, different asset 
and liability structures and operate under different regulatory frameworks, data on 
these organisations was omitted from the sample. During the trial run of the 
modelling process, companies that were outliers in the context of the overall data 
set (i.e. exceeding three standard deviations from the mean) were omitted in the 
final modelling process. 
5.3. Data Volume and Distribution  
For the purposes of this thesis, the data has been organised in three sets. The 
first set is a joint data set named SZXSHX, which includes all listed companies in 
both the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZX) and the Shanghai Securities 
Exchange (SHX). The other two sets are the market-based individual data sets 
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named as SZX and SHX, respectively. The three sets of data are designed to 
generate results for the purpose of comparison between SZXSHX, SZX and SHX.  
In the joint data set SZXSHX in Table 5.1a, below, there are 6,647 data entries 
collected on 1,098 companies covering the ten-year period from 1991 to 2000.  
The distribution of data entries by duration shows that the years 1993 and 1997 
had the most listings. There are 326 companies newly listed in 1993 with a 
duration of eight years, and 334 companies newly listed in 1997 with a duration of 
four years. Because of the two surges in listings, the distribution of data entries 
by year shows that the number of data entries increased greatly to 535 in 1993, 
and then to 929 in 1997. There were no listings in 1996, which meant no increase 
in data entries, and 37 de-listings in 2000, which resulted in a decrease of 37 
data entries. 
Table 5.1a: Data Entries Distributed by Year and Duration in SZXSHX 
 Duration (Number of Listing Years)  




1991  0 0 0 0 0 0 2 52 67 122 
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 81 67 181 
1993 0 0 0 0 1 58 326 83 67 535 
1994 0 0 0 0 7 94 326 83 67 577 
1995 0 0 0 1 16 94 326 83 67 587 
1996 0 0 0 1 16 94 326 83 67 587 
1997 1 6 334 2 16 94 326 83 67 929 
1998 1 164 334 2 16 94 326 83 67 1087 
1999 9 165 334 2 16 90 324 83 67 1090 
2000 9 160 334 2 8 47 293 33 67 953 
Total Entries by Duration 20 495 1336 10 96 665 2608 747 670 6647 
No. of Co. Newly Listed 10 165 334 2 16 95 326 83 67  






The SZX data set presented in Table 5.1b, below, shows 3,010 entries of data 
collected on 501 listed companies for the nine- year period from 1992 to 2000.  
Table 5.1b: Data Entries Distributed by Year and Duration in SZX 
 Duration (Number of Listing Years)  
Year 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 Total Data Entries by Year 
1992 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 8 
1993 0 0 0 0 13 226 7 246 
1994 0 0 0 0 35 226 7 268 
1995 0 0 0 8 35 226 7 276 
1996 0 0 0 8 35 226 7 276 
1997 1 5 170 8 35 226 7 452 
1998 1 50 170 8 35 226 7 497 
1999 2 51 170 8 31 226 7 495 
2000 2 47 170 8 33 225 7 492 
Total Data Entries by Duration 6 153 680 48 252 1808 63 3010 
No. of Companies Newly Listed 3 51 170 8 36 226 7  
No. of Companies on the Market 3 54 224 232 268 494 501  
 
 
The distribution of data entries by duration shows that the years 1993 and 1997 
had the most listings. There were 226 companies newly listed in 1993 with 
duration of eight years, and 170 companies newly listed in 1997 with duration of 
four years. Because of the two surges in listing, the distribution of data entries by 
year shows that the number of data entries increased greatly to 246 in 1993, and 
to 452 in 1997. There were no listings in 1996, causing no increase in data 
entries, and three de-listings in 2000 causing a decrease of three data entries. 
There are no data entries with a duration of five years. 
The SHX data set presented in Table 5.1c, below, shows 3,637 entries of data 
collected on 597 listed companies for the ten-year period from 1991 to 2000.  
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Table 5.1c:  Observations Distributed by Year and Duration in SHX 
 Duration (Number of Listing Years)  





1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 52 67 121 
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 74 67 173 
1993 0 0 0 0 1 45 100 76 67 289 
1994 0 0 0 0 7 59 100 76 67 309 
1995 0 0 0 1 8 59 100 76 67 311 
1996 0 0 0 1 8 59 100 76 67 311 
1997 0 1 164 2 8 59 100 76 67 477 
1998 0 114 164 2 8 59 100 76 67 590 
1999 7 114 164 2 8 59 98 76 67 595 
2000 7 113 164 2 0 14 68 26 67 461 
Total Data Entries by Duration 14 342 656 10 48 413 800 684 670 3637 
No. of Co. Newly Listed 7 114 164 2 8 59 100 76 67  
No. of Co. on the Market 7 121 285 287 295 354 454 530 597  
 
 
The distribution of data entries by duration shows that the years 1993 and 1997 
had the most listings. There were 100 companies newly listed in 1993 with a 
duration of eight years, and 164 companies newly listed in 1997 with a duration of 
four years. Because of the two surges in listing, the distribution of data entries by 
year shows that the number of data entries increased greatly to 289 in 1993, and 
then to 477 in 1997. There were no listings in 1996 causing no increase in data 
entry, and 34 de-listings in 2000 causing a decrease of 34 data entries. 
The uneven distribution of the numbers of listed companies by year has caused   
the uneven distribution of the number of data entries by duration. This reflects the 
planned nature of the listings on the Chinese stock markets and the influence of 
the government on these markets. The data distribution patterns may have 
caused some data bias in results (Lee et al. 2000), particularly with large 
concentrated listings in 1993 and 1997. However, the three sets of data have the 
same pattern of distribution by year and duration that were caused entirely by 
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common government policy factors. It is also thought in this study that any 
subjective selection and/or deletion of the data due to these uneven distributions 
would cause a further data selection bias. Therefore, no deletion or selection was 
made in the raw data set.  
It is potentially important to note that the Shanghai Securities Exchange (SHX) 
started about a year before the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZX). It is possible 
that in the very early years there was a learning process occurring and the 
companies listed on SZX may have learnt adequately from the early experiences 
of the companies listed on SHX. For example, there were far fewer de-listings 
from SZX (3) than SHX (34). In the section on statistical description later in this 
chapter, the differences between these two markets will be discussed further.  
5.4. Organisation of Information  
The format of the information is quite similar among the three secondary sources. 
There is one page devoted to a single company, and the information on each 
listed company is organised according to five categories: 
• Company general information  
• Financial information 
• Share ownership information 
• Business strategy information 
• Other information   
All numbers are denominated in Chinese currency (People’s Currency, or RMB) 
and are expressed in a standard Chinese value unit of ‘wan yuan’ or 
RMB$10,000. The value numbers are rounded-up to two decimal points.  
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For the purposes of this research, the original information in the five categories 
listed above is organised in four sections in the database: General Information, 
Financial Information, Strategy Information and Corporate Governance 
Information.   
Company General Information, presented in Table 5.2a, below, provides the 
name of the listed company (NM), the numerical code of the listed company (NC), 
the year to which the data relates (Y1), the year in which the company was 
incorporated (Y2), and the year in which the company was listed (Y3).  
Table 5.2a: Data and Variables – Section 1: Company General Information 
Raw Data  Code Transformed Data Name of Variables Proxy for 
Company Name NM    
Company Code NC    
Year of data Y1 Year Dummy Variables   
Years of Incorporation  Y2    




Company General Information is used to generate year dummy variables (Y1) 
and duration variable (DURA) (Y3). The company code (NC) is used as a subject 
name for each data entry. As discussed earlier, the issue for attention in the 
company general information is that it produces an unbalanced data set with 
uneven distribution of duration and listing years over companies. 
Company Financial Information in Table 5.2b, below, provides financial data for 
total assets (TA), Liabilities (L), Equity (E), Total Revenue (TR), Gross Profit 




Table 5.2b: Data and Variables – Section 2: Financial Information 
Raw Data Code Transformed  Data Name of Variable Proxy for 
Total Assets TA    
  log of TA SIZE Probability of  bankruptcy 
  TA/R CAPI Probability of  bankruptcy 
Equity E    
Liability D    
  Debt/Equity DE Capital structure 
  Debt/Total Asset DTA Capital structure 
  log of DE LDE Capital structure 
  Arcsin square root of DTA ARCDTA Capital structure 
Revenue R    
  log of R GROW Probability of  bankruptcy 
Gross Profit GP    
  GP/TA PROF Tax benefit of debt 
Expenses EXP    
Net profit NP    
Tax Amount TX    
  TX/GP TXER Tax benefit of debt 
 
 
Company Financial Information also provides supplementary data, presented in 
Table 5.2c below, for Earnings per Share (EPS), Net Assets per Share (NAPS) 
and Return to Net Assets (RNA).  
Table 5.2c: Data and Variables – Section 2: Supplementary Financial Information 
Raw Data  Code Transformed  Data Name of Variable Proxy for 
Earnings per share EPS    
  s.d. of EPS RISK Probability of  bankruptcy 
Net Asset per share NAPS    
  (NAPS*TS)/TA TANG Probability of  bankruptcy 
Return to Net Asset RNA    
 
This set of financial information is used to generate proxies for the four 
dependent variables of capital structure and the independent variables of 
financial explanatory variables such as size (SIZE), capital intensity (CAPI), 
growth (GROW), profitability (PROF), tax rate (TXER), tangibility (TANG) and risk 
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(RISK). These dependent and independent variables will be defined in the next 
section. It is necessary to note here that, in this type of financial data, there may 
be a problem for a general concern due to the fact that financial data is from the 
same balance sheet, and therefore there are issues of inter-relatedness of the 
data; for example, profit and revenue are always linked. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, financial data tend to have correlation problems. In this thesis, 
we attempt to overcome this data problem by including other non-financial factors 
(as discussed in Chapter Two) and using more sophisticated linear mixed models 
(as discussed in Chapter Four).   
The business strategy information, presented in Table 5.2d below, provides a 
company’s product list and describes the company’s asset type. 
  
Table 5.2d: Data and Variables – Section 3: Business Strategy Information 
Raw 
Data Code Transformed  Data 
Name of 
Variable Proxy for 
Product 1 P1 Single product PROD1 Very low degree of product diversification 
Product 2 P2 dominant product PROD2 Low degree of product diversification  
Product 3 P3 related products PROD3 High degree of product  diversification 
Product 4 P4 unrelated products PROD4 Very high degree of product diversification 
Asset 1 A1 very general assets ASSET1 Very low degree of asset specificity 
Asset 2 A2 general assets ASSET2 Low degree of asset specificity 
Asset 3 AT specific assets ASSET3 High degree of asset specificity 
 
Companies are coded according to the product list available in the data by using 
dummy variables to represent four levels of product diversification. PROD1 is a 
dummy variable for companies that produce a ‘single product’ and is classified as 
a very low degree of product diversification; PROD2 is a dummy variable for 
companies that produce a ‘dominant product’ and is classified as a low degree of 
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product diversification; PROD3 is a dummy variable for ‘related products’ that 
companies produce and is classified as a high degree of product diversification; 
and PROD4 is a dummy variable for ‘unrelated products’ that companies produce 
and is a very high degree of product diversification. 
Companies are coded according to the asset description available in the data by 
using dummy variables representing three levels of asset specificity. ASSET1 is a 
dummy variable for ‘very general assets’ and is classified as a very low degree of 
asset specificity; ASSET2 is a dummy variable for ‘general assets’ and is 
classified as a low degree of asset specificity; ASSET3 is a dummy variable for 
‘specific assets’ and is classified as a high degree of asset specificity. 
The method of classification in relation to product diversification is based on 
Rumelt’s strategy taxonomy or diversification ratio (Rumelt, 1974). This method 
was used later by Barton and Gordon (1988), Lowe et al. (1994) and Jordan et al. 
(1998) in their studies of UK companies. The method of classification in relation 
to asset specificity is based on the study of Vilasuso & Minkler (2001). Although 
the classification of product diversification and assert specificity could be subject 
to the arbitrariness of coding; a very large amount of data available for coding 
would reduce the degree of probability of the arbitrariness. Because of the limited 
annual information on products and assets, it is not possible for this study to 
obtain a time-varying data on product diversification and asset specificity. In this 
research, when coded, the classification on product diversification and asset 
specificity will be used for the whole time period of data. The implication of this 
non-time-varying nature of product dummy variables and assert dummy variables 
for the analysis will be discussed in next chapter. 
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Corporate governance information in Table 5.2e (overleaf) provides data on 
ownership structure and ownership concentration. The data include the numbers 
of total shares (TS), the number of shares owned by government (GS), the 
number of shares owned by legal persons (LPS) and the numbers of shares 
owned by the largest single shareholder (EQU1), and the number of shares 
owned by the largest ten shareholders (EQU10).  
The secondary sources also provide information on the number of shares  
owned by Chinese individuals, which are classified as A-Type Share and  
traded only by Chinese citizens on SZX and SHX; the number of shares  
owned by foreign citizens, which are classified as B-Type Share and traded only 
by foreign citizens on B-Share markets; and the number of shares owned  
by Hong Kong citizens, which are classified as H-Type Share and traded only  
by Hong Kong citizens on the Hong Kong Stock Market. Because this  
study focuses on Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets, the information  
on B-Type Share and H-Type Share is not used. The information on  
A-Type Share, which is also traded on the Shenzhen and Shanghai  
stock markets, is not used because the ownership of A-Type Share  
accounts for no more than 35% of total shares, and most Chinese investors  
in A-Type Share do not actually participate actively in company management 
decisions.   
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Table 5.2e: Data and Variables – Section 4: Corporate Governance Information 
Raw Data  Code Transformed  Data Name of Variables Proxy for 
Total Shares TS    
Government Share  GS    
  GS/TS GOV Degree of agency cost of 
debt 
Legal Person Share LPS    
  LPS/TS GL Degree of agency cost of 
equity 
A-Type Share AS    
B-Type Share BS    
H-Type Share HS    
Largest Shareholders 
from 1 to 10 
 Shares of one largest 
shareholder/TS 
EQ1 Degree of agency cost of 
debt 
  Shares of ten largest 
shareholders/TS 
EQ10 Degree of agency cost of 
equity 
 
This category of information provides us with data to measure the ownership 
structure in terms of the percentage of shares owned by the government in total 
shares (named as GOV) and the percentage of shares owned by the legal 
persons in total shares (named as GL). It also allows us to measure the 
ownership concentration in terms of the percentage of shares owned by the 
largest shareholder (named as EQU1) and the percentage of shares owned by 
the largest ten shareholders (named as EQU10). Inevitably these measures are 
arbitrary, but Chen (2004) and other scholars have used these measures in their 




During the trial run of the modelling process, various measures were tried on 
ownership structure and ownership concentration. For example, a dummy 
variable was used to take the percentage of shares owned by the government or 
legal persons or the largest shareholder or the largest ten shareholders above 
50% as 1, and below 50% as 0. The difficulty in treating the observations on 50% 
is hard to avoid. Either ruling 50% in 1 or 0 could cause a data selection bias (Lee 
et al., 2000). 
The method of logging the ownership percentages was also tried. There was not 
much difference in the results produced by the logging method. In the final 
analysis, we believe that it is still desirable to adopt a simple method of using raw 
percentages of share ownership as proxies for ownership structure and 
ownership concentration. Chen (2004) and other scholars have used these 
measures in their studies.   
5.5. Definitions of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Although dependent variables, time-varying independent variables and  
non-time-varying dummy variables were discussed according to the theoretical 
hypotheses in the previous chapter, they are now defined here with  
reference to the data collected. The discussion in this section is based on  
Table 5.3, below.  
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Table 5.3: Definition of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Four Dependent Variables Representing Capital Structure: 
 
DE  = Debt/Equity 
LDE  = log of (Debt/Equity) 
DTA  = Debt/Total Asset 
ARCDTA  = Arcsin square-root of (Debt/total Asset)  
 
Eight Financial Covariates: 
 
TXER = Tax Amount/Gross Profit 
PROF = Gross Profit/Total Asset 
SIZE = log of Total Assets 
GROW = log of Total Revenue 
TANG = (Net Asset per Share x Total Shares)/Total Assets  
CAPI = Total Assets/Total Revenue 
RISK = standard deviation of first difference in earnings per share 
DURA = years of listing in stock market 
 
 
Seven Business Strategy Fixed Factors 
 
Product Type Dummy Variables 
PROD1 = a single product that companies produce 
PROD2 = a dominant product that companies produce 
PROD3 = related products that companies produce 
PROD4 = unrelated products that companies produce 
 
Asset Type Dummy Variables 
ASSET1 = general assets that companies employ 
ASSET2 = neutral assets that companies employ 
ASSET3 = specific assets that companies employ 
 
 
Four Corporate Governance Covariates 
 
GOV = percentage of government shares in total shares 
GL = percentage of legal person shares in total shares 
EQU1 = percentage of shares by the largest shareholder in total shares 




5.5.1. Four Dependent Variables 
Capital structure is a dependent variable in this study, and it is normally defined 
by two ratios: the total debt to total asset ratio (DTA) and the total debt to equity 
ratio (DE) (Ferri and Jones, 1979). Debt can be measured as short term debt or 
long term debt. Debt and equity can be measured by either book values or 
market values.  
The data available on the dependent variables has two limitations. The first 
limitation is that the data on assets and liabilities are not available for both short- 
and long terms. This prevents us from defining capital structure using long-term 
debt as normally used in other studies. However, this limitation is not serious 
because Chinese listed companies take more short-term debt (80%) than long-
term debt (20%). The use of long-term debt in defining capital structure, which is 
not possible in this study, may well distort the measurement of capital structure 
(Chen & Xu, 2003, 2004). Also, because the company debenture market is very 
underdeveloped, corporate debenture accounts for a very small proportion of the 
total corporate debt. In this research, total liabilities are used as a gross measure 
of corporate debt. This includes short-term debt, long-term debt and debenture. 
Chen and Xu (2003, 2004) also used total liabilities as a measure of debt. 
The second limitation is that the data is based on market value of equity, and it is 
only available for the minority of company shares traded as A-Type Share. The 
majority of company shares such as governance shares and legal person shares 
are not tradable. Data on the market value of debt is not available due to the 
undeveloped corporate debt market in China, thus preventing this study from 
analysing the difference in effect between the book value and the market value of 
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equity and/or debt. However, this limitation is not serious because, firstly, very 
few Chinese listed companies issued corporate debentures and the estimates of 
market value of debt are not reliable (Chen, 2004), and secondly, the majority of 
Chinese listed company equity is not tradable. Non-tradable shares such as 
government shares and legal person shares account for 65% of total shares 
(Chen & Xue, 2003, 2004), and the estimates of market value of equity are not 
reliable either. Qian and Wirjanto (2007) provided evidence that, during the period 
from 1999 to 2004, the average book value of total debt ratio for publicly listed 
companies is about 46% while the market value of total debt ratio over the same 
period is only about 6%. The low market value is due to the excessively over-
valued equity in the Chinese securities markets. Whilst book and market values 
of debt and equity are different, most studies use book value and Bowman’s 
research (1980) suggests that this would not lead to substantial measure errors. 
In this research, book values instead of market values are used in defining capital 
structure. Most of the scholars being engaged in the Chinese studies such as 
Chen and Xue (2004) and Qian and Wirjanto (2007) also used the book value of 
capital structure in their research works for similar reasons. 
The first dependent variable DE is represented by the ratio of total liabilities to 
total equity. The DE ratio indicates the number of dollars of debt for every dollar 
of equity and it can also be interpreted as how many times the debt is as much as 
equity. A high DE ratio stands for a high debt level or vice versa. 
E
DDE =                                                                                     
where D stands for total liabilities while E stands for equity. The DE ratio is an un-
bonded ratio ranging from zero possibly to a very large number. Such data may 
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exhibit strong positive skew, which may lead to violations of the assumptions of 
normal random errors, constant error variance and linearity of relationships. To 
overcome this problem, the DE ratio is transformed or condensed by a 
conventional mathematical operation of a natural logarithm (Lee et al. 2000). This 
transformation also removes the non-linearity of the data. 




DLDE =                                                                              
The third dependent variable is DTA. It is represented by the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets. The DTA ratio indicates the number of dollars of debt for 
every dollar of asset and it can also be interpreted as the proportion of debt in 
total asset. A high DTA ratio stands for a high debt level or vice versa. 
TA
DDTA =                                                                                     
where D stands for total liabilities while TA stands for total asset which is the sum 
of D and E. The DTA ratio is a bounded ratio within the range of 0 to 1. The 
variability of such proportional data is not constant, being largest at the centre of 
the range, which can lead to violations of the assumption constant error variance 
(Lee et al. 2000). To overcome this problem, the DTA ratio is transformed by the 
arcsin square-root operation (Bromiley & Thacker, 2002).   
Therefore, the fourth dependent variable is ARCDTA. 
TA
DARCDTA arcsin=                                                          
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Four dependent variables include two raw dependent variables (DE and DTA) 
and two transformed dependent variables (LDE and ARCDTA). In order to test if 
the transformed dependent variables are more appropriate for analysis than the 
raw dependent variables, a trial run on four dependent variables respectively and 
their distributions of regression residuals were compared after the ordinary least 
square regression (OLS) on the explanatory variables. The satisfactory results for 
are displayed in the following three groups of Q-Q graphs, as Figure 5.1a-d, 
Figure 5.2a-d and Figure 5.3a-d, following, for each of the three data sets.  

































Figure 5.1a: SZXSHX - Residual 
Distribution for DE 
Figure 5.1b: SZXSHX - Residual 
Distribution for LDE 
 
 
The testing results on the residual values of OLS using DE and LDE in the joint 
data set of SZXSHX in Figure 5.1a and Figure 5.1b, above, show that the use of 
LDE fits the data better than DE in terms of the fit between the observed values 
and the values predicted on the basis of a normal distribution.  
The similar testing results on the residual values of OLS using DTA and ARCDTA 
in the joint data set of SZXSHX, displayed as Figure 5.1c and Figure 5.1d, below, 
also show that the use of ARCDTA fits the data once again better than DTA in 
terms of the fit between the observed values and predicted values. 
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Figure 5.1c: SZXSHX - Residual 
Distribution for DTA 
Figure 5.1d: SZXSHX - Residual 





The consistent satisfactory results are obtained on the residual values of OLS 
using DE vs LDE and DTA vs ARCDTA as shown in the following Q-Q graphs, 
displayed below as Figure 5.2a, 5.2b, 5.2c and 5.2d  for the SZX data set and 
displayed as Figure 5.3a, 5.3b, 5.3c and 5.3d for the SHX data set.  
 









































Figure 5.2a: SZX –Residual 
Distribution for DE 
Figure 5.2b: SZX – Residual 













































Figure 5.2c: SZX – Residual 
Distribution for DTA 
Figure 5.2d: SZX – Residual 
Distribution for ARCDTA 
 










































Figure 5.3a: SHX - Residual 
Distribution for DE 
Figure 5.3b: SHX - Residual 
Distribution for LDE 
 










































Figure 5.3c: SHX - 
Residual Distribution for DTA 
Figure 5.3d: SHX - 




After these trial runs, the transformed data on dependent variables such as LDE 
and ARCDTA were chosen to be used in the final run of the models. 
5.5.2. Independent Variables 
Independent variables are grouped and discussed here according to the three 
theoretical approaches discussed in Chapter Two and the three models 
constructed in Chapter Four. Model 1 represents the financial approach that 
considers the impact of the eight financial variables and year dummy variables on 
capital structure; Model 2 represents the business strategy approach that 
considers the impact of product diversification and asset specificity, conditional 
on financial variables, on capital structure; and Model 3 represents the corporate 
governance approach that considers the impact of ownership structure and 
ownership concentration, conditional on financial variables, on capital structure. 
5.5.2.1. Eight Time-Varying Financial Variables in Model 1 
The financial approach is based on the implications of debt benefits and debt 
costs for capital structure. Debt benefits are mainly measured by the benefit of 
tax deduction of debt interest payments. Debt costs are mainly measured by the 
degree of bankruptcy and/or the degree of financial distress. In general, debt 
benefits affect capital structure positively while debt costs affect capital structure 
negatively. 
The effective corporate income tax rate (TXER) is the ratio of the tax amount to 
the gross profit. TXER indicates the amount of tax for every dollar of gross profit. 
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It can also be interpreted as a proportion of tax in gross profit. A high TXER 
stands for a high tax rate or vice versa. 
GP
TTXER =                                                      
T stands for the tax amount while GP stands for gross profit. TXER is the proxy 
for the debt benefit. A high TXER means greater potential tax benefit of debt.  It is 
hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between TXER and capital 
structure. The coefficient of TXER is expected to carry a positive sign. 
Profitability (PROF) is the ratio of gross profit to total asset. PROF indicates the 
number of dollars of gross profit for every dollar of asset. It can also be 
interpreted as an amount of gross profit that is generated by a dollar of asset. A 
high PRO ratio stands for a high level of profit or vice versa. 
TA
GPPROF =                                                     
 
GP stands for gross profit, while TA stands for total asset. PROF is a proxy either 
for the borrowing capacity or the borrowing need. High profit gives rise to the 
need to borrow to maximise the tax benefit of debt. It is hypothesised that there is 
a positive relationship between profit and capital structure. The coefficient of 
PROF is expected to carry a positive sign.  However, high profit can also mean 
great free cash flow, which, when the internal fund substitutes external debt fund, 
reduces the need to borrow. It can also be hypothesised that there is a negative 
relationship between the profit and capital structure.  The coefficient of PROF is 
expected to carry a negative sign. 
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Size (SIZE) is the log of total asset. SIZE indicates the growth index of total 
asset. It can also be interpreted as the size of a firm. 
)log(TASIZE =   
                                                
TA stands for total asset. SIZE is a proxy for the degree of less financial distress.  
Larger companies have less of a tendency to go bankrupt and therefore are able 
to borrow more. It is hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between 
SIZE and capital structure. SIZE is expected to carry a positive sign of coefficient. 
However, SIZE can also be a proxy for the degree asymmetric information 
because larger companies tend to suffer more from asymmetric information. It is 
hypothesised that there is a negative relationship between SIZE and capital 
structure. The coefficient of SIZE is expected to carry a negative sign. 
Growth (GROW) is a log of total revenue. GROW indicates the growth index of 
total revenue. It can also be interpreted as the potential growth of a firm. 
)log(TRGROW =   
                                                
TR stands for total revenue. GROW is a proxy for less financial distress. 
Companies with fast growth need to borrow more and are able to borrow more. It 
is hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between GROW and capital 
structure. The coefficient of GROW is expected to carry a positive sign. 
Tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of total net assets to total assets. TANG indicates 
the number of dollars of net tangible asset for every dollar of total asset. It can 
also be interpreted as a proportion of net tangible asset in total asset. A high 




TNATANG =   
                                                
TNA stands for total net asset. TANG is a proxy for collateral asset that can be 
liquidated in the event of bankruptcy. Companies with more tangible assets tend 
to have more collateral assets that can be mortgaged against debt. It is 
hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between TANG and capital 
structure. The coefficient of TANG is expected to carry a positive sign. 
Capital Intensity (CAPI) is the ratio of total assets to total revenue. CAPI indicates 
the number of dollars of total assets for every dollar of revenue. It can also be 
interpreted as the amount of assets used to generate a dollar of revenue. A high 
CAPI ratio stands for a high level of capital intensity of a firm or vice versa. 
TR
TACAPI =                                                    
                                                
TA stands for total asset and TR stands for total revenue. CAPI is a proxy for 
both tangible and intangible collateral assets that can be liquidated in the event of 
bankruptcy. Companies with high capital intensity assets tend to have more 
collateral assets to be mortgaged against debt. It is hypothesised that there is a 
positive relationship between CAPI and capital structure. The coefficient of CAPI 
is expected to carry a positive sign. 
Risk (RISK) is the standard deviation of first difference in earnings per share. 
PerShareInEarningsDifferenceionOfFirstdardDeviatSRISK tan=    
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RISK is measured in terms of the degree of fluctuation in a company’s earnings 
and it is a proxy for business risk. Companies with high risk are less able to 
borrow. It is hypothesised that there is a negative relationship between RISK and 
capital structure. The coefficient of RISK is expected to carry a negative sign. 
Duration (DURA) is the number of years of listing in stock market. 
eMarkettingInSharYearsOfLisDURA =                                                    
                                                
DURA is measured in terms of the years a company has been listed on the stock 
market, and it is a proxy for market reputation. Companies with long duration tend 
to have a good reputation. It is hypothesised that there is a positive relationship 
between DURA and capital structure. The coefficient of DURA is expected to 
carry a positive sign. 
As discussed in section 5.4, the financial variables tend to be related. The 
definitions of the above variables show that tax rate and profitability may be 
related by a common measurement of gross profit, and that profitability and size 
are related by a common measurement of total asset. In addition, profitability and 
tangibility may be related by a common measurement of total assets; and capital 
intensity may be related to profit, size, growth, tangibility by a common 
measurement of total assets and total revenue. The problem associated with this 
type of accounting relatedness in financial variables is unavoidable, and it is a 
serious limitation in the financial approach to the study of capital structure. This, 
therefore, justifies the recommendation to use more sophisticated statistical 
methods to deal with the variables, as well as including more non-financial 
variables in the study. 
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5.5.2.2. Two Non-Time-Varying Business Strategy Fixed Factors in Model 2 
Business strategy approach is based on the implications of product diversification 
and asset specificity for capital structure. Generally, high product diversification 
and low asset specificity affect capital structure positively; while low product 
diversification and high asset specificity affect capital structure negatively. 
Companies in the data set are classified according to the number and nature of 
products they produce and according to the type of assets they possess. Product-
type dummy variables are established as Prod1, Prod2, Prod3 and Prod4, based 
on the classification method used by Rumelt (1974). Asset-type dummy variables 
are established as Asset1, Asset2 and Asset3. 
PROD1 is a dummy variable representing companies that produce a ‘single 
product’. It is a proxy for very low product diversification and, therefore, very high 
business risk. It is hypothesised that there is a negative relationship between 
PROD1 and capital structure. The coefficient of PROD1 is expected to carry a 
negative sign. However, it is used as a reference dummy variable. 
PROD2 is a dummy variable representing companies that produce a ‘dominant 
product’ within their product portfolio. It is a proxy for low product diversification 
and, therefore, high business risk. It is hypothesised that there is a positive 
relationship between PROD2 and capital structure, relative to PROD1. The 
coefficient of PROD2 is expected to carry a positive sign. 
PROD3 is a dummy variable representing companies that produce ‘related 
products’ within their product portfolio. It is a proxy for high product diversification 
with low business risk. It is hypothesised that there is a strong positive 
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relationship between PROD3 and capital structure, relative to PROD1. The 
coefficient of PROD3 is expected to carry a positive sign. 
PROD4 is a dummy variable representing companies that produce ‘unrelated 
products’ within their product portfolio. It is a proxy for very high product 
diversification and very low business risk. It is hypothesised that there is a very 
strong positive relationship between PROD4 and capital structure, relative to 
PROD1. The coefficient of PROD4 is expected to carry a positive sign. 
ASSET1 is a dummy variable representing companies that employ ‘very general 
assets’. It is a proxy for the highly tradable and deployable assets in the event of 
bankruptcy. It is hypothesised that there is a very strong positive relationship 
between ASSET1 and capital structure. The coefficient of ASSET1 is expected to 
carry a positive sign. However, ASSET1 will be used as reference dummy 
variable. 
ASSET2 is a dummy variable representing companies that employ ‘less general 
assets’. It is a proxy for the less tradable and deployable assets in the event of 
bankruptcy. It is hypothesised that there is a negative relationship between 
ASSET2 and capital structure, relative to ASSET1. The coefficient of ASSET2 is 
expected to carry a negative sign. 
ASSET3 is a dummy variable representing companies that employ ‘specific 
assets’. It is a proxy for the least tradable and deployable assets in the event of 
bankruptcy. It is hypothesised that there is a strong negative relationship between 
ASSET3 and capital structure, relative to ASSET1. The coefficient of ASSET3 is 
expected to carry a negative sign. 
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Although, as discussed in section 3, arbitrariness is possible in coding product 
diversification and asset specificity, this method is used in other similar studies. 
The non-time-varying nature of these variables is not desirable, but it is 
acceptable for this research due to the limitation of available data. 
5.5.2.3. Four Time-Varying Corporate Governance Covariates in Model 4 
The corporate governance approach is based on the implications of ownership 
structure and ownership concentration for capital structure. Ownership structure 
can be represented by either the level of government ownership (GOV) or legal 
person ownership (GL). In this research, ownership concentration is represented 
by either the proportion of shares owned by one largest shareholder (EQU1) or 
the proportion of shares owned by ten largest shareholders (EQU10). These 
measures reflect the agency costs of debt and equity as explained in Chapter 
Two.  
The government ownership (GOV) is measured by the percentage of the shares 
owned by the government (G-share) in total shares. 
sTotalShare
SharesTypeGGOV −−=           
                                          
GOV is a proxy for a type of ownership structure, and it is hypothesised that there 
is a positive relationship between GOV and capital structure implying the 
existence of the agency cost of debt.  The coefficient of GOV is expected to carry 
a positive sign. A negative relationship between GOV and capital structure 




The legal person ownership (GL) is measured by the percentage of shares 
owned by legal persons (L-share) in total shares. 
 
sTotalShare
SharesTypeLPSGL −−=            
 
GL is a proxy for a type of ownership structure and it is hypothesised that there is 
a negative relationship between GL and capital structure implying the existence 
of the agency cost of equity.  The coefficient of GL is expected to carry a negative 
sign. A positive relationship between GL and capital structure implies the non-
existence of the agency cost of equity. 
Ownership concentration is represented by the percentage of shares owned by 
the largest shareholder in total shares (EQU1) 
sTotalShare
lderestSharehoeLsharesByOnEQU arg1=              
                                       
EQU1 is a proxy for high ownership concentration implying the existence of 
agency cost of debt. It is hypothesised that there is a positive relationship 
between EQU1 and capital structure implying the existence of the agency cost of 
debt. The coefficient of EQU1 is expected to carry a positive sign. A negative 
relationship between EQU1 and capital structure implies the non-existence of the 
agency cost of debt. 
Ownership diversification is represented by the percentage of shares owned by 
the ten largest shareholders in total shares (EQUI10).  
sTotalShare
ldersestSharehonLsharesByTeEQU arg10 =                                                    
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EQU10 is a proxy for low ownership concentration, and it is hypothesised that 
there is a negative relationship between EQU10 and capital structure, thus 
implying the existence of the agency cost of equity. The coefficient of EQU10 is 
expected to carry a negative sign. A positive relationship between EQU10 and 
capital structure implies the non-existence of the agency cost of equity. 
As discussed in section 5.4, a simple percentage is used to calculate the types of 
ownership structure and the levels of ownership concentration due to the lack of a 
better method. 
5.5.2.4. Year Dummy Variables and Market Dummy Variables 
In order to detect any common effect of time across all companies on dependent 
variable (i.e., any consistent differences between years), nine year dummy 
variables are used in the models for SHX and SZXSHX, and eight year dummy 
variables are used in the models for SZX. Also in order to detect any consistent 
differences between markets in dependent variables, a market dummy variable is 
used in Model 4 for SZXSHX. 
5.6. Descriptive Statistics of Description of Data 
This section discusses the descriptive statistics of data on their mean values, 
trends and correlations. Descriptive statistics are listed in Table A5.4a, A5.4b and 
A5.4c (dependent variables), Table A5.5a, A5.5b and A5.5c (financial variables), 
Table A5.6a, A5.6b and A5.6c (business strategy variables) and Table A5.7a, 
A5.7b and A5.7c (corporate governance variables) on pp. 294-308 of the 
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Appendix). The annual trends of these dependent and independent variables are 
graphed in figures 5.1 to 5.18, below.   
5.6.1. Dependent Variables 
For the purpose of discussion in this section, we use raw dependent variables 
(DE and DTA) instead of the transformed dependent variables (LDE and 
ARCDTA). The transformed dependent variables have only statistical meanings 
and do not express the financial meanings we need to discuss. The discussion of 
descriptive statistics on dependent variables is based on the data presented in 
Table A5.4a, Table A5.4b and Table A5.4c, on p. 294-296 of the Appendix. 
In the joint data set of SZXSHX in the period of 1991 to 2000, the average debt to 
equity ratio (DE) is 1.1681 (dollars of debt per dollar of equity) and the average 
debt to total asset ratio (DTA) is 0.4669 (proportion of dollar debt in total dollar 
asset) (Table A5.4a, p. 294). In the SZX data set in the period of 1992 to 2000, 
the average DE is 1.2099 and the average DTA is 0.4766 (Table A5.4b, p. 295). 
In the SHX data set in the period of 1991 to 2000, the average DE is 1.1335 and 
the average DTA is 0.4589 (Table A5.4c, p. 296). 
The trend of DE ratios in the SHX data set declines continuously over 10 years, 
while the trend of DE ratios in the SZX data set fluctuates with two peaks: in 1994 
and 1998. The trends of DE ratios in both SHX and SZX data sets diverge from 
each other before 1994 and converge with each other after 1994. Before 1997, 
DE ratios were higher in SZX than SHX and after 1997, DE ratio were lower in 
SZX than SHX. Over average DE ratios are higher in SZX than in SHX. Similar 



























Figure 5.4a: Trends of DE Ratios 
over 10 Years 
Figure 5.4b: Trends of DTA Ratios 
over 10 Years 
 
 
The descriptive statistics present us with the following observations: 
• The debt levels of Chinese listed companies are low (DTA at 46.68%). 
• The debt levels are higher in SZX (DTA at 47.66%) than that in SHX (DTA 
at 45.89%). 
• The debt levels of SZX and SHX fluctuate in a similar pattern with two 
peaks of debt level in 1994 and 1998 with a declining trend since 1994.  
• There is a converging trend of debt levels between SZX and SHX from 
1994. 
5.6.2. Financial Variables in Model 1 
The discussion on descriptive statistics on financial variables is based on the data 




5.6.2.1. Effective Tax Rate 
In the joint data set of SZXSHX for the period of 1991 to 2000, the average tax 
rate is 23.02 % (the amount of tax payment for each dollar of profit). In the SZX 
data set for the period of 1992 to 2000, the average tax rate is 23.95% and in the 
SHX data set for the period of 1991 to 2000 the average is 22.24%. The 
companies listed on SZX have higher debt levels at a higher tax rate than those 
in SHX, indicating a predicted positive relationship between tax rate and debt 
level.   
The tax rate trends in all three data sets follow the same pattern of fluctuation, 
increasing sharply and peaking in 1997. Before 1996, the tax rates moved 
between 20% and 15%, and from 1997, they fluctuated between 20% and 30% 


















In the joint data set of SZXSHX, the average profit rate is 0.0995 (dollars of gross 
profit for each dollar of total asset).  In the SZX data set, the average profit rate is 
0.1018, and in the SHX data set the average profit rate is 0.0975. The companies 
listed on SZX have higher debt levels at a higher profitability than those in SHX, 
indicating a predicted positive relationship between profitability and debt level.   
The trends of profit rate in all three data sets follow the same pattern of 
fluctuation and the profitability improves dramatically in 1997.  Before 1997, 
profitability moves between 11% and 8%. After 1997, profitability fluctuates 
















Figure 5.6: Trends of Profitability over 10 Years 
5.6.2.3. Size 
In the joint data set of SZXSHX, the average size of Chinese listed companies is 
6.5036 (log of total asset or growth index of total assets). In the SZX data set, the 
average size is 6.5217, and in the SHX data set the average size is 6.4887. The 
listed companies in SZX have higher debt levels with a larger size than those in 
SHX, indicating a predicted positive relationship between size and debt level.   
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The trends of SIZE in all three data sets follow the same pattern and the size 














Figure 5.7: Trends of Size over 10 Years 
 
5.6.2.4. Growth 
In the joint data set of SZXSHX, the average growth rate of the Chinese listed 
companies is 5.7695 (log of total revenue or growth index of total revenue). In the 
SZX data set, the average growth rate is 5.7046, and in the SHX data set the 
average growth rate is 5.8232. The listed companies in SZX have higher debt 
levels with a faster growth rate than those in SHX, indicating a predicted positive 
relationship between growth and debt level.   
The trends of growth in all three data sets follow the same pattern and the growth 


















Figure 5.8: Trends of Growth over 10 Years 
5.6.2.5. Tangibility 
In the joint data set of SZXSHX, the average tangibility rate of the Chinese listed 
companies is 1.1291 (dollars of net tangible asset for each dollar of total assets). 
In the SZX data set, the average tangibility rate is 1.5256, and in the SHX data 
set the average tangibility rate is 0.8009. The listed companies in SZX have 
higher debt levels with a higher tangibility rate than those in SHX, indicating a 
predicted positive relationship between tangibility and debt level.   
The trends of tangibility in all three data sets follow the same pattern, and the 















Figure 5.9: Trends of Tangibility over 10 Years 
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5.6.2.6. Capital Intensity 
In the joint data set of SZXSHX, the average capital intensity rate of the listed 
companies is 3.0142 (dollars of total assets for each dollar of total revenue). In 
the SZX data set, the average growth rate is 3.4072, and in the SHX data set, the 
average capital intensity rate is 2.6890. The listed companies in SZX have higher 
debt levels with a higher capital intensity rate than those in SHX, indicating a 
predicted positive relationship between capital intensity and debt level.   
The trends of capital intensity in all three data sets follow the same pattern, and 
the capital intensity rates increase and converge continuously from 1.5 to 3.75 













Figure 5.10: Trends of Capital Intensity over 10 Years 
5.6.2.7. Risk 
In the joint data set of SZXSHX, the average risk level of the Chinese listed 
companies is 0.2934 (fluctuation in earnings). In the SZX data set, the average 
risk level is 0.2645, and in the SHX data set the average risk level is 0.3173. The 
listed companies in SZX have higher debt levels with a lower risk level than those 
in SHX, indicating a predicted negative relationship between risk level intensity 
and debt level.   
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The trends of risk level in all three data sets follow the same pattern, and the risk 
levels decreases continuously from 0.40 to 0.19 since 1993 (Figure 5.11, below). 
However, there is diverging trend between SZX (lower risk level since 1995) and 


















Figure 5.11: Trends of Risk over 10 Years 
5.6.2.8. Duration 
In the joint data set of SZXSHX, the average duration of the Chinese listed 
companies is 6.9862 (years of listing). In the SZX data set, the average duration 
is 6.7355, and in the SHX data set the average duration is 7.1936. The listed 
companies in SZX have a higher debt levels with a shorter duration than those in 
SHX, indicating an unpredicted negative relationship between duration and debt 
level. This is not surprising because the SHX market was established one year 
earlier than the SZX market.  
The trends of duration in all three data sets follow the same pattern of declining, 
but this is not a truly declining trend. The trends displayed show that the 
companies listed early in the 1990s have a longer duration than the companies 



















Figure 5.12: Trends of Duration over 10 Years 
 
The comparison of descriptive statistics of independent financial variables 
between SZX and SHX demonstrates three observations: 
• There are some common positively-related patterns of fluctuation between 
tax rates and profitability and between growth and size. 
• There is a common negatively-related patterns of fluctuation between 
tangibility and capital intensity. 
• The higher debt levels of SZX, compared with SHX, are related to most 
financial variables. 
These three observations imply that the capital structure determinants may be 
subject to the impact of a common set of Chinese policy factors (systematic) over 
time. Despite this, there is preliminary support to the hypotheses that the capital 
structure of Chinese listed companies is positively related to TXER, PROF, 
TANG, CAPI; negatively related to RISK; and negatively related to SIZE, GROW 
and DURA as indicated by the preliminary comparisons between SZX and SHX. 
Finally, financial variables tend to be related to one another. 
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5.6.3. Business Strategy Variables in Model 2 
The discussion of descriptive statistics on business strategy variables is based on 
the data presented in Table A5.6a, Table A5.6b, and Table A5.6c (pp. 303-305 of 
the Appendix). 
5.6.3.1. Product Diversification 
In the joint data set of SZXSHX, the average degree of product diversification of 
the Chinese listed companies is 2.2694 (an indicative point over the range of 1 to 
4, or from undiversified to very diversified with an mid-range of 2). In the SZX 
data set, the average degree of product diversification is 2.2917, while in the SHX 
data set it is 2.2510. The companies listed on SZX have higher debt levels with a 
higher degree of product diversification than those on SHX, indicating a predicted 
positive relationship between product diversification and debt level.  
The trends of product diversification in all three data sets follow the same pattern 
of stability. However, SZX was more diversified than SHX before 1996 and 













Figure 5.13: Trends of Product Diversification over 10 Years 
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5.6.3.2. Asset Specificity 
In the joint data set of SZXSHX, the average degree of asset specificity of the 
Chinese listed companies is 2.0179 (an indicative point over the range of 1 to 3 or 
from low asset specificity to high asset specificity with a mid-range of 1.5). In the 
SZX data set, the average degree of asset specificity is 2.0286, and in the SHX 
data set the average degree of asset specificity is 2.0091. The listed companies 
in SZX have higher debt levels with a higher level of asset specificity than those 
in SHX, indicating an unpredicted positive relationship between asset specificity 
and debt level.  
The trends of asset specificity in all three data sets follow the same increasing 
patterns. However, SZX experienced a lower asset specificity than SHX only 
during the period of 1994 and 1997 over 10 years. SZX experienced higher asset 
specificity than SHX only during the early years of 1992 and 1993 and the late 
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The comparison of average descriptive statistics of business strategy variables 
between SZX and SHX demonstrates support to the hypothesis that the capital 
structure is positively related to product diversification, but it is slightly 
contradictory to the hypothesis that the capital structure is negatively related to 
asset specificity.  
5.6.4. Corporate Governance Variables in Model 3 
The discussion of descriptive statistics on corporate governance variables is 
based on Table A5.7a, Table A5.7b and Table A5.7c on pp. 306-308 of the 
Appendix. 
5.6.4.1. Government Ownership 
In the joint data set of SZXSHX, the average level of government ownership of 
the Chinese listed companies is 0.5477 (the percentage of government-owned 
shares in total shares). In the SZX data set, the average level of government 
ownership is 0.5695, and in the SHX data set the average level of government 
ownership is 0.5296. The listed companies on SZX have higher debt levels with a 
higher level of government ownership than those listed on SHX, indicating a 
predicted positive relationship between government ownership and debt level.  
The trends of government ownership in all three data sets follow the same pattern 
of increasing. However, SZX had a higher level of government ownership than 
SHX in the early years before 1997 and had a lower level of government 










1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002




Figure 5.15: Trends of Government Ownership over 10 Years 
 
5.6.4.2. Legal Person Ownership 
In the joint data set of SZXSHX, the average level of legal person ownership 
including government ownership of the Chinese listed companies is 0.6681  
(the percentage of both legal person-owned and government-owned  
shares in total shares). In the SZX data set, the average level of legal  
person ownership including government ownership is 0.7270, and in the  
SHX data set the average level of legal person ownership including government 
ownership is 0.6194. The companies listed on SZX have higher debt levels  
with a higher level of legal person ownership than those on SHX,  
indicating an unpredicted positive relationship between government ownership 
and debt level.  
The trends of legal person ownership in all three data sets follow  
the same pattern of stability. However, SZX has a higher level of  














Figure 5.16: Trends of Legal Person Ownership over 10 Years 
 
5.6.4.3. Ownership of the Single Largest Shareholder 
In the joint data set of SZXSHX, the average level of ownership of the largest 
shareholder of Chinese listed companies is 0.7029 (the percentage of shares 
owned by the largest shareholder in total shares — government owner in most 
cases). In the SZX data set, the average level of ownership of the largest 
shareholder is 0.6942, and in the SHX data set, the average level of ownership of 
the largest shareholder is 0.7101. The companies listed on SZX have higher debt 
levels with a lower level of ownership of the largest shareholder than those in 
SHX, indicating an unpredicted negative relationship between the ownership of 
the largest shareholder and debt level.  
The trends of ownership of the largest shareholder in all three data sets follow the 
same increasing pattern. However, SZX has a lower level of ownership of the 





















Figure 5.17: Trends of Ownership by the Largest Shareholder over 10 Years 
 
5.6.4.4. Ownership of the Ten Largest Shareholders 
In the joint data set of SZXSHX, the average level of ownership by the ten largest 
individual shareholders of Chinese listed companies is 0.2354 (the percentage of 
shares owned by the ten largest individual shareholders in total shares). In the 
SZX data set, the average level of ownership by the ten largest individual 
shareholders is 0.2283, and in the SHX data set the average level of ownership 
by the ten largest individual shareholders is 0.2414. The companies listed on SZX 
have higher debt levels with a lower level of ownership by the ten largest 
individual shareholders than those on SHX, indicating a predicted negative 
relationship between ownership by the ten largest individual shareholders and 
debt level.  
The trends of ownership by the ten largest individual shareholders in all three 
data sets follow the same pattern of increasing. However, SZX has a lower level 
of ownership by the ten largest individual shareholders than SHX over the entire 


















Figure 5.18: Trends of Ownership by the 
Ten Largest Shareholders over 10 Years 
 
The comparison of average descriptive statistics of corporate governance 
variables between SZX and SHX demonstrates support to the hypotheses that 
the capital structure is positively related to 1) high government ownership 
concentration, and 2) high legal person ownership concentration due to high 
agency cost of debt in the case of SZX. It also supports the hypothesis that the 
capital structure is negatively related to high equity concentration due to high 
agency cost of equity in the case of SHX.  
The preliminary analysis of the statistical descriptive data has presented the 
interesting finding that the modelling and the research design are appropriate and 
its associated hypotheses are testable as indicated by the above-described 
relationships between capital structures and financial, strategy and governance 
variables. This is only a preliminary test on the suitability of the modelling and the 
research design. The averaged statistics are very raw estimates regardless of the 
effects of variations between companies and/or between years on results of the 




Examination of the correlation coefficients in Table A5.8a (SZXSHX), Table A5.8b 
(SZX) and Table A5.8c (SHX) (pp. 309-311 of the Apendix) gives rise to the 
following three observations: 
• It is not surprising to notice that the correlation coefficients among DE, 
LDE, DTA and ARCDTA are at a level of approximately 0.80 and highly 
significant. It could be assumed that this may be due to a strong 
correlation among three key financial figures such as liabilities, equity and 
total assets in financial balance sheets.  
• It is also not surprising to notice that the correlation coefficients between 
dependent variables and most independent variables are at a level of 
approximately 0.25 and are significant. The preliminary descriptive 
statistics have indicated correlated relationships worthy of examination 
according to the hypotheses. 
• It is a concern to notice, however, that the correlation coefficients among a 
few independent variables such as SIZE vs GROW, GOV vs GL, and 
EQU1 vs EQU10 are highly significant. SIZE as a log of total assets and 
GROW as a log of total revenue can be correlated when total assets and 
total revenue grow together. GOV as the proportion of government shares 
in total shares and GL as the proportion of legal person shares in total 
shares are correlated because legal person ownership can be regarded as 
an indirect form of government ownership. EQU1 as the proportion of the 
shares owned by one largest shareholder and EQU10 as the proportion of 
the shares owned by ten largest shareholders are also correlated because 
EQU1 is included in EQU10.  
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Overall, most cross-correlations for the independent variables occur among a few 
variables, and there is no across-the-board serious correlation of independent 
variables for great concern. The possibility of the problem of multi-collinearity in 
the time series was discussed in Chapter Four.       
5.8. The Nature of Panel Data  
Typical studies of capital structure have used cross-sectional data on a number of 
companies and examined the relationship between capital structure and 
determinant variables in OLS Model. Increasingly researchers are using data that 
has both a cross-sectional and a time series element, that is, data on the 
dependent variables and explanatory variables across a number of organisations 
and over a period of time. The data set is panel data, which contains both cross-
sectional and time series data. The nature and the associated problem with panel 
data were discussed in Chapter Four.  
Some researchers have merely pooled the data without recognising its contained 
time series characteristics. However, it is increasingly required that more 
sophisticated models are used because of the problem of autocorrelation (i.e., a 
variable is time dependent as well as being determined by the characteristics of 
the organisation or data).  
Also as discussed in Chapter Four, the pooled regression model to be estimated 
by the least ordinary square method (OLS) is not sufficient to capture both the 
time-varying effect and the cross-sectional effect. OLS treats all observations 
equally without considering the differences in effects between companies and 
years. In this sense, OLS is a model which has constant intercepts and slopes 
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that do not vary with companies (between-subject effect) and years (within-
subject effect). Given the nature of the panel data that is available for the analysis 
and has 1,098 companies for a period of up to ten years, OLS is useful but not 
sufficient for the analytical task in the case of panel data.  It is for this reason that 
this study uses linear mixed models in addition to ordinary least square models.  
5.9. Model Building Procedure 
As the data in Table 4.2 of Chapter Four (p. 101) shows, the four (4) regression 
models or four sets of predictors with either fixed or random effects (2 effects) 
could be estimated in three model fitting methods or types (3 methods) of error 
structure: OLS with independence error structure, LMM with compound symmetry 
error structure (repeated measures) and LMM with autoregressive error structure. 
There are 24 models that could be estimated. For this complex modelling 
structure, there is a need to undertake a logical but simple steps-based 
procedure to identify a best fit model. According to Hox (1995), in the case of 
LMM (Hox uses the term “multilevel model), the following steps are carried out to 
identify the best fit model: 
Hox Step 1  (Intercept) computes the deviance for the baseline model which 
includes only the intercept and can be carried out in the LMM model 
but cannot be carried out in the OLS Model. 
Hox Step 2  (time-varying variables) computes the deviance of explanatory 
variables from the base line model and considers the variance 
components of the slopes constrained to zero. A chi-square 
difference test (-2 Log Maximum Likelihood) is used to see if this 
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model has a significantly better fit than the baseline model. If it 
does, then the researcher proceeds to investigate super-level 
modifier variables. Also, at this second step, the researcher can 
assess the relative contribution of the base level independent 
variables.  
Hox Step 3  (random effect) identifies which base-level regression slopes have 
significant variance across super-level groups and computes the 
deviance for the model with the variance components of the base 
level slopes constrained to zero only for the slopes which do not 
have significant variance across super-level groups. 
Hox Step 4  (non-time-varying factors) adds super-level modifier variables and 
determines which factor improves the model fit. 
Hox Step 5  (interactions of time-dependent variables) adds cross-level 
interactions between explanatory modifier variables and base level 
independent variables that had slope variance. 
According to Hox’s 5-Step procedure, the following model building procedure is 
formulated for the purpose of this research, and the procedure is summarised in 
Table 5.9, overleaf. 
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Table 5.9: Model Building Procedure 
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 None None  None Interaction effect 
(Note to this table is presented overleaf) 
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Note to Table 5.9 (Model Building Procedure) 
Step 1 (FI)  follows Hox Step 1 (Fixed Intercept or FI) and computes the deviance 
for the baseline model.  
 
This step is Model 0a which considers the fixed effect of intercept 
without taking into account the AR1 autoregressive correlated error 
structure or the repeated measures (Fixed Intercept or FI). This step can 
be carried out in the LMM method and cannot be carried out in the OLS 
Method. OLS cannot run on intercept without independent variables. 
 
Step 2 (FI) follows Hox Step 1 (Fixed Intercept or FI) and computes the deviance 
for the baseline model with the repeated measures.  
 
This step is Model 0b which considers the fixed effect of intercept with 
the AR1 autoregressive correlated error structure or repeated measures 
(FI). This step can be carried out in the LMM method and cannot be 
carried out in the OLS Method. Compared with Model0a in Step 1, 
Model0b in Step 2 shows the repeated measures effect of intercept. 
 
Step 3 (FIFS) follows Hox Step 2 (Fixed Intercept and Fixed Slope, FIFS, on time-
varying variables), computes the deviance of time-varying explanatory 
variables from the base line model and considers the variance 
components of the slopes constrained to zero.  
This step is the financial model (Model 1) which considers the fixed 
effect of both intercept and financial variables with the AR1 
autoregressive correlated error structure (Fixed Intercept and Fixed 
Slope or FIFS).  This step can be carried out in both the OLS method 
and the LMM method. However, the estimating methods and the 
correlated error structures are different between the methods. 
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Compared with Model0b in Step 2, Model 1 in Step 3 shows the fixed 
effect of both intercept and slope. 
Step 4a (RIRS) follows Hox Step 3 (random Intercept and random slope, RIRS,  on 
time-varying variables), computes the deviance of explanatory variables 
from the base line model and considers the variance components of the 
slopes constrained to zero.  
 
This step, again, is the financial model (Model 1) which considers the 
random effect of both intercept and financial variables, with the AR1 
autoregressive correlated error structure, being superimposed on the 
fixed effect (random intercept and random slope, RIRS). This step can 
be carried out in the LMM method and cannot be carried out in the OLS 
Method. OLS cannot run on models with random effect. Compared with 
Model 1 in Step 3, Model 1 in Step 4a shows the random effect of both 
intercept and slope.  
 
Step 4b (RIRS) follows Hox Step 4 (random intercept and random slope, RIRS, on non-
time-varying variables), computes the deviance of explanatory variables 
from the baseline model.  
This step is the business strategy model (Model 2) which considers the 
random effect of both intercept and business strategy dummy variables 
in addition to financial variables, with the AR1 autoregressive correlated 
error structure, being superimposed on the fixed effect (random 
intercept and random slope, RIRS). This step can be carried out in the 
LMM method and cannot be carried out in the OLS Method. Compared 
with Model 1 in Step 4a, Model 2 in Step 4b tests the model fit when 
business strategy factors are added to Model 1. 
 
Step 4c (RIRS) follows Step 3 (random intercept and random slope, RIRS, on time-
varying variables), computes the deviance of explanatory variables from 
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the base line model and considers the variance components of the 
slopes constrained to zero.  
 
This step is the corporate governance model (Model 3) which considers 
the random effect of both intercept and corporate governance variables, 
with the AR1 autoregressive correlated error structure, being 
superimposed on the fixed effect (random intercept and random slope or 
RIRS). This step can be carried out in the LMM method and cannot be 
carried out in the OLS Method. Compared with Model 1 in Step 4a, 
Model 3 in Step 4c tests the model fit when corporate governance 
variables are added to Model 1. 
 
Step 4d (RIRS) follows both Hox Steps 3 and 4 (random intercept and random slope, 
RIRS, on both time-varying and non-time-varying variables), computes 
the deviance of explanatory variables from the base line model and 
considers the variance components of the slopes constrained to zero.  
 
This step is the integrated model (Model 4) which considers the random 
effect of both intercept and all time-varying and non-time-varying 
variables, with the AR1 autoregressive correlated error structure, being 
superimposed on the fixed effect (random intercept and random slope or 
RIRS). This step can be carried out in the LMM method and cannot be 
carried out in the OLS Method. Compared with Model 1 in Step 4a, 
Model 4 in Step 4d tests the model fit when both business strategy 
factors and corporate governance variables are added to Model 1. 
 
Step 5  follows Hox Step 5 but this research will not add cross-level interactions 
between explanatory modifier variables and base level independent 
variables that had slope variance due to the complex modelling 
structure and large number of variables. 
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5.9.1 Model Building Procedure Using the OLS Method 
Following the designed model building procedure in Table 5.9 (p. 163), the  
OLS method cannot consider intercept alone, so Step 1 and Step 2 are  
not applicable to the OLS method. The OLS method starts with Step 3 in 
considering the effect of eight time-varying covariates with year dummy variables 
in the financial model (Model 1). The OLS method cannot consider the random 
effect, so Step 4a is not applicable. In Step 4b, the OLS method considers  
the fixed effect of non-time-varying product dummy variables and asset dummy 
variables in the business strategy model (Model 2) together with the financial 
variables. Also in Step 4c, the OLS method considers the fixed effect of  
time-varying ownership concentration variables in the corporate governance 
model (Model 3) together with the financial variables, and then in Step 4d,  
the OLS method considers the fixed effect of all variables in the integrated  
model (Model 4). In Step 5, the OLS method can consider the interaction  
effect of variables.  
5.9.2 Model Testing in the OLS Method 
A model needs to be tested in its fit during each step of the designed model 
building procedure. A model is regarded as valid or fit when the value of F-test 
meets appropriate statistical criteria, such as a p value (significance) set at 1% or 
5% or 10%; Partial F test value passes the critical F test value; and residuals to 




In the OLS method, the model fit will be tested by the following methods (Lee et 
al., 2000): 
• the multiple correlation coefficient, R, which is defined as the correlation 
between the observed values of the response variable and the values of 
predicted by the model; 
• the value of 2R which gives the proportion of the variability of the response 
variable accounted for by the explanatory variables;  
• F-test which is the ratio of the regression mean square to the residual 
mean square on the basis of the hypothesis that each of the regression 
coefficients takes the value of zero; and 
• partial F-test which is the ratio of the difference between Model 2’s 
Regression Sum of Squares and Model 1’s Regression Sum of Square to 
the Model 2’s Mean Square. A model is valid normally when the value of 
F-test is over 5 with p value (significance) at 1% or 5% or 10%, 2R is as 
much as close to 1 and Partial F test value passes the critical F test value.  
The explanatory power of a model is measured by its adjusted R2. The 
significance of coefficients in models is checked by t-statistic within the 
significance level of 5% (p<0.05) or 1% (p<0.01) or 0.1% (p<0.001). The model 
improvement is measured by the partial F-statistic between the models within the 
significance level of 5% (p<0.05) or 1% (p<0.01) or 0.1% (p<0.001). 
5.9.3 Model Building Procedure Using the LMM Method 
Following the designed model building procedure in Table 5.9 (p. 176), LMM is 
built with the fixed effect on intercept (FI) as the baseline Model 0a in Step 1. This 
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step does not consider the (repeated measures) effect of the AR1 regressive 
correlated error structure. In Step 2, the LMM method considers the fixed effect 
on intercept (FI) with AR1 regressive correlated error structure as Model 0b. The 
difference between Step 1 and Step 2 is the (repeated measures) effect of AR1 
regressive correlated error structure. 
In Step 3, the LMM method considers the fixed effect, with AR1 regressive 
correlated error structure, of both intercept and slope by including time-varying 
financial variables and year dummy variables and this step is the financial model 
(Model 1) with Fixed Intercept and Fixed Slope (FIFS). In Step 3, the OLS 
method can be regarded as similar to the LMM method but the estimating 
methods and error structures of the two methods are different. The difference 
between Step 2 and Step 3 is the fixed effect of financial variables and year 
dummy variables. 
In Step 4a, the LMM method considers the random effect being superimposed on 
the fixed effect, with AR1 regressive correlated error structure of both intercept 
and slope including time-varying financial variables and year dummy variables, 
and this step is the financial model (Model 1) with random intercept and random 
slope (RIRS). The difference between Step 3 and Step 4a is the random effect of 
financial variables in Model 1. This comparison is very important because the 
measurement of model fit will or will not demonstrate if LMM fits the data better 
than OLS or not. 
In Step 4b, the LMM method considers the random effect being superimposed on 
the fixed effect, with AR1 regressive correlated error structure, of both intercept 
and slope including non-time-varying business strategy dummy variables, and 
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this step is the business strategy model (Model 2) with random intercept and 
random slope (RIRS). The difference between Step 4a and Step 4b is the random 
effect of business strategy dummy variables in Model 2.  
In Step 4c, the LMM method considers the random effect being superimposed on 
the fixed effect, with AR1 regressive correlated error structure, of both intercept 
and slope including time-varying corporate governance variables and this step is 
the corporate governance model (Model 3) with random intercept and random 
slope (RIRS). The difference between Step 4a and Step 4c is the random effect 
of corporate governance variables in Model 3.  
In Step 4d, the LMM method considers the random effect being superimposed on 
the fixed effect, with AR1 regressive correlated error structure, of both intercept 
and slope including all variables of the previous models and this step is the 
integrated model (Model 4) with random intercept and random slope (RIRS). The 
difference between Step 4a and Step 4d is the random effect of both business 
and governance variable in Model 4.  
Step 5 is related to the interactions between explanatory variables. The models 
listed above include only the main effects of each variable.  Interactive effects can 
be modelled by adding interaction terms, generated by forming products of 
explanatory variables.  For example, a first-order interaction between product 










kl apβ  
where p and k  stand for product type and a and l stand for asset type.  
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However, due to the large number of explanatory variables and the complexity of 
the data and modelling structures, the investigation of interaction effects was 
beyond the scope of this research.  
5.9.4 Model Testing in the LMM Method 
In accordance with standard practice, model building and comparison was 
undertaken using a hierarchical maximum likelihood (ML) algorithm, the criterion 
at each step being a significant reduction in the quantity of -2log likelihood, which 
is tested in a chi-square test with degrees of freedom equal to the increase in the 
number of parameters (Lee et al., 2000). The parameters of the final chosen 
model were estimated using restricted maximum likelihood (REML). Unbiased 
estimates of the parameters of the final chosen model can be obtained using 
restricted maximum likelihood (REML) (Lee et al. 2000). In all Hox steps, all 
covariates and fixed factors are considered under both the maximum likelihood 
conditions (ML) and the restricted maximum likelihood conditions (REML). Only 
the results of REML are reported (see Chapter Six). 
The LMM method with both fixed effect and random effect are assessed by the 
maximum likelihood ratio (Lee et al., 2000). The maximum likelihood ratio is the 
difference in -2log likelihood for the two compared models, and this ratio can be 
tested as chi-square with degrees of freedom given by the difference in the 
number of parameters. This test shows if the difference is statistically significant 
in relation to the improvements between the two compared models. The Wald 
test can also be used to demonstrate the significance of the variance of the 
random slope effects.  
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5.9.5 The Application of OLS and LMM to Two Dependent Variables in the 
Three Data Sets 
In running four models, this model building procedure is applied to two statistical 
methods (OLS and LMM) with two dependent variables (LDE and ARCDTA) in 
three data sets (SZXSHX, SZX and SHX) as displayed in Table 5.10, below. This 
application gives rise to great complexity and requires a very clear structure of 
analysing, comparing and presenting the results. The statistical analysis is 
conducted in two parts: the first part deals with the analysis using the OLS 
method and the second part deals with the analysis using the LMM method. In 
each of the two parts, the analysis of LDE dependent variable comes before 
ARCDTA and the modelling of the joint data set of SZXSHX comes before the 
SZX and SHX data sets. When each of three data sets is modelled, four 
statistical models are regressed in order of Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 
4. The same procedure is repeated for each of the two dependent variables (LDE 
and ARCDTA) and for each of the two statistical methods (OLS and LMM). 
Table 5.10: Model Building Framework 




Integrated Two Markets  (joint data set SZXSHX) Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZX data set)  Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 





5.10.     Concluding Remarks 
The discussion above raises some issues concerning the adequacy and 
sufficiency of information in measuring variables for the purpose of modelling. 
The panel data has uneven distribution of observations by year and duration and, 
more importantly, the panel data violates the assumption of independence of 
variables for general linear regression models, particularly the area of possible 
autocorrelation of time series in the panel data. For this reason, the relatively new 
method of LMM has been used in addition to the conventional OLS method. 
In line with the four linear regression models that were developed according to 
the three theoretical approaches of financial approach, business strategy 
approach and corporate governance approach (discussed in Chapter Two and 
modelled in Chapter Four), all variables including dependent variables, 
explanatory variables and fixed factors were defined according to specific 
theoretical hypotheses. After analysing the nature of panel data, Hox’s model 
building procedure was established to estimate and test the models using the 
OLS and LMM methods in three error structures such as independence structure, 
compound symmetry structure and autoregressive structure. Within the 
framework of the Hox-Five-Step model building procedure, the model testing 
methods were explained.  
In summary, this research takes a number of departures from the conventional 
methodology in the following ways: 
• By going beyond financial explanation to include Business Strategy 
variables and Corporate Governance variables and establishing well-
structured four models; 
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• By using two different measures of capital structure: the log of Debt to 
Equity Ratio (LDE) and the arcsin square root of Debt to Total Asset Ratio 
(ARCDTA); 
• By modelling of three data sets (SZXSHX, SZX and SHX); and 
• By applying a mix of statistical methods to examine the relationship (OLS 
and LMM). These include linear mixed model (LMM) which will help 
separate the fixed and random effects in the data and crucially work on the 
basis of an assumption of dependence between observations and not 
independence; 
This represents part of the contribution that this thesis makes to the study of the 
capital structure of Chinese listed companies. The presentation and discussion of 





RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents the results of four statistical models of capital structure 
according to the research questions in Chapter One. The capital structure 
theories underlying these models were discussed in Chapter Two. The statistical 
models to test the theoretical hypotheses were constructed in Chapter Four. 
These models were estimated using both OLS and LMM methods in the Hox 
procedure, which was described in Chapter Five. This research has undertaken a 
complex process of modelling in relation to four statistical models.  Two different 
statistical methods for three data sets are used. To provide a basis for cross-
comparison with other studies, the empirical work reported here uses two 
measures of capital structure based on the debt to equity ratio and the debt to 
total assets ratio. Although discussed in detail in both Chapter Four (modelling 
and hypotheses) and Chapter Five (data and methodology), an explanation of 
how a comparison between these models is made is still necessary, and this is 
provided below.  
The results of these four models are discussed in terms of (1) overall model fit, 
and (2) the contribution and significance of individual explanatory variables. This 
is not an easy task, given the complex modelling and methodological structures in 
this study.  
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As developed in Chapter Four, Model 1 is the financial model as well as a 
baseline model for other models. This model estimates the impact of financial 
variables on capital structure. In addition to the financial variables, Model 2 
estimates the impact of business strategy factors, and Model 3 estimates the 
impact of corporate governance variables on capital structure. Model 4 brings all 
variables together in one single model and estimates the general impact of all 
financial, strategy and governance variables on capital structure. These models 
are tested and their results are reported, compared and discussed in the Hox 
procedure.  
As explained in Chapter Four, the OLS method assumes that the explanatory 
variables in a model are independent. Because panel data simultaneously deals 
with cross-sectional and time series data, the likelihood is that this assumption 
will be violated, and the LMM model is used on the combined data set to examine 
whether these issues of multicollinearity are present, and if they change the 
overall direction of results. The results of the models are reported in two sections: 
one providing results of models using the OLS method, and the other providing 
results of models using the LMM method. In doing so, the results on model fit and 
the significance of coefficients can be compared between the two methods. 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the analysis of the descriptive statistics in the SZX 
data set and the SHX data set demonstrates that the companies listed on these 
two markets (i.e., SZX and SHX) are significantly different in their choice of 
capital structure. Although the results of the joint data set of SZXSHX will be 
reported here, the results of the two individual markets will be reported as well 
because of these important differences. In reporting the results of the three sets 
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of data for the combined market of both SZX and SHX and the two individual 
markets, relative model fit and relative significance of coefficients can be 
compared in order to better understand the determinants of capital structure of 
the Chinese listed companies when examined from individual or aggregate 
market perspectives. 
Also as discussed in Chapter Five, capital structure is normally defined in terms 
of the ratio of debt to equity (DE) and the ratio of debt to total assets (DTA)  Also 
discussed was the need for the transformation of both DE and DTA to logDE 
(LDE) and arcsin square root of DTA (ARCDTA). These will be the measures 
used for the dependent variables in this research. The results of the four models 
will be presented in order of LDE and ARCDTA. In doing so, the results can be 
compared and verified for the two different measures of capital structure. 
In this context, the results of the OLS method using LDE as dependent variable 
will be discussed in section 6.2; the results of the OLS method using ARCDTA as 
dependent variable will be discussed in section 6.3; and the results of the LMM 
method using both LDE and ARCDTA as the dependent variables will be 
discussed in section 6.4. In each of these three sections, the results will be 
discussed in relation to the model fit and the significance of coefficients. In the 
first instance, the statistical results are reported and narrated in the sections 




6.2.    Results of the OLS Method using LDE as the Dependent Variable 
The discussion in this section is based on Table 6.1, overleaf. For the 
convenience of referring the results to the discussion in each sub-sections, the 
summaries of these results are displayed in breakdown tables named as Table 
6.1a, 6.1b, etc. Table 6.1 is a master table that presents the overall results of 
modelling using the OLS Method with LDE as the Dependent Variable. This 
section examines the goodness of model fit of modelling using the OLS method 
with LDE as the dependent variable and reports the statistical significance of the 
coefficients in the best fit model in each of three data sets.  
6.2.1.  Model Fit of Capital Structure Relationships in the Joint Data Set of 
SZXSHX and Individual Data Sets of SZX and SHX 
The discussion on model fit is carried out in order of the three data sets: the joint 
data set of SZXSHX, the SZX data set, and the SHX data set. For each data set, 
a best model fit will be identified to present the significance of coefficients in three 
groups of capital structure determinants in relation to financial, strategy and 
governance variables. 
The first data set to be reported is the joint data set of SZXSHX. A summary of 
the modelling of the joint data set of SZXSHX appears in Table 6.1a, on p. 195, 
and shows that using the statistical parameters of the adjusted R2, the model F-
statistic and the partial F test showing model improvement, all four models are 
statistically robust, although some of the parameters – model R2 are at the lower 
end of the acceptable range (Lee et al., 2000). 
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Table 6.1: Results of OLS Method Using LDE as Dependent Variable 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 SZXSHX   SZX    SHX    
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
(Constant) -0.6188*** -0.6377***  -0.6094***  -0.5650***  -0.7127***  -0.6944***  -0.7507***  -0.7056***  -0.3269***  -0.3108***  -0.0900  -0.0957  
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.114) (0.116) (0.060) (0.060) (0.145) (0.145) (0.062) (0.063) (0.177) (0.178) 
TXER 0.1955***  0.1948***  0.1956***  0.1923***  0.2877***  0.2848***  0.2875***  0.2869***  0.1442***  0.1458***  0.1388***  0.1409***  
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
GROW 0.1361***  0.1328***  0.1359***  0.1341***  0.1365***  0.1263***  0.1366***  0.1266***  0.1292***  0.1359***  0.1377***  0.1438***  
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
CAPI 0.0135***  0.0134***  0.0138***  0.0137***  0.0137***  0.0130***  0.0139***  0.0132***  0.0119***  0.0133***  0.0148***  0.0162***  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
TANG -0.0015  -0.0015  -0.0017  -0.0025  0.0025  0.0023  0.0024  0.0022  -0.0997***  -0.0994***  -0.1337***  -0.1330***  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
PROF -0.4386***  -0.4378***  -0.4353***  -0.4400***  -0.3854***  -0.3650***  -0.3905***  -0.3709***  -0.1537**  -0.1812**  -0.3830***  -0.3121***  
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.081) (0.081) (0.089) (0.089) 
SIZE -0.0696***  -0.0686*** -0.0654***  -0.0665***  -0.0486***  -0.0420***  -0.0485***  -0.0424***  -0.0905***  -0.0991***  -0.0880***  -0.0961***  
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
RISK -0.0268*  -0.0251*  -0.0226  -0.0187  -0.0568***  -0.0490***  -0.0538***  -0.0464***  0.0489  0.0463  0.0228  0.0199  
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
DURA -0.0015  -0.0015  -0.0017  -0.0009  0.0141***  0.0101***  0.0143***  0.0105***  -0.0030  -0.0019  -0.0043  -0.0039  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
PROD1 (reference dummy variable)            
             
PROD2  0.0803***   0.0797***   0.0744***   0.0773***   0.0416**   0.0465**  
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.022) 
PROD3  0.0234*   0.0298**   0.0204*   0.0215*   0.0279*   0.0351***  
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
PROD4  0.0486***   0.0419***   0.0793***   0.0765***   0.0050   -0.0081  
  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.018) 
ASSET1 (reference dummy variable)            
             
ASSET2  -0.0336***   -0.0476***   -0.0282***   -0.0291***   -0.0087   -0.0042  
  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.0016)  (0.0016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
ASSET3  -0.0109***   -0.0101***   -0.0650***   -0.0617***   -0.0625***   -0.0579***  
  (0.0011)  (0.0012)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
GOV   0.093***  0.060***    0.0187  0.0166    0.0341***  0.0379***  
   (0.017) (0.017)   (0.018) (0.018)   (0.0043) (0.0043) 
GOVL   -0.080*  -0.228***    -0.0914  -0.0744    -0.0155***  -0.0022***  
   (0.046) (0.048)   (0.060) (0.060)   (0.0082) (0.0082) 
EQU1   0.0677*  0.0777*    0.0756  0.0754    0.0826***  0.0666***  
   (0.042) (0.042)   (0.058) (0.058)   (0.0059) (0.0059) 
EQU10   -0.1180**  -0.123**    -0.0244  -0.0246    -0.0355***  -0.0546***  
   (0.020) (0.020)   (0.027) (0.027)   (0.0030) (0.0031) 
 
Market dummy -0.0400***  -0.0400***  -0.0400***  -0.0400***          
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.025) (0.020)         
Y91 (reference year dummy variable)            
             
Y92 0.0656***  0.0646***  0.0639***  0.0604***      0.0358***  0.0353***  0.0217***  0.0222***  
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.046)     (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.047) 
Y93 0.2399***  0.2356***  0.2578***  0.2389***  0.3205***  0.3272***  0.3071***  0.3109***  0.1050***  0.1026***  0.1164***  0.1154***  
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040) (0.124) (0.123) (0.133) (0.132) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) 
Y94 0.3081***  0.3044***  0.3221***  0.3034***  0.1471***  0.1448***  0.1488***  0.1463***  0.1871***  0.1862***  0.1986***  0.1994***  
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) 
Y95 0.2963***  0.2930***  0.3132***  0.2950***  0.1742***  0.1717***  0.1768***  0.1746***  0.1668***  0.1659***  0.1831***  0.1842***  
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) 
Y96 0.2035***  0.2005***  0.2142***  0.1960***  0.1595***  0.1575***  0.1621***  0.1597***  0.0866*  0.0867*  0.0905*  0.0925*  
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) 
Y97 0.1892***  0.1865***  0.1980***  0.1827***  0.0535*  0.0514*  0.0563*  0.0546*  0.1296***  0.1305***  0.1272***  0.1292***  
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.042) 
Y98 0.1766***  0.1742***  0.1805***  0.1660***  0.0198  0.0196  0.0295  0.0295  0.1170***  0.1182***  0.1101***  0.1122***  
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) 
Y99 0.1425***  0.1401***  0.1483***  0.1343***  -0.0423*  -0.0423*  -0.0382*  -0.0381*  0.0860*  0.0870*  0.0785*  0.0805*  
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.042) 
Y20 0.1146***  0.1116***  0.1178***  0.1009***  -0.0495*  -0.0487*  -0.0460*  -0.0451*  0.0504  0.0513  0.0391  0.0405  
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
R2   0.1070 0.1150 0.1120   0.1220   0.1515   0.1640   0.1520   0.1650   0.1529   0.1613   0.1624   0.1710 
Adj R2   0.1050 0.1120 0.1100   0.1190   0.1469   0.1580   0.1463   0.1579   0.1491   0.1563   0.1577   0.1652 
Partial F-statistic  61.3400*** 36.363***   113.41***    41.7696***   1.6804   47.5422***    31.6160***   41.4622***   76.8740*** 
F-statistic   49.2500*** 40.6900*** 41.500***   35.070***   33.0700***   27.6196***   26.5193***   23.3418***   40.4708***   32.7783***   34.7386***   29.5202*** 
Regr. SS   89.6100 96.5400 93.710   102.34   53.9515   58.1383   54.1229   58.7368   73.9904   77.5524   78.6862   82.5937 
Residl MS   0.1100 0.1100 0.1100   0.1100   0.1020   0.1002   0.1020   0.1007   0.1143   0.1127   0.1133   0.1119 
df   18 23 22   27   16   21   20   25   17   22   21   26 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Significance:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; The figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Model 1 = Financial Model, Model 2 = Business Strategy Model, Model 3 = Corporate Governance Model; and Model 4 = the Integrated Model. 
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Table 6.1a: Model Fit of OLS Method Using LDE as Dependent Variable - SZXSHX 






Model 1: Financial variables  0.1050   49.2500 
Model 2: Business strategy variables 0.1120 0.0700 40.6900 61.3400
Model 3: Corporate governance variables 0.1100 0.0500 41.5000 36.3600
Model 4: All variables 0.1190 0.1400   35.0700   113.4100
Note: The results in Table 6.1a and the following tables 6.1b to 6.1i are extracted from Table 6.1.  
 
 
The impact of the financial variables on capital structure is captured in Model 1, 
and the adjusted R2 is 0.105 with a F-statistic of 49.25 (df=1, 18, p<0.001). When 
the business strategy factors are added to Model 1, Model 2 improves the model 
fit with the adjusted R2 up to 0.112 with a partial F-statistic of 61.34 (df=18, 23, 
p<0.01), and the impact of product diversity and asset specificity on capital 
structure is detected. When the corporate governance factors are added to Model 
1, Model 3 improves the model fit with the adjusted R2 up to 0.11with a partial F-
statistic of 36.36 (df=18, 22, p<0.01) and the impact of ownership structure and 
ownership concentration on capital structure is evidenced. When all factors are 
considered, Model 4 improves the model fit with the adjusted R2 up to 0.119, 
relative to Model 1, with a partial F-statistic of 113.41 (df=18, 27, p<0.001). 
Although this result in Model 4 would be expected when the model is increased to 
cover more explanatory variables, the signs and significance of the coefficients 
do not change.  
The second data set to be reported is the SZX data set. A summary of the 
modelling of the SZX data set is displayed in Table 6.1b, below, and 
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demonstrates that Model 2 and Model 4 improve the fit compared with Model 1, 
but Model 3 is not a significant improvement over Model 1. Capital structure is 
related to the financial and business strategy variables, but this model is not 
related to the corporate governance variables in the SZX data set. 
 
Table 6.1b: Model Fit of OLS Method Using LDE as Dependent Variable - SZX 






Model 1: Financial variables  0.1469   33.0700 
Model 2: Business strategy variables 0.1580 0.0129   27.6196   41.7696
Model 3: Corporate governance variables 0.1463 -0.0006   26.5193 1.6804
Model 4: All variables 0.1579 0.0110   23.3418   47.5422
 
 
The adjusted R2 of Model 1, which is the financial model, is 0.1469 with  
an F-statistic of 33.07 (df=1, 16, p<0.01), and this shows the impact of financial 
variables on capital structure. Relative to Model 1, Model 2 improves the  
adjusted R2 to 0.158 with a partial F-statistic of 41.7696 (df=16, 21, p<0.01)  
and shows the impact of business strategy variables on capital structure. 
However, the adjusted R2 of Model 3 is 0.1463 and is no improvement  
from Model 1. This model does not pass the test of partial F-statistic of  
1.68 (df16, 20, p<0.20). The impact of ownership structure and ownership 
concentration on capital structure is not detected in Model 3. Model 4  
improves the adjusted R2 to 0.1579, relative to Model 1, with the partial F-statistic 
of 47.5422 (df=16, 25, p<0.01). 
Because Model 3 is not significant, Model 4 reflects only on the impact of 
financial and strategy variables in Model 1 and Model 2 on capital structure. 
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Again, although this result in Model 4 would be expected when the model is 
increased to cover more explanatory variables, the signs and significance of the 
coefficients do not change. 
The third data set to be reported is the SHX data set. A summary of the modelling 
of the SHX dataset is displayed in Table 6.1c, below, and shows that the capital 
structure is related to all three groups of variables in finance, business strategy 
and corporate governance in the SHX data set. 
Table 6.1c: Model Fit of OLS Method Using LDE as Dependent Variable - SHX 
 Adj R2 
Change in Adj 






Model 1: financial variables 0.1491    40.4708  
Model 2: business strategy variables 0.1563 0.052   32.7783 31.6160 
Model 3: corporate governance variables 0.1577 0.086   34.7386 41.4622 
Model 4: all variables 0.1652 0.161   29.5202 76.8740 
 
In the SHX data set, the adjusted R2 of Model 1 is 0.1491 with an F-statistic of 
40.47 (df1, 17, p<0.01), and the impact of financial variables on capital structure 
is significant. Relative to Model 1, Model 2 improves the adjusted R2 to 0.1563 
with a partial F-statistic of 31.616 (df=17, 22, p<0.01) and the impact of business 
strategy variables on capital structure is detected. Model 3 improves the adjusted 
R2 to 0.1577 relative to Model 1 with a partial F-statistic of 41.4622 (df=17, 21, 
p<0.01) and the impact of corporate governance variables on capital structure is 
evidenced. Model 4 also improves greatly the adjusted R2 to 0.1652, relative to 
Model 1, with a partial F-statistic of 76.87 (df=17, 26, p<0.01). Although this result 
in Model 4 would be expected when the model is increased to cover more 




The modelling of the three data sets shows that the integrated model (Model 4) 
provides the best overall explanation of the nature of capital structure. It improves 
the model fit in relation to all three previous models and has a R2 of 0.119 for the 
joint data set of SZXSHX, a R2 of 0.1579 for the SZX data set, and a R2 of 0.1652 
for the SHX data set. The R2 is lowest in the joint data set. However, when the 
data set is split to two individual market-based data sets, the adjusted R2 
improves. Because Model 3 is not significant in the SZX data set, the R2 of the 
SZX data set is lower than the R2 of the SHX data set. Relative to other data sets, 
Model 4 of the SHX data set provides the greatest explanatory power. 
6.2.2. The Influence of Explanatory Variables on Capital Structure  
Following the discussion in the previous section on the model fit across three 
data sets, this section reports on the significance of coefficients on financial, 
strategy and governance variables on the basis of Model 4 in each of three data 
sets. 
6.2.2.1. The Influence of Financial Variables on Capital Structure 
The modelling of the joint data set of SZXSHX shows that, in Model 4, the 
coefficients are significant for five of the eight financial variables, shown in Table 
6.1d, below. Tax, growth and capital intensity are positively related to the capital 
structure as predicted by trade-off theory. Profitability and size are negatively 
related to the capital structure as predicted by pecking order theory. Tangibility, 
risk and duration are not significant. The values of coefficients are displayed in 




Table 6.1d:  The Influence of Financial Variables on Capital Structure: 
Using the OLS Method with LDE as the Dependent Variable - SZXSHX 
Time-Varying 
Financial Variables Hypotheses Model 1 Model  2 Model 3 Model 4 
TXER H1.1 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
PROF H1.2 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - 
SIZE H1.3 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - 
GROW H1.4 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
TANG H1.5     
CAPI H1.6 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
RISK H1.7 Sig., - Sig., -   
DURA H1.8     
Note: Significance: p<0.05 
 
The modelling of the SZX data set shows that, in Model 4, the coefficients are 
significant for seven of the eight financial variables, as displayed in Table 6.1e, 
below.  
 
Table 6.1e:  The Influence of Financial Variables on Capital Structure: 
Using the OLS Method with LDE as the Dependent Variable - SZX 
Time-Varying 
Financial Variables 
Hypotheses Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
TXER H1.1 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., +
PROF H1.2 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., -
SIZE H1.3 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., -
GROW H1.4 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., +
TANG H1.5 
CAPI H1.6 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., +
RISK H1.7 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., -
DURA H1.8 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., -
 




As predicted by trade-off theory, tax, growth and capital intensity are positively 
related to capital structure, and risk is negatively related to capital structure. 
Profitability and size are negatively related to capital structure as predicted by 
pecking order theory. The result on duration is significant, but it is not consistent 
with trade-off theory because its coefficient carries a negative sign. The only non-
significant variable is tangibility. The values of coefficients are displayed in Table 
6.1 on p. 194. 
The modelling of the SHX data set shows that, in Model 4, the coefficients are 
significant for six of the eight financial variables are significant across four 
models, displayed in Table 6.1f, below. 
Table 6.1f: The Influence of Financial Variables on Capital Structure: 
Using the OLS Method with LDE as the Dependent Variable - SHX 
Time-Varying 
Financial Variables 
Hypotheses Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
TXER H1.1 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., +
PROF H1.2 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., -
SIZE H1.3 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., -
GROW H1.4 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., +
TANG H1.5 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., -
CAPI H1.6 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., +
RISK H1.7 
DURA H1.8     
Note: Significance: p<0.05 
 
 
Tax, growth and capital intensity are positively related to capital structure, and 
risk is negatively related to capital structure as predicted by trade-off theory. 
Profitability and size are negatively related to capital structure as predicted by 
pecking order theory. The result on tangibility is significant but is not consistent 
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with trade-off theory because its coefficient carries a negative sign. The non-
significant variables are risk and duration. The values of coefficients are 
displayed in Table 6.1 on p. 194. 
The above results lead to the following summarised findings displayed in Table 
6.1g, below: 
 
Table 6.1g:  The Influence of Financial Variables in Model 4 on Capital Structure: 
Using the OLS Method with LDE as the Dependent Variable across 
Three Data Sets 
 
Note: Significance: p<0.05 
 
 
Although, prior to further model tests in the following sections, it is too early to 
make any conclusions on the basis of only results of the modelling using the OLS 
method with LDE dependent variable, it is worthwhile summarising and recording 





Hypotheses SZXSHX Model 4 SZX Model 4 SHX Model 4 
TXER H1.1 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
PROF H1.2 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - 
SIZE H1.3 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - 
GROW H1.4 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
TANG H1.5   Sig., - 
CAPI H1.6 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
RISK H1.7  Sig., -  
DURA H1.8  Sig., -  
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1. Tax rate, growth and capital intensity are positively related to the capital 
structure of the Chinese listed companies, thus confirming the hypotheses 
of H1.1 (the impact of tax), H1.4 (the impact of growth), and H1.6 (the 
impact of capital intensity) and predicted by trade-off theory. 
2. Profit and size are negatively related to the capital structure of the Chinese 
listed companies, thus confirming the hypotheses of H.1.2 (the impact of 
profitability) and H.1.3 (the impact of size) and predicted by pecking order 
theory. 
3. Tangibility is significant only in the SHX data set. This result is not 
consistent with trade-off theory because it is negatively related to capital 
structure, thus rejecting the hypothesis H1.5 (the impact of tangibility). 
4. Risk is significant and negatively related to the capital structure only in the 
SZX data set, thus confirming the hypothesis of H1.7 (the impact of risk) 
only for the SZX data set. 
5. Duration is significant only in the SZX data set, but the result is not 
consistent with trade-off theory because it is negatively related to the 
capital structure, thus rejecting the hypotheses of H1.6 (the impact of 
duration). 
6.2.2.2. The Influence of Business Strategy Variables on Capital Structure 
The overall results of Model 4 across the three data sets, presented in Table 
6.1h, below, indicate that the business strategy factors such as product 
diversification and asset specificity are significantly related to the capital structure 




Table 6.1h:  The Influence of Business Strategy Variables on Capital Structure: 
Using the OLS Method with LDE as the Dependent Variable  
 SZXSHX SZX SHX 
Non-Time-Varying 
Dummy Variables 
Hypotheses Model 2 Model 4 Model 2 Model 4 Model 2 Model 4
PROD1 H2.1       
PROD2 H2.2 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
PROD3 H2.3 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
PROD4 H2.4 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., +   
ASSET1 H2.5       
ASSET2 H2.6 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., -   
ASSET3 H2.7 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - 
Note: Significance: p<0.05 
 
 
In modelling based on the joint data set of SZXSHX, the product diversification 
dummy variables (PROD2, PROD3 and PROD4) are significant and positively 
related to the capital structure (relative to PROD1) as predicted by the theory of 
product diversification. Asset specificity dummy variables (ASSET2 and ASSET3) 
are significant and negatively related to the capital structure (relative to ASSET1) 
as predicted by transaction cost economics (TCE) theory (Williamson, 1988; 
Kochhar, 1996).  The hypotheses from H2.1 to H2.7 are accepted for the joint 
data set of SZXSHX (Table 6.1h). 
Modelling using the SZX data set produces results similar to those in the joint 
data set of SZXSHX. The capital structure of the companies is related positively 
to product diversification (PROD2, PROD3 and PROD4 relative to PROD1) and 
negatively to asset specificity (ASSET2 and ASSET3 relative to ASSET1). The 
hypotheses from H2.1 to 2.7 are accepted (Table 6.1h).  
The modelling of the SHX data set shows that PROD2 and PROD3 are significant 
and have positive signs on their coefficients but PROD4 is not significant. 
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Although ASSET3 is significant and has a negative sign on its coefficient, the 
effect of ASSET2 is not detected. The hypotheses of H2.1, H2.2, H2.3, H2.5 and 
H2.7 are accepted and the hypotheses of H2.4, H2.6 are rejected (Table 6.1h,). 
These results lead to the following summarised findings: 
• PROD2 and PROD3 are positively related to capital structure as predicted 
by the theory of product diversification. 
• ASSET3 is negatively related to capital structure as predicted by 
transaction cost economics theory. 
• The capital structure of the listed companies in SZX is positively related to 
PROD4 and negatively related to ASSET2. This is not found in the SHX 
data set. 
6.2.2.3. The Influence of Corporate Governance Variables on Capital 
Structure 
Overall results of Model 4 displayed in Table 6.1i, below, indicate that the 
corporate governance variables are related to the capital structure of listed 
companies only in the SHX data set.  
Table 6.1i: The Influence of Corporate Governance Variables on Capital Structure: 
Using the OLS Method with LDE as the Dependent Variable 
 SZXSHX SZX SHX 
Time-Varying 
Variables Hypotheses Model 3 Model  4 Model  3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 
GOV H3.1 Sig., + Sig., +   Sig., + Sig., + 
GOVL H3.2 Sig., - Sig., -   Sig., - Sig., - 
EQU1 H3.3 Sig., + Sig., +   Sig., + Sig., + 
EQU10 H3.4 Sig., - Sig., -   Sig., - Sig., - 
Note: Significance: p<0.05 
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The modelling of the SZX dataset in Model 4 does not demonstrate  
the significance of any of the GOV, GL, EQU1 and EQU10 variables. This  
implies that the corporate governance factors do not impact on the  
capital structure of the listed companies in SZX, thus rejecting the hypotheses 
from H3.1 to H3.4. 
The modelling using the joint data set of SZXSHX and the SHX data set in Model 
4 produce the same results, Government ownership (GOV) and ownership by the 
largest shareholder (EQU1) are positively related to capital structure implying the 
existence of the agency cost of debt, thus accepting H3.1 and H3.2. Legal person 
ownership (GL) and ownership by the ten largest shareholders (EQU10) are 
negatively related to capital structure implying the existence of the agency cost of 
equity, thus accepting H3.3 and H3.4. 
The above results lead to the following summarised findings (see Table 6.1i, 
above): 
• The capital structure of listed companies in SHX is related to the corporate 
governance variables as predicted by Agency Cost Theory. 
• The capital structure of listed companies in SZX is not related to the 
corporate governance variables. 
6.2.3. Conclusion on the Influence of Financial, Strategy and Governance 
Variables in the OLS method Using LDE as the Dependent Variable 
The discussion in section 6.2.1 on model fit and in section 6.2.2 on the 
significance of coefficients leads to the following summarised findings: 
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1. The modelling of capital structure relationships demonstrates that the 
integrated model (Model 4) is the best fit model in all three data sets as 
compared with other models. Although the modelling of the joint data 
set of SZXSHX produces a low R2 in Model 4, the modelling of the 
individual market-based data sets of SZX and SHX produces 
reasonably higher and more significant R2 values in Model 4. The 
differences in R2 between SZX (lower) and SHX (higher) are explained 
by the findings on the differences in the significant variables between 
SZX and SHX, as indicated in the following points. 
2. On the basis of the results on the financial variables in the best fit 
model (Model 4) in all three data sets, the modelling of capital structure 
relations shows that the capital structure of listed companies is related 
to five common financial variables (tax, growth, capital intensity, 
profitability and size) in both SZX and SHX data sets. Particularly, with 
the negative signs on the coefficients of profitability and size, this 
implies that pecking order theory is supported in the case of the 
Chinese listed companies, and also that the asymmetric information 
may be the underlying explanation to the strong equity preference of 
the Chinese listed companies and the low debt ratios in the capital 
structure of the Chinese listed companies.  
3. On the basis of the results on the business strategy dummy variables in 
the best fit model (Model 4) in all three data sets, and particularly in the 
SZX data set, the modelling of capital structure relations shows that the 
capital structure of listed companies is related positively to product 
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diversification and negatively related to asset specificity. All variables of 
product diversification and asset specificity are consistently significant 
in the SZX data set. This supports the hypotheses advanced in Chapter 
4 on the impact of diversification on portfolio risk and the willingness of 
the capital markets, particularly lenders, to provide finance for 
companies that hedge their risk through diversity, notwithstanding the 
argument that capital markets diversify their risk by diversifying their 
portfolios.  
4. On the basis of the results on the corporate governance variables in 
the best fit model (Model 4) only in the SHX data set (resultantly in the 
joint data set), the modelling of capital structure relations shows that 
the capital structure of listed companies in SHX market is related to the 
ownership structure with positive coefficient signs on the coefficients of 
government ownership and the ownership of the largest shareholder 
and negative signs on the coefficients of legal person ownership and 
the ownership of the ten largest shareholders. This supports agency 
cost theory in the case of the Chinese listed companies. The agency 
costs of debt and equity may be the underlying explanation to the lower 
debt ratios of the listed companies in SHX market than those in SZX 
market.  
5. On the basis of the results on the year dummy variable in the best fit 
model (Model 4) in all three data sets, the modelling of capital structure 
relations shows that year dummy variables are significant and carry 
decreasingly positive signs on the coefficients over time. The results 
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suggest a strong auto-correlation effect in time series and also indicate 
that the choice of capital structure of the Chinese listed companies has 
a path-dependent effect. 
6. On the basis of the results on the market dummy variable in the best fit 
model (Model 4) in the joint data set of SZXSHX, the modelling of 
capital structure relations shows that the coefficient of the market 
dummy variable has a significant negative sign. This implies that the 
listed companies in the SZX data set and the SHX data set differ 
greatly in their choice of capital structure being influenced by different 
sets of capital structure determinants as evidenced previously in Item 2 
and Item 3. Although the capital structures of the listed companies in 
the SZX data set and the SZX data set are commonly related to the 
financial variables, the capital structure of the listed companies in the 
SZX data set is related more to business strategy factors while the 
capital structure of the listed companies in the SHX data set is related 
more to corporate governance factors. 
A discussion of the implications of these results for the Chinese institutional 
context is provided later in section 6.5, where presentation of the overall results 
will be finalised.  
6.3.  Results of the OLS Method Using ARCDTA as the Dependent Variable 
In the previous section 6.2., the results of the OLS method using LDE as the 
dependent variable were presented, discussed and compared. Some preliminary 
but interesting findings were discovered on the capital structure determinants of 
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Chinese listed companies. To verify and cross-check these findings, an 
alternative dependent (ARCDTA) is used in the modelling of the capital structure 
relations. This section presents, discusses and compares the results on the 
goodness of model fit of the OLS modelling of capital structure relationships using 
this alternative dependent variable (ARCDTA). 
The discussion in this section is based on Table 6.2, overleaf. For the 
convenience of referring the results to the discussion in each sub-sections, the 
summaries of these results are displayed in break-down tables named as Table 
6.2a, 6.2b, etc. Table 6.2 is a master table that presents the overall results of 
modelling using the OLS Method with ARCDTA as the Dependent Variable. This 
section examines the goodness of model fit of modelling using the OLS method 
with ARCDTA as the dependent variable and reports the statistical significance of 
the coefficients in the best fit model in each of three data sets.  
6.3.1 Model Fit of Capital Structure Relationships in the Joint Data Set of 
SZXSHX and Individual Data Sets of SZX and SHX 
The report on model fit in this section follows the same procedure used in section 
6.2.1. Here, the dependent variable ARCDTA is used. The discussion in this 
section will be carried out in the order of three data sets: the joint data set of 
SZXSHX, the SZX data set, and the SHX data set. For each data set, a best fit 
model will be identified to present the significance of coefficients in three groups 




Table 6.2: Results of OLS Method Using ARCDTA as Dependent Variable 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 SZXSHX   SZX    SHX    
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 (Constant) 0.4673***  0.4567***  0.4925***  0.5282***  0.4147***  0.4236***  0.4026***  0.4251***  0.6222***  0.6288***  0.7717  0.7657  
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.058) (0.060) (0.031) (0.031) (0.075) (0.075) (0.031) (0.031) (0.087) (0.087) 
TXER 0.1083***  0.1080***  0.1080***  0.1064***  0.1576***  0.1563***  0.1576***  0.1575***  0.0811***  0.0819***  0.0779***  0.0789***  
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
GROW 0.0706***  0.0688***  0.0705***  0.0695***  0.0712***  0.0661***  0.0713***  0.0663***  0.0674***  0.0706***  0.0717***  0.0745***  
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
CAPI 0.0072***  0.0072***  0.0073***  0.0072***  0.0072***  0.0069***  0.0073***  0.0070***  0.0068***  0.0075***  0.0081***  0.0088***  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
PROF -0.2312***  -0.2307***  -0.2285***  -0.2306***  -0.2052***  -0.1947***  -0.2079***  -0.1979***  -0.0750*  -0.0886*  -0.0666*  -0.0932*  
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.044) 
SIZE -0.0362***  -0.0357***  -0.0339***  -0.0345***  -0.0257***  -0.0225***  -0.0256***  -0.0226***  -0.0478***  -0.0522***  -0.0460***  -0.0501***  
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
TANG -0.0010  -0.0010  -0.0011  -0.0015  0.0012  0.0011  0.0011  0.0010  -0.0540***  -0.0538***  -0.0715***  -0.0711***  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
RISK -0.0150**  -0.0143**  -0.0126**  -0.0108**  -0.0321***  -0.0282***  -0.0306***  -0.0269***  0.0262  0.0245  0.0131  0.0112  
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
DURA -0.0008  -0.0008  -0.0008  -0.0004  0.0076***  0.0056***  0.0078***  0.0059***  -0.0017  -0.0011  -0.0021  -0.0019  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
PROD1 (reference variable)             
 
PROD2  0.0427***   0.0426***   0.0379***   0.0396***   0.0242*   0.0270*  
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
PROD3  0.0138*   0.0172**   0.0091   0.0100   0.0187*   0.0224**  
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
PROD4  0.0247***   0.0213***   0.0403***   0.0391***   0.0022   0.0047  
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
ASSET1 (reference variable)             
 
ASSET2  -0.0197***   -0.0268***   -0.0158***   -0.0163***   -0.0124***   -0.0220***  
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
ASSET3  -0.0522***   -0.055***   -0.0313***   -0.0295***   -0.0313***   -0.0289***  
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
GOV   0.0240***  0.0120***    0.0092  0.00830    0.1080***  0.1330***  
   (0.009) (0.009)   (0.009) (0.009)   (0.021) (0.021) 
GOVL   -0.0306*  -0.088**    0.0451*  0.0368*    -0.1610***  -0.0680***  
   (0.023) (0.024)   (0.031) (0.031)   (0.040) (0.040) 
EQU1   0.0472**  0.0523**    0.0445*  0.0449*    0.0595**  0.0522**  
   (0.021) (0.021)   (0.030) (0.030)   (0.029) (0.029) 
EQU10   -0.0740***  -0.0290*    0.0162  0.0165    -0.1540***  -0.157***  
   (0.010) (0.010)   (0.014) (0.014)   (0.015) (0.015) 
 
Market dummy -0.0200***  -0.0200***  -0.0200***  -0.0200***          
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)         
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Y92 0.0343  0.0338  0.0332  0.0315      0.0185  0.0183  0.0107  0.0111  
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)     (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Y93 0.1269***  0.1249***  0.1354***  0.1260***  0.1718**  0.1744***  0.1646**  0.1658**  0.0551**  0.0542**  0.0595***  0.0593***  
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.064) (0.064) (0.069) (0.068) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
Y94 0.1596***  0.1579***  0.1664***  0.1572***  0.0813***  0.0801***  0.0824***  0.0811***  0.0943***  0.0942***  0.0996***  0.1004***  
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
Y95 0.1540***  0.1525***  0.1620***  0.1530***  0.0931***  0.0918***  0.0946***  0.0934***  0.0847***  0.0847***  0.0918***  0.0928***  
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
Y96 0.1035***  0.1022***  0.1085***  0.0996***  0.0851***  0.0841***  0.0867***  0.0854***  0.0404*  0.0409*  0.0417*  0.0432*  
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Y97 0.0967***  0.0955***  0.1008***  0.0933***  0.0283*  0.0272*  0.0299*  0.0290*  0.0648***  0.0655***  0.0623***  0.0636***  
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Y98 0.0931***  0.0920***  0.0945***  0.0874***  0.0106  0.0105  0.0159  0.0159  0.0636***  0.0645***  0.0590***  0.0602***  
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Y99 0.0723***  0.0713***  0.0745***  0.0677***  -0.0231*  -0.0231*  -0.0215  -0.0214  0.0429*  0.0436*  0.0379*  0.0391*  
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Y20 0.0550***  0.0537***  0.0561***  0.0477***  -0.0278*  -0.0273*  -0.0259*  -0.0254*  0.0201  0.0206  0.0131  0.0138  
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
R2 0.100  0.108  0.103  0.113  0.136  0.152  0.136  0.152  0.155  0.164  0.164  0.177  
Adjusted R2 0.098  0.105  0.101  0.110  0.131  0.146  0.130  0.145  0.152  0.159  0.159  0.172  
Partial F test  57.27***  24.02***  98.61***   55.87***  1.49  57.25***   70.531***  70.600***  77.384***  
F 46.10*** 38.13*** 38.19*** 32.54*** 29.38*** 25.43*** 23.56*** 21.40*** 41.41*** 33.59*** 35.30*** 30.95*** 
Regression SS 25.74 27.73 26.58 29.14 14.95 16.70 15.00 16.74 21.65 22.81 22.86 24.69 
Residual MS 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
df         18 23               22              27       16  21               20               25       17 22               21             26 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Significance: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   The figures in parentheses are standard errors.    
    Model 1 = Financial Model, Model 2 = Business Strategy Model, Model 3 = Corporate Governance Model; and Model 4 = the Integrated Model. 
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The first data set to be discussed is the joint data set of SZXSHX. A summary of 
the modelling appears in Table 6.2a, below, and shows that, using the statistical 
parameters of the adjusted R2, the model F statistic and the partial F test which 
shows model improvement, all four models are statistically robust, although some 
of the parameters – model R2 are at the lower end of the acceptable range. 
Table 6.2a:  Model Fit of the OLS Method Using ARCDTA as the 
Dependent Variable - SZXSHX 
 Adj R2 Change in Adj 




Model 1: Financial Variables  0.0980  46.1000  
Model 2: Business Strategy Variables 0.1050 0.0070 38.1300 57.2700 
Model 3: Corporate Governance Variables 0.1010 0.0030 38.1900 24.0200 
Model 4: All Variables 0.1100 0.0120 32.5400 98.6100 
Note: The result in Table 6.2a and following tables 6.2b to 6.2g are extracted from Table 6.2.  
 
The adjusted R2 of Model 1 is 0.098 with an F-statistic of 46.10 (df=1, 18, p<0.01) 
implying the impact of financial variables on capital structure is significant but 
relatively small. Relative to Model 1, Model 2 improves the adjusted R2 of Model 2 
to 0.105 with a partial F-statistic of 57.27 (df=18, 23, p<0.01) evidencing the 
impact of business strategy variables on capital structure. Again relative to Model 
1, Model 3 improves the adjusted R2 to 0.101 with a partial F-statistic of 24.02 
(df=18, 22, p<0.01) showing the impact of corporate governance variables on 
capital structure. When all factors are considered, Model 4 improves the adjusted 
R2 to 0.11 with a partial F-statistic of 98.61 (df=18, 27, p<0.01). When a model is 
increased to cover more explanatory variables, it would be normally expected that 
the model has a higher R2. The signs and significance of the coefficients in Model 
4 do not change relative to other models. 
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The model fit parameters in both LDE and ARCDTA dependent variables are low 
in the joint data set. This is an acceptable result which normally occurs in a very 
large data set. Relatively speaking, however, compared with the case of LDE 
dependent variable for the joint data set of SZXSHX, the adjusted R2 is even 
lower in the case of ARCDTA dependent variable for the same set of data. 
Despite this lower explanatory power, other model parameters such as change in 
adjuted R2, F statistic and partial F test statistic are higher in the case of 
ARCDTA dependent variable than LDE dependent variable, continuing to show a 
consistent improvement of the models relative to Model 1.  
When the data set is split into two market-based data sets, the adjusted R2 
improves. (The results of modelling for individual data sets are discussed in  
sections to follow.) 
The second data set to be reported is the SZX data set. A summary of the 
modelling of the SZX data set is displayed in Table 6.2b, below. The modelling 
shows the same pattern of capital structure determinants that occurs in the case 
of LDE dependent variable. Model 2 and Model 4 improve model fit relative to 
Model, 1 but Model 3 is no improvement over Model 1. 
Table 6.2b: Model Fit of the OLS Method Using ARCDTA as the 
Dependent Variable - SZX 








Model 1: Financial Variables  0.1310  29.3800  
Model 2: Business Strategy Variables 0.1460 0.0150 25.4300 55.8700 
Model 3: Corporate Governance Variables 0.1300 -0.0010 23.5600 1.4900 
Model 4: All Variables 0.1450 0.0140 21.4000 57.2500 
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The adjusted R2 of Model 1 is 0.131 with an F-statistic of 29.38 (df=1, 16, 
p<0.01).  Compared with Model 1, Model 2 improves the adjusted R2 to 0.146 
with a partial F-statistic of 55.87 (df=16, 21, p<0.01). However, Model 3 does not 
improve the adjusted R2 at all and does not pass the test of the partial F-statistic 
of 1.49 (df=16, 20, p<0.30). The adjusted R2 of Model 4 is increased to 0.145 with 
a partial F-statistic of 57.25 (df=16, 25, p<0.01). 
Compared with the case of LDE dependent variable, the statistical parameters of 
model fit are lower in the case of ARCDTA for the same data set of SZX. 
However, the pattern of model improvement remains the same. The impact of 
financial and strategy variables is detected in Model 1, Model 2 and Model 4. The 
impact of the governance variables is not evidenced in Model 3. It is also 
normally expected that Model 4 improves model fit the most as it covers more 
explanatory variables. There is no change in the signs and the significance of the 
coefficients.  
The third data set to be reported is the SHX data set. A summary of the modelling 
of this data set is displayed in Table 6.2c, below. The modelling shows that all 
four models are robust. 
Table 6.2c: Model Fit of the OLS Method Using ARCDTA as the 
Dependent Variable - SHX 
 Adj R2 Change in Adj 




Model 1: Financial Variables  0.1520  41.4100  
Model 2: Business Strategy Variables 0.1590 0.0070 33.5900 70.5310 
Model 3: Corporate Governance Variables 0.1590 0.0070 35.3000 70.6000 
Model 4: All Variables 0.1720 0.0200 30.9500 77.3840 
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The adjusted R2 of Model 1 is 0.152 with an F-statistic of 41.41 (df=1, 17, 
p<0.01). Compared with Model 1, the adjusted R2 of Model 2 is increased to 
0.159 with a partial F-statistic 70.531 (df=17, 22, p<0.01), the adjusted R2 of 
Model 3 is increased to 0.159 with a partial F-statistic of 70.60 (df=17, 21, 
p<0.01), and the adjusted R2 of Model 4 is increased to 0.172 with a partial F-
statistic of 77.384 (df=17, 26, p<0.01). Model 4 fits the data set the most as its 
model R2 of 0.172 is the highest among all models. The signs and the 
significance of coefficients are not changed in Model 4 when compared with other 
models. Compared with the case of LDE dependent variable, the model fit 
statistics are higher in terms of the adjusted R2, F-statistic and partial F-statistic in 
the case of ARCDTA. 
The modelling of the three data sets as discussed above shows once again that 
the integrated model (Model 4) provides the best overall explanation of the nature 
of capital structure. It improves the model fit in relation to all three previous 
models and has R2 of 0.11 for the joint data set of SZXSHX, R2 of 0.145 for the 
SZX data set and R2 of 0.172 for the SHX data set. Model 4 of the SHX data set 
provides the greatest explanatory power. The R2 of the SZX data set is smaller 
than that of the SHX data set because Model 3 is not significant in the SZX data 
set. The R2 of the joint data set of SZXSHX is smaller than those of the SZX data 
set and the SHX data set, and this is normally expected when the data set gets 
larger with a smaller R2. The joint data set is much larger than these two 
individual market-based data sets.  
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6.3.2. The Influence of Explanatory Variables on Capital Structure 
Following the discussion in the previous section on the model fit across three 
data sets, this section reports on the significance of coefficients on financial, 
strategy and governance variables on the basis of the best fit model (Model 4) in 
each of three data sets. 
6.3.2.1. The Influence of Financial Variables on Capital Structure 
The discussion on the significance of financial variables in all three data sets is 
based on Table 6.2d, below. 
Table 6.2d:  The Influence of Financial Variables on Capital Structure:  
Using the OLS Method with LDE as the Dependent Variable  



























TXER H1.1 Sig.+ Sig.+ Sig.+ Sig.+ Sig.,+ Sig.,+ Sig.,+ Sig.,+ Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
PROF H1.2 Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - Sig. - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - 
SIZE H1.3 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - 
GROW H1.4 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
TANG H1.5         Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
CAPI H1.6 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
RISK H1.7 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., -     
DURA H1.8     Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., +     
Note: Significance: p<0.05 
The first data set to be reported is the joint data set of SZXSHX. Using the 
ARCDTA dependent variable, the modelling of the joint data set of SZXSHX 
shows most of the same significant financial variables as evidenced in the case of 
the LDE dependent variable. In Model 4, the coefficients are significant for six of 
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the eight financial variables (Table 6.2d). Tax, growth, and capital intensity are 
positively related and risk is negatively related to the capital structure as 
predicted by trade-off theory. Profitability and size are negatively related to the 
capital structure as predicted by pecking order theory. The use of the ARCDTA 
dependent variable improves the significance of risk variable. It was not 
significant in the case of the LDE dependent variable and becomes significant in 
the case of the ARCDTA dependent variable. Tangibility and duration remain 
insignificant. The values of all coefficients are displayed in Table 6.2, on p. 210. 
The second data set to be reported is the SZX data set. Using the ARCDTA 
dependent variable, the modelling of the SZX data set shows mostly the same 
significant financial variables as evidenced in the case of the LDE dependent 
variable. In Model 4, the coefficients are significant for seven of the eight financial 
variables (Table 6.2d). As predicted by trade-off theory, tax, growth, capital 
intensity and duration are positively related and risk is negatively related to the 
capital structure. Profitability and size are negatively related to the capital 
structure as predicted by pecking order theory. The use of the ARCDTA 
dependent variable improves the significance of duration variable in terms of 
changing its sign from negative to positive which is consistent with trade-off 
theory. Tangibility remains insignificant. The values of all coefficients are 
displayed in Table 6.2, on p. 210. 
The third data set to be reported is the SHX data set. Using the ARCDTA 
dependent variable, the modelling of the SHX data set shows the same 
significant financial variables as evidenced in the case of the LDE dependent 
variable. In Model 4, the coefficients are significant for six of the eight financial 
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variables (Table 6.2d, p. 215). As predicted by trade-off theory, tax, growth, 
tangibility and capital intensity are positively related to the capital structure. 
Profitability and size are negatively related to the capital structure as predicted by 
pecking order theory. The use of the ARCDTA dependent variable improves the 
significance of the tangibility variable in terms of changing the sign of its 
coefficient from negative to positive, which is now consistent with trade-off theory. 
Risk and duration remain insignificant. The values of all coefficients are displayed 
in Table 6.2, on p. 210. 
The above-discussed results on the significance of coefficients in financial 
variables through the modelling of three data sets using ARCDTA as the 
dependent variable lead to the same findings (Table 6.2e, below) as evidenced in 
the case of LDE in section 6.2.2.1.  
 
Table 6.2e:  The Influence of Financial Variables in Model 4 on Capital Structure: 
Using the OLS Method with ARCDTA as the Dependent Variable 









TXER H1.1 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
PROF H1.2 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - 
SIZE H1.3 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - 
GROW H1.4 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
TANG H1.5   Sig., + 
CAPI H1.6 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
RISK H1.7 Sig., - Sig., -  
DURA H1.8  Sig., +  




The modelling using both the LDE and ARCDTA dependent variables produce 
the same five common financial determinants of capital structure across three 
data sets: 
• Tax rate, growth and capital intensity remain positively related to capital 
structure. 
• Profit and size remain negatively related to capital structure. 
The modelling using the ARCDTA dependent variable improves the significance 
of the following three determinants over the modelling using the LDE dependent 
variable: 
• Risk variable becomes significant and is negatively related to capital 
structure in the joint data set of SZXSHX. 
• Duration variable changes the sign of its coefficient from negative to 
positive in the SZX data set, which is now consistent with trade-off theory. 
• Tangibility variable changes the sign of its coefficient from negative to 
positive in the SHX data set, which is now consistent with trade-off theory. 
Overall, the modelling using the ARCDTA dependent variable identifies and 
confirms the same five financial determinants as the modelling using the LDE 
dependent variable and improves the significance of the risk, duration and 
tangibility variables. However these three variables are not consistently significant 
across the three data sets, and therefore are not regarded as common capital 
structure determinants of Chinese listed companies. 
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6.3.2.2. The Influence of Business Strategy Variables on Capital Structure 
The discussion on the significance of business strategy variables across the three 
data sets is based on the data presented in Table 6.2f, below. 
Table 6.2f: The Influence of Business Strategy Variables on Capital Structure: 
Using the OLS Method with LDE as the Dependent Variable 




Model 2 Model 4 Model 2 Model 4 Model 2 Model 4
PROD1 H2.1  
PROD2 H2.2 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., +
PROD3 H2.3 Sig., + Sig., +  Sig., + Sig., +
PROD4 H2.4 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
ASSET1 H2.5  
ASSET2 H2.6 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., -
ASSET3 H2.7 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., -
Note: Significance: p<0.05 
 
In the modelling of the joint data set of SZXSHX, the use of the ARCDTA 
dependent variable presents the same set of results as the use of LDE, and the 
capital structure is positive related to PROD2, PROD3 and PROD4 and 
negatively related to ASSET2 and ASSET3.   
The modelling of the SZX data set shows that PROD2 and PROD4 remain 
significant with predicted signs of their coefficients, but PROD3 is no longer 
significant when the ARCDTA dependent variable is used, and ASSET2 and 
ASSET3 remain significant with predicted signs of their coefficients when the 
ARCDTA dependent variable is used.  
The modelling of the SHX data set shows that PROD2 and PROD3 remain 
significant with predicted signs of their coefficients, and ASSET3 remain 
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significant with predicted sign of its coefficient, and ASSET2 becomes significant 
with predicted sign of its coefficient when the ARCDTA dependent variable is 
used. 
The modelling of the three data sets shows that the use of the ARCDTA 
dependent variable improves the significance of the ASSET2 variable in the SHX 
data set, but it reduces the significance of the PROD3 variable in the SZX data 
set. Despite these two changes, the use of the ARCDTA dependent variable does 
not change the overall pattern of the capital structure determinants of the Chinese 
listed companies. The listed companies in both SZX and SHX markets are related 
to product diversity and asset specificity. 
6.3.2.3. The Influence of Corporate Governance Variables on Capital 
Structure 
The discussion on the significance of corporate governance variables is based on 
the data presented in Table 6.2g, below. 
Table 6.2g:  The Influence of Corporate Governance Variables on Capital 
Structure: Using the OLS Method with LDE as the Dependent Variable  
 SZXSHX SZX SHX 
Time-Varying 
Variables Hypotheses Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4 
GOV H3.1 Sig., + Sig., +   Sig., + Sig., + 
GOVL H3.2 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., + Sig., + Sig., - Sig., - 
EQU1 H3.3 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
EQU10 H3.4 Sig., - Sig., -   Sig., - Sig., - 




In the modelling of the joint data set of SZXSHX, the use of the ARCDTA 
dependent variable presents the same set of results on the significance of 
governance variables as the use of LDE. The capital structure is positive related 
to government ownership (GOV) and the ownership of the largest shareholder 
(EQU1), and negatively to legal person ownership (GOVL) and the ownership by 
the ten largest shareholders (EQU10).   
The modelling of the SZX data set shows that the use of the ARCDTA dependent 
variable improves slightly on the significance of legal person ownership (GOVL) 
and the ownership of the largest shareholder (EQU1), despite the poor model fit 
discussed earlier (section 6.3.1). The positive sign of coefficient of GOVL is not 
consistent with the agency cost theory. The significance of coefficients of these 
two variables is at low level of 5%. In general, the capital structure of listed 
companies in SZX market is not related to governance variables. 
The modelling of the SHX data set shows that the use of ARCDTA dependent 
variable produces the same results as in the use of LDE dependent variable. The 
capital structure of listed companies is positively related to government ownership 
(GOV) and ownership by the largest shareholder (EQU1) as predicted by the 
agency cost theory in relation to equity and negatively related to legal person 
ownership (GOVL) and ownership by the largest ten shareholders (EQU10) as 
predicted by the agency cost theory in relation to debt. 
The modelling of the three data sets shows that the use of the ARCDTA 
dependent variable does not change the significance and the signs of coefficients 
in corporate governance variables for the SHX data set, despite some small 
improvement for the SZX data set, however, with a poor model fit.  
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6.3.3. Conclusion on the Influence of Financial, Strategy and Governance 
Variables on Capital Structure 
Referring to the six dot points on the findings in the case of the LDE dependent 
variable discussed earlier (section 6.2.3), the modelling of the three data sets 
using the ARCDTA dependent variable does not alter the model fit and the 
significance of coefficients in the financial, business and governance variables. 
The conclusions established in the modelling using the LDE dependent variable 
(section 6.2.3) are consistent with the modelling using the ARCHDTA dependent 
variable as follows:  
1. The integrated model (Model 4) remains the best fit model in each set of 
the three data sets. Although the adjusted R2 of Model 4 is lower in the 
case of the ARCDTA dependent variable than in the case of the LDE 
dependent variable for the joint data set of SZXSHX and the SZX data 
set, the adjusted R2 of Model 4 is higher for the SHX data set. As far as 
the model fit is concerned, the modelling of the three data sets using 
both the LDE and ARCDTA dependent variables have produced the 
same result. 
2. Although the modelling of the three data sets using the ARCDTA 
dependent variable improves on the significance of coefficients in risk, 
duration and tangibility, these three variables are only significant in one 
of the three data sets. The conclusion on the five common financial 
determinants (tax rate, growth, capital intensity with positive signs of 
their coefficients and profit and size with negative signs of their 
coefficients) of capital structure remains valid in the modelling of three 
data sets using the ARCDTA dependent variable. 
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3. The modelling of the three data sets using the ARCDTA dependent 
variable does not change the finding on the significance and signs of 
coefficients in business strategy variables, despite two minor changes in 
the significance of ASSET3 in the SHX data set and the significance of 
PROD3 in the SZX data set. The capital structure of Chinese listed 
companies, particularly in SZX market, is positively related to product 
diversification and negatively related to asset specificity. 
4. The modelling of the three data sets using the ARCDTA dependent 
variable does not change the finding on the significance and signs of 
coefficients in business strategy variables, despite a small improvement 
for the SZX data set. The capital structure of listed companies on the 
SZX market is not related to the governance variables and the capital 
structure of listed companies on the SHX market is related to the 
governance variables. 
5. The significance of year dummy variables remains supportive of the 
finding on the path-dependent effect on the choice of capital structure of 
the Chinese listed companies. 
6. The significance of market dummy variables remains in support of the 
finding on the difference in the pattern of the capital structure 
determinants between the Shenzhen market and the Shanghai market. 
The modelling of the three data sets using both the LDE and the ARCHDTA 
dependent variables confirms the findings in sections 6.2.3 and 6.3.3 that the 
capital structure of Chinese listed companies is related to the five common 
financial determinants in both SZX and SHX markets, product diversity and asset 
specificity particularly in the SZX market, and ownership structure and ownership 
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concentration only in the SHX market. There will be a discussion of the 
implications of these results for the Chinese context in section 6.5, where the 
presentation of overall results is will be finalised.  
6.4. Results of LMM Method Using both LDE and ARCHDTA as Dependent 
Variables 
The discussion in this section is based on Table 6.3 (p. 226) and Table 6.4  
(p. 227). For the convenience of referring the results to the discussion in each 
sub-sections, the summaries of these results are displayed in break-down tables 
named as Table 6.3a, Table 6.3b, and Table 6.4a, Table 6.4b, etc. Table 6.3 and 
Table 6.4 are master tables that present the overall results of modelling using the 
LMM method with LDE as the Dependent Variable (Table 6.3) and using the LMM 
method with ARCDTA as dependent variable (Table 6.4).  
Following the discussion on the modelling of the three data sets using the OLS 
method with the LDE dependent variable (section 6.2) and the modelling using 
the OLS method with the ARCDTA dependent variable (section 6.3), it was found 
that the modelling using either LDE or ARCDTA produces the same result. For 
the convenience of clarity in representation, the modelling using the LMM method 
with both LDE and ARCDTA dependent variables is discussed in this section. 
This section examines the goodness of model fit of modelling using LMM with 
both LDE and ARCDTA as the dependent variables and reports the statistical 
significance of the coefficients in the best fit model in each of three data sets.  
As discussed in Chapter Four, the significant difference between the OLS method 
and the LMM method is that OLS does not consider the effect of the correlated 
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error structure (i.e., the repeated measures effect), nor separates fixed effect and 
random effect whilst LMM does all of this. To demonstrate if LMM improves 
model fit, the Hox procedure (see Chapter Five is used to report the results.  
The results on the -2 Restricted Log Likelihood in each of the steps in the Hox 
procedure are listed in Table 6.3a (p. 229) and Table 6.4a (p. 230) for the joint 
data set of SZXSHX, Table 6.3b (p. 232) and Table 6.4b (p. 233 for the SZX data 
set, and Table 6.3c (p.235) and Table 6.4c (p. 236) for the SHX data set. 
In these tables, ‘change in FIFS from Model 1’ stands for the difference in the 
fixed effect in comparison with Model 1; ‘change in RIRS from Model1’ stands for 
the difference in the fixed and random effects in comparison with Model 1. ‘RIRF-
FIFS’ stands for the difference between the fixed effect and the fixed and random 
effects at each level of models.  The model fit is tested by the maximum likelihood 
ratio (χ2 of ‘change in FIFS from Model 1’ or ‘change in RIRS from Model 1’) 
against the critical value of χ2 with degrees of freedom. The smaller, the -2 
Restricted Log Likelihood, the greater, the significance of the model fit between 
each step of the Hox procedure. For example, Model 0b has a better model fit 
than Model 0a after taking into account the repeated measures effect because χ2 
of 3,900.33 is above the critical value at degree of freedom of 1. This means that 
Model 0b is significantly different from Model 0a. The overall results on the 
significance of coefficients are displayed in Table 6.3 and 6.4, overleaf. The 
discussion on the significance of coefficients will be based on these two tables.  
 
 Table 6.3: Results of LMM Method Using LDE as Dependent Variable 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 SZXSHX         SZX         SHX        
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 fe re fe re fe re fe re fe re fe re fe re fe re fe re fe re fe re fe re 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
(Constant) -0.4415***  -0.4968***  -0.4392***  -0.4965***  -0.3883***  -0.3630***  -0.3820***  -0.3631***  -0.6158***  -0.5569***  -0.6075***  -0.5646***  -0.6540**  -0.6190**  -0.6340**  -0.6112**  -0.2402***  0.0994  -0.2315***  0.0270  -0.0855  0.2475  -0.0929  0.1676  
 (0.058) (0.062) (0.061) (0.065) (0.139) (0.141) (0.139) (0.141) (0.084) (0.086) (0.089) (0.093) (0.188) (0.195) (0.189) (0.197) (0.081) (0.087) (0.085) (0.086) (0.261) (0.260) (0.261) (0.250) 
TXER 0.1179***  0.1748***  0.1179***  0.1753***  0.1253***  0.1754***  0.1248***  0.1757***  0.0743*  0.0915**  0.0743*  0.0913**  0.0823**  0.0943**  0.0824**  0.0931**  0.1188***  0.2899***  0.1187***  0.2672***  0.1249***  0.2833***  0.1249***  0.2655***  
 (0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.026) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.026) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.026) (0.036) (0.026) (0.034) (0.027) (0.037) (0.027) (0.034) 
PROF -0.0389  -0.0310  -0.0391  -0.0280  -0.0391  -0.0272  -0.0406  -0.0292  -0.0695  -0.0585  -0.0656  -0.0487  -0.0787  -0.0613  -0.0750  -0.0470  0.2694***  0.6231***  0.2607***  0.6390***  0.4370***  0.6154***  0.4295***  0.6378***  
 (0.040) (0.079) (0.040) (0.079) (0.041) (0.079) (0.041) (0.080) (0.049) (0.108) (0.049) (0.109) (0.049) (0.107) (0.049) (0.109) (0.076) (0.115) (0.076) (0.105) (0.084) (0.117) (0.084) (0.105) 
SIZE -0.0456***  -0.0564***  -0.0453***  -0.0558***  -0.0392***  -0.0562***  -0.0393***  -0.0565***  -0.0322*  -0.0495**  -0.0305*  -0.0455**  -0.0341*  -0.0487**  -0.0325*  -0.0454**  -0.0718***  -0.0781***  -0.0748***  -0.0734***  -0.0600***  -0.0816***  -0.0626***  -0.0732***  
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) 
GROW 0.0960***  0.1094***  0.0943***  0.1079***  0.0958***  0.1117***  0.0947***  0.1113***  0.0986***  0.1067***  0.0951***  0.1028***  0.0987***  0.1063***  0.0955***  0.1030***  0.0966***  0.0883***  0.0986***  0.0859***  0.1008***  0.0914***  0.1023***  0.0878***  
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) 
TANG -0.0008  -0.0010  -0.0008  -0.0010  -0.0006  -0.0010  -0.0008  -0.0011  0.0014  0.0013  0.0015  0.0012  0.0016  0.0013  0.0016  0.0013  -0.0775***  -0.5296***  -0.0775***  -0.4892***  -0.1023***  -0.5296***  -0.1022***  -0.4881***  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.026) (0.009) (0.024) (0.010) (0.026) (0.010) (0.024) 
CAPI 0.0075***  0.0103***  0.0074***  0.0103***  0.0076***  0.0105***  0.0076***  0.0106***  0.0073***  0.0077***  0.0071***  0.0075***  0.0073***  0.0077***  0.0072***  0.0076***  0.0095***  0.0122***  0.0098***  0.0115***  0.0107***  0.0128***  0.0110***  0.0116***  
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
RISK -0.0061  -0.0091  -0.0060  -0.0088  -0.0063  -0.0092  -0.0057  -0.0086  -0.0238*  -0.0595**  -0.0226*  -0.0588**  -0.0255*  -0.0611**  -0.0244*  -0.0599**  0.0223  0.0153  0.0218  -0.0008  0.0074  0.0150  0.0070  -0.0007  
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012) (0.019) (0.012) (0.019) (0.024) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) (0.024) 
DURA 0.0014  0.0057  0.0014  0.0059  0.0010  0.0050  0.0013  0.0053  0.0157**  0.0178**  0.0123*  0.0155**  0.0165**  0.0180**  0.0130*  0.0154*  -0.0016  -0.0065  -0.0009  -0.0038  -0.0023  -0.0054  -0.0021  -0.0037  
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
PROD1(reference dummy variable)                         
PROD2   0.0322  0.0350    0.0337  0.0367    0.0044  0.0123    0.0043  0.0126    0.0308  0.0561*    0.0433  0.0610*  
   (0.028) (0.029)   (0.029) (0.030)   (0.038) (0.041)   (0.039) (0.041)   (0.041) (0.039)   (0.041) (0.040) 
PROD3   0.0131  0.0134    0.0067  0.0100    0.0496  0.0548*    0.0498  0.0550*    0.0373  0.0548*    0.0496  0.0598*  
   (0.025) (0.026)   (0.025) (0.026)   (0.035) (0.037)   (0.035) (0.038)   (0.034) (0.033)   (0.034) (0.034) 
PROD4   0.0371  0.0340    0.0351**  0.0303**    0.0595*  0.0516*    0.0601***  0.0521**    0.0025  0.0277    0.0093  0.0315  
   (0.023) (0.024)   (0.023) (0.024)   (0.032) (0.035)   (0.033) (0.035)   (0.031) (0.031)   (0.032) (0.031) 
ASSET1(reference dummy variable)                         
ASSET2   -0.0114  -0.0103    -0.0116  -0.0062    -0.0661***  -0.0599**    -0.0631***  -0.0573***    -0.0577***  -0.0297    -0.0503***  -0.0292  
   (0.020) (0.021)   (0.020) (0.021)   (0.028) (0.029)   (0.028) (0.029)   (0.028) (0.028)   (0.029) (0.029) 
ASSET3   -0.0467***  -0.0360*    -0.0518***  -0.0389*    -0.1006***  -0.0869***    -0.0980***  -0.0850***    -0.0068  -0.0073    -0.0012  -0.0047  
   (0.021) (0.022)   (0.021) (0.022)   (0.031) (0.033)   (0.032) (0.033)   (0.028) (0.027)   (0.028) (0.027) 
GOV     0.0160  0.0126  0.0145  0.0114      0.0191  0.0187  0.0185  0.0182      0.0063  0.1041**  0.0095  0.0545  
     (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)     (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)     (0.066) (0.059) (0.066) (0.060) 
GOVL     -0.0518  -0.0472  -0.0422  -0.0399      -0.0528  -0.0535  -0.0508  -0.0526      -0.0028  -0.0610  0.0066  -0.0222  
     (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041)     (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)     (0.125) (0.121) (0.125) (0.119) 
EQU1     0.0952*  0.1176*  0.1026*  0.1220*      0.0367  0.0130  0.0388  0.0186      0.1253*  0.1276*  0.1184*  0.1097*  
     (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) (0.073)     (0.107) (0.114) (0.106) (0.113)     (0.098) (0.103) (0.098) (0.095) 
EQU10     -0.0063  -0.0038  -0.0109  -0.0073      -0.0363  -0.0103  -0.0340  -0.0106      -0.0109  -0.0067  -0.0250  -0.0115  
     (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)     (0.050) (0.054) (0.050) (0.054)     (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.046) 
market -0.0214***  -0.0222***  -0.0264***  -0.0242***  -0.0254***  -0.0262***  -0.0274***  -0.0282***                  
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)                 
Y91(reference dummy variable)                         
Y92 0.0017  -0.0341  0.0014  -0.0338  -0.0018  -0.0311  0.0037          -0.0272          -0.0050  0.0283  -0.0059  0.0526**  0.0124  0.0339  0.0115  0.0596*  
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036)          (0.035)         (0.042) (0.034) (0.042) (0.037) (0.043) (0.035) (0.043) (0.038) 
Y93 0.0513  0.0169  0.0506  0.0169  0.0409  0.0194  0.0431           0.0217  0.3185**  0.2498**  0.3182**  0.2561**  0.2744**  0.2515**  0.2735**  0.2551**  0.0214  0.0630***  0.0200  0.0785***  0.0259  0.0680***  0.0249  0.0849***  
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)          (0.029) (0.093) (0.099) (0.093) (0.099) (0.098) (0.099) (0.098) (0.099) (0.038) (0.031) (0.038) (0.034) (0.039) (0.032) (0.039) (0.034) 
Y94 0.1040***  0.1102***  0.1032***  0.1099***  0.1234***  0.1115***  0.1220***       0.1113***  0.1660***  0.1533***  0.1648***  0.1565***  0.1650***  0.1555***  0.1638***  0.1566***  0.0396  0.1132***  0.0380  0.1193***  0.0700***  0.1198***  0.0690***  0.1251***  
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)          (0.022) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.033) (0.026) (0.033) (0.029) (0.034) (0.027) (0.034) (0.029) 
Y95 0.1710***  0.1744***  0.1705***  0.1741***  0.1862***  0.1758***  0.1849***       0.1755***  0.1957***  0.1873***  0.1942***  0.1889***  0.1962***  0.1890***  0.1948***  0.1897***  0.1253***  0.1478***  0.1242***  0.1545***  0.1526***  0.1550***  0.1522***  0.1603***  
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022)          (0.020) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.031) (0.024) (0.031) (0.027) (0.032) (0.025) (0.032) (0.027) 
Y96 0.1734***  0.1767***  0.1731***  0.1766***  0.1896***  0.1775***  0.1887***       0.1772***  0.2024***  0.1877***  0.2012***  0.1892***  0.2007***  0.1890***  0.1996***  0.1895***  0.1190***  0.1120***  0.1181***  0.1215***  0.1485***  0.1190***  0.1481***  0.1270***  
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)          (0.019) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.029) (0.023) (0.029) (0.026) (0.030) (0.024) (0.030) (0.026) 
Y97 0.0899***  0.0867***  0.0896***  0.0866***  0.0985***  0.0874***  0.0980***       0.0872***  0.1047***  0.0917***  0.1037***  0.0914***  0.1037***  0.0918***  0.1028***  0.0919***  0.0502***  0.0169  0.0496***  0.0262  0.0643***  0.0239  0.0640***  0.0315*  
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)          (0.017) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.024) 
Y98 0.0778***  0.0690***  0.0777***  0.0688***  0.0840***  0.0696***  0.0843***       0.0698***  0.0781***  0.0684***  0.0776***  0.0696***  0.0800***  0.0695***  0.0796***  0.0696***  0.0786***  0.1209***  0.0784***  0.1207***  0.0865***  0.1208***  0.0864***  0.1211***  
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)   (0.014) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) 
Y99 0.0488***  0.0405***  0.0488***  0.0403***  0.0515***  0.0411***  0.0521***    0.0414***  0.0477***  0.0376***  0.0472*  0.0379*  0.0470**  0.0384**  0.0465**  0.0382**  0.0491***  0.0456***  0.0491***  0.0483***  0.0533***  0.0460***  0.0534***  0.0486***  
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)   (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) 
Y20 0.0200**  0.0170**  0.0201**  0.0169  0.0221*  0.0171  0.0228    0.0176  0.0110  0.0069  0.0106  0.0074  0.0098  0.0069  0.0094  0.0068  0.0286*  0.0151  0.0286***  0.0171  0.0326***  0.0153  0.0327***  0.0172  
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)   (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________) 
Significance: *** P<0.001, ** P<0.01, * P<0.05 
 Table 6.4: Results of LMM Method Using ARCDTA as Dependent Variable 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 SZXSHX        SZX        SHX        
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   Model 4  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 fe re fe re fe re fe re fe re fe re fe re fe re fe re fe re fe re fe re 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
(Constant) 0.5628  0.5301  0.5617  0.5282  0.6067  0.6092  0.6076  0.6062  0.4685  0.4908  0.4727  0.4847  0.4545  0.4659  0.4653  0.4662  0.6710  0.8316  0.6718  0.8203  0.7726  0.9420  0.7680  0.9371  
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.072) (0.043) (0.045) (0.046) (0.048) (0.098) (0.101) (0.098) (0.102) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.132) (0.127) (0.132) (0.128) 
TXER 0.0632***  0.0930***  0.0632***  0.0932***  0.0666***  0.0931***  0.0665***  0.0933***  0.0416*  0.0503**  0.0415*  0.0495**  0.0452**  0.0502**  0.0452**  0.0497**  0.0643***  0.1453***  0.0642***  0.1445***  0.0675***  0.1445***  0.0675***  0.1437***  
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) 
PROF -0.0123  0.0240  -0.0124  0.0250  -0.0095  0.0259  -0.0102  0.0248  -0.0380  -0.0262  -0.0360  -0.0182  -0.0413  -0.0249  -0.0393  -0.0171  0.1630***  0.3729***  0.1595***  0.3713***  0.2599***  0.3691***  0.2569***  0.3682***  
 (0.019) (0.037) (0.019) (0.037) (0.020) (0.037) (0.020) (0.037) (0.025) (0.057) (0.025) (0.058) (0.025) (0.057) (0.025) (0.058) (0.035) (0.050) (0.035) (0.050) (0.039) (0.050) (0.039) (0.050) 
SIZE -0.0254***  -0.0297***  -0.0252***  -0.0293***  -0.0220***  -0.0296***  -0.0220***  -0.0296***  -0.0186*  -0.0267**  -0.0177*  -0.0248**  -0.0194*  -0.0264**  -0.0186*  -0.0247**  -0.0386***  -0.0372***  -0.0399***  -0.0381***  -0.0313***  -0.0375***  -0.0324***  -0.0382***  
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
GROW 0.0502***  0.0565***  0.0493***  0.0557***  0.0501***  0.0575***  0.0495***  0.0572***  0.0522***  0.0563***  0.0505***  0.0543***  0.0521***  0.0562***  0.0505***  0.0543***  0.0493***  0.0411***  0.0500***  0.0411***  0.0510***  0.0419***  0.0515***  0.0419***  
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
TANG -0.0005  -0.0007  -0.0005  -0.0007  -0.0004  -0.0008  -0.0005  -0.0008  0.0007  0.0006  0.0007  0.0005  0.0007  0.0007  0.0008  0.0006  -0.0410***  -0.2672***  -0.0409***  -0.2672***  -0.0538***  -0.2670***  -0.0537***  -0.2669***  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012) 
CAPI 0.0039***  0.0054***  0.0039***  0.0054***  0.0039***  0.0055***  0.0039***  0.0055***  0.0039***  0.0041***  0.0038***  0.0040***  0.0039***  0.0041***  0.0038***  0.0040***  0.0049***  0.0051*  0.0051***  0.0051*  0.0054***  0.0051*  0.0055***  0.0052*  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
RISK -0.0033  -0.0091  -0.0033  -0.0089  -0.0033  -0.0093  -0.0031  -0.0088  -0.0144*  -0.0343**  -0.0138*  -0.0335**  -0.0151*  -0.0346**  -0.0146*  -0.0339**  0.0135  0.0125  0.0133  0.0127  0.0056  0.0133  0.0055  0.0134  
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) 
DURA 0.0009  0.0027  0.0010  0.0028  0.0009  0.0025  0.0010  0.0027  0.0085**  0.0102**  0.0069*  0.0091**  0.0091**  0.0105**  0.0074*  0.0093**  -0.0007  -0.0027  -0.0003  -0.0023  -0.0008  -0.0022  -0.0007  -0.0019  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
PROD1(reference dummy variable) 
PROD2   0.0189  0.0206    0.0195  0.0214    0.0036  0.0091    0.0034  0.0094    0.0183  0.0332    0.0245  0.0354  
   (0.015) (0.015)   (0.015) (0.016)   (0.020) (0.022)   (0.020) (0.022)   (0.021) (0.021)   (0.022) (0.021) 
PROD3   0.0046  0.0061    0.0150*  0.0430**    0.0259  0.0279    0.0260  0.0279    0.0239  0.0290    0.0300*  0.0315*  
   (0.013) (0.014)   (0.013) (0.014)   (0.018) (0.019)   (0.018) (0.020)   (0.018) (0.018)   (0.018) (0.018) 
PROD4   0.0170  0.0157    0.0162  0.0139    0.0292*  0.0227*    0.0297*  0.0229*    0.0040  0.0173    0.0070  0.0189  
   (0.012) (0.012)   (0.012) (0.012)   (0.017) (0.018)   (0.017) (0.018)   (0.016) (0.017)   (0.017) (0.017) 
ASSET1(reference dummy variable)                         
ASSET2   -0.0059  -0.0064    -0.0059  -0.0044    -0.0325*  -0.0304*    -0.0311*  -0.0297*    -0.0019  -0.0011    -0.0029  -0.0001  
   (0.011) (0.011)   (0.011) (0.011)   (0.014) (0.015)   (0.015) (0.015)   (0.015) (0.015)   (0.015) (0.015) 
ASSET3   -0.0251*  -0.0204*    -0.0280*  -0.0220*    -0.0514**  -0.0468**    -0.0500**  -0.0461**    -0.0282  -0.0123    -0.0247  -0.0116  
   (0.011) (0.011)   (0.011) (0.011)   (0.016) (0.017)   (0.017) (0.017)   (0.015) (0.015)   (0.015) (0.015) 
GOV     0.0237  0.0230  0.0045  0.0039      0.0070  0.0066  0.0067  0.0063      0.0029  0.0360  0.0011  0.0344  
     (0.020) (0.020) (0.006) (0.006)     (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)     (0.032) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) 
GOVL     -0.0628  -0.0709  -0.0166  -0.0195      -0.0249  -0.0245  -0.0240  -0.0242      -0.0076  -0.0344  -0.0027  -0.0321  
     (0.038) (0.038) (0.020) (0.020)     (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)     (0.062) (0.059) (0.062) (0.059) 
EQU1     0.0085  0.0081  0.0669**  0.0733**      0.0263  0.0149  0.0277  0.0171      0.0849*  0.0704*  0.0832*  0.0733*  
     (0.018) (0.018) (0.038) (0.038)     (0.056) (0.059) (0.056) (0.059)     (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) 
EQU10     -0.0806  -0.0999  -0.0106  -0.0099      -0.0236  -0.0116  -0.0224  -0.0110      -0.0003  -0.0083  -0.0066  -0.0042  
     (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)     (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028)     (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
market -0.0137***  -0.0146***  -0.0157***  -0.0136***  -0.0137***  -0.0138***  -0.0139***  -0.0139***                  
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)                 
Y91(reference dummy variable) 
Y92 0.0114  -0.0064  0.0110  -0.0063  0.0092  -0.0049  0.0116  -0.0029          0.0070  0.0370*  0.0065  0.0355*  0.0172  0.0406*  0.0167  0.0393*  
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)         (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) 
Y93 0.0351*  0.0175  0.0346*  0.0175  0.0289*  0.0187  0.0298*  0.0199  0.1748**  0.1404**  0.1743**  0.1428**  0.1502**  0.1404**  0.1495**  0.1425**  0.0188  0.0478**  0.0181  0.0465**  0.0215  0.0509**  0.0211  0.0500**  
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.048) (0.051) (0.048) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) 
Y94 0.0593***  0.0614***  0.0589***  0.0612***  0.0691***  0.0620***  0.0684***  0.0619***  0.0921***  0.0865***  0.0915***  0.0873***  0.0916***  0.0866***  0.0910***  0.0874***  0.0254  0.0645***  0.0247  0.0636***  0.0412**  0.0673***  0.0408**  0.0666***  
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) 
Y95 0.0917***  0.0932***  0.0914***  0.0930***  0.0997***  0.0939***  0.0991***  0.0937***  0.1058***  0.1020***  0.1049***  0.1025***  0.1058***  0.1024***  0.1050***  0.1027***  0.0668***  0.0795***  0.0663***  0.0789***  0.0819***  0.0824***  0.0817***  0.0820***  
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) 
Y96 0.0939***  0.0949***  0.0938***  0.0949***  0.1021***  0.0953***  0.1017***  0.0952***  0.1092***  0.1016***  0.1086***  0.1020***  0.1081***  0.1018***  0.1075***  0.1021***  0.0653***  0.0633***  0.0649***  0.0628***  0.0808***  0.0661***  0.0806***  0.0658***  
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
Y97 0.0487***  0.0475***  0.0486***  0.0474***  0.0535***  0.0478***  0.0532***  0.0477***  0.0571***  0.0503***  0.0566***  0.0504***  0.0563***  0.0506***  0.0559***  0.0506***  0.0273*  0.0136  0.0270*  0.0131  0.0357**  0.0165  0.0356**  0.0161  
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
Y98 0.0432***  0.0378***  0.0431***  0.0377***  0.0463***  0.0380***  0.0464***  0.0381***  0.0431***  0.0379***  0.0427***  0.0381***  0.0440***  0.0381***  0.0437***  0.0381***  0.0435***  0.0638***  0.0434***  0.0635***  0.0475***  0.0641***  0.0474***  0.0639***  
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Y99 0.0305***  0.0256***  0.0304***  0.0255***  0.0319***  0.0258***  0.0322***  0.0260***  0.0268**  0.0214**  0.0265**  0.0213**  0.0265**  0.0216**  0.0262**  0.0214**  0.0332**  0.0314***  0.0332***  0.0311***  0.0354***  0.0316***  0.0354***  0.0314***  
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Y20 0.0129**  0.0110**  0.0129**  0.0109**  0.0138**  0.0110**  0.0141***  0.0112**  0.0069  0.0042  0.0067  0.0042  0.0058  0.0040  0.0056  0.0040  0.0187**  0.0119*  0.0188**  0.0117*  0.0209**  0.0121*  0.0210**  0.0120*  
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 




6.4.1. Model Fit of Capital Structure Relationships in the LMM Method Using 
LDE and ARCHDTA as Dependent Variables 
This section discusses the model fit in the modelling of three data sets using the 
LMM method. The results of the modelling will be discussed for each data set of 
SZXSHX, SZX and SHX in the next sections. 
6.4.1.1. Model Fit of Capital Structure Relationships in the Joint Data Set of 
SZXSHX 
In the joint data set of SZXSHX, the modelling using the LMM method has 
captured the effect in AR1 autoregressive error structure (i.e., the repeated 
measure effect), fixed effect and random effect and has improved model fit.  
In the context where the LDE dependent variable is used (Table 6.3a, below), the 
LMM method, following Hox steps, has captured the effect of repeated measures, 
the fixed effect and the random effect. The difference in the  -2 Restricted Log 
Likelihood between Step 1 and Step 2 shows a significant effect in AR1 
autoregressive error structure (i.e., repeated measures effect) which is evidenced 
by the significant X2 statistic of 7,800 (df=1, 1; p<0.001). The difference in the  -2 
Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 2 and Step 3 indicates a significant fixed 
effect evidenced by the significant X2 statistic of 342 (df=1, 29; p<0.001). The 
difference in the -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between  Step 3 and Step 4a shows 
the significant random effect evidenced  by the significant X2 statistic of 177 
(df=29. 40; p<0.001).  
229 
 
Table 6.3a: Model Fit of LMM Method Using LDE as Dependent Variable –SZXSHX 
 Model 0a Model 0b Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 no repeated repeated     
 measures measures     
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3    
FIFS = -2Restricted Log Likelihood 6279.14 2378.81 2207.35 2176.00 2187.00 2165.00 
change in FIFS from Model 1  -3900.33 -171.46 -31.35 -20.35 -42.35 
χ2  7800.66 342.92 62.70 40.70 84.70 
   Step 4a Step 4b Step 4c Step 4d 
RIRS = -2Restricted Log Likelihood 3910.24 2358.83 2118.81 2075.00 2091.00 2066.00 
change in RIRS from Model1  -1551.41 -240.02 -43.81 -27.81 -52.81 
χ2  3102.82 480.04 87.62 55.62 105.62 
RIRS – FIFS -2368.90 -19.98 -88.54 -101.00 -96.00 -99.00 
χ2 4737.80 39.96 177.08 202.00 192.00 198.00 
df in fixed effect  1.00 1.00 29.00 36.00 33.00 40.00 
df in random effect 1.00 1.00 40.00 47.00 44.00 51.00 
       
 
Also following Hox Steps 4a, 4b, 4c and 4d, LMM has improved the model fit 
significantly in terms of the significant X2 statistic of 87.62 (df=40, 47; p<0.001) on 
the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 4a and Step 4b 
or between Model 1 and Model 2, the significant X2 statistic of 55.62 (df=40, 44; 
p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 4a 
and Step 4c or between Model 1 and Model 3, and the significant X2 statistic of 
105.62 (df=40, 51; p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood 
between Step 4a and Step 4d or between Model 1 and Model 4.  
In the context where ARCDTA dependent variable is used (Table 6.4a, below), it 
is also found that the modelling using the LMM method has captured the effect in 
AR1 autoregressive error structure (i.e., the repeated measure effect), fixed effect 
and random effect and has improved model fit.  
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Table 6.4a: Model Fit of LMM Method Using ARCDTA as Dependent Variable - 
SZXSHX 
 Model 0a Model 0b Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 No repeated repeated     
 measures measures     
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3    
FIFS -2744.80 -7094.98 -7286.03 -7321.00 -7315.00 -7344.00 
change in FIFS from Model 1  -4350.18 -191.05 -34.97 -28.97 -57.97 
Χ2  8700.36 382.10 69.94 57.94 115.94 
   Step 4a Step 4b Step 4c Step 4d 
RIRS -5312.13  -7102.62 -7367.23 -7401.00 -7389.00 -7436.00 
change in RIRS from Model1  -1790.49 -264.61 -298.38 -286.38 -333.38 
Χ2  3580.98 529.22 596.76 572.76 666.76 
RIRS – FIFS -2567.33 -7.64 -81.20 -80.00 -74.00 -92.00 
Χ2 5134.66 15.28 162.40 160.00 148.00 184.00 
df in fixed effect   1   1                        29                 36            33            40  
df in random effect 1 1                       40                47           44           51 
 
There is a significant effect in AR1 autoregressive error structure (i.e., repeated 
measures effect) evidenced by the significant X2 statistic of 8,700 (df=1, 1; 
p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 1 
and Step 2, a significant fixed effect evidenced by the significant X2 statistic of 
382 (df=1, 29; p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood 
between Step 2 and Step 3, and a significant random effect evidenced  by the 
significant X2 statistic of 162.40 (df=29. 40; p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 
Restricted Log Likelihood between  Step 3 and Step 4a.  
Again following Hox steps 4a, 4b, 4c and 4d, LMM has improved the model fit 
significantly in terms of the significant X2 statistic of 596. 76 (df=40, 47; p<0.001) 
on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 4a and Step 
4b or between Model 1 and Model 2, the significant X2 statistic of 572.76 (df=40, 
44; p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 
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4a and Step 4c or between Model 1 and Model 3, and the significant X2 statistic of 
666.76 (df=40, 51; p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood 
between Step 4a and Step 4d or between Model 1 and Model 4,  
The discussion of the results for the joint data set of SZXSHX in Table 6.3a and 
Table 6.4a above shows that 1) the LMM method fits the models better than the 
OLS method; 2) Model 4 which considers the impact of all variables on capital 
structure fits the data set better than all other models in both cases of the LDE 
and ARCHDTA dependent variables.  
6.4.1.2. Model Fit of Capital Structure Relationships in the SZX Data Set 
In the SZX data set, the LMM method has captured the effect in AR1 
autoregressive error structure (i.e., repeated measures effect), fixed effect and 
random effect and has improved the model fit across models.  
In the context where LDE dependent variable is used (Table 6.3b, below), the 
LMM method has captured the three above-mentioned effects. There is a 
significant effect in AR1 autoregressive error structure (i.e., repeated measures 
effect) evidenced by the significant X2 statistic of 3,791.69 (df=1, 1; p<0.001) on 
the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 1 and Step 2, a 
strong fixed effect also evidenced by the significant X2 statistic of 954.65 (df=1, 
27; p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 
2 and Step 3  and the random effect evidenced by the significant X2 statistic of 
100.42 (df=27, 38; p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood 
between Hox Step 3 and Hox Step 4a.  
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Table 6.3b: Model Fit of LMM Method Using LDE as Dependent Variable - SZX 
 Model 0a Model 0b Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 no repeated repeated     
 measures measures     
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3    
FIFS = -2Restricted Log Likelihood 2531.76 635.91 158.59 125.00 145.00 119.00 
change in FIFS from Model 1  -1895.84 -477.32 -33.59 -13.59 -39.59 
χ2  3791.69 954.65 67.18 27.18 79.18 
   Step 4a Step 4b Step 4c Step 4d 
RIRS = -2Restricted Log Likelihood 1230.07 617.53 108.38 81.00 89.00 75.00 
change in RIRS from Model1  -612.54 -509.15 -27.38 -19.38 -33.38 
χ2  1225.08 1018.30 54.76 38.76 66.76 
RIRS – FIFS -1301.69 -18.38 -50.21 -44.00 -56.00 -44.00 
χ2 2603.37 36.77 100.42 88.00 112.00 88.00 
df in fixed effect  1.00 1.00 27.00 34.00 31.00 38.00 
df in random effect 1.00 1.00 38.00 45.00 42.00 49.00 
 
Following Hox Steps 4a, 4b and 4c, LMM has improved the model fit significantly 
in terms of the significant X2 statistic of 54.76 (df=38, 45; p<0.001) on the 
difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 4a and Hox Step 4b 
or between Model 1 and Model 2, the significant X2 statistic of 38.76 (df=38, 42; 
p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 4a 
and Step 4c or Model 1 and Model 3, and the significant X2 statistic of 66.76 
(df=38, 49; p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood 
between Step 4a and Step 4d or Model 1 and Model 4.  
In the context where ARCHDTA dependent variable is used (Table 6.4b, below), 
the LMM method has captured the effect in AR1 autoregressive error structure 
(i.e., repeated measures effect), fixed effect and random effect and has improved 
the model fit across models. 
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Table 6.4b: Model Fit of LMM Method Using ARCDTA as Dependent Variable - SZX 
 Model 0a Model 0b Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 no repeated repeated     
 measures measures     
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3    
FIFS -1405.77 -3343.92 -3516.05 -3566.00 -3540.00 -3578.00 
change in FIFS from Model 1  -1938.15 -172.13 -49.95 -23.95 -61.95 
χ2  3876.30 344.26 99.90 47.90 123.90 
   Step 4a Step 4b Step 4c Step 4d 
RIRS -2712.83  -3373.66 -3562.44 -3598.00 -3591.00 -3613.00 
change in RIRS from Model1  -660.83 -188.78 -35.56 -28.56 -50.56 
χ2  1321.66 377.56 71.12 57.12 101.12 
RIRS – FIFS -1307.06 -29.74 -46.39 -32.00 -51.00 -35.00 
χ2 2614.12 59.48 92.78 64.00 102.00 70.00 
df in fixed effect     1  1  27               34         31       38  
df in random effect    1 1 38               45        42      49 
 
There is a strong repeated measures effect evidenced by the significant X2 
statistic of 3,876.30 (df=1, 1; p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log 
Likelihood between Step 1 and Step 2 , a strong fixed effect also evidenced by 
the significant X2 statistic of 344.26 (df=1, 27; p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 
Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 2 and Step 3,  and the random effect 
evidenced by the significant X2 statistic of 92.78 (df=27, 38; p<0.001) on the 
difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 3 and Step 4a.  
Following Hox Steps 4a, 4b and 4c, LMM improves the model fit significantly in 
terms of the significant X2 statistic of 71.12 (df=38, 45; p<0.001) on the difference 
in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 4a and Hox Step 4b or between 
Model 1 and Model 2, the significant X2 statistic of 57.12 (df=38, 42; p<0.001) on 
the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 4a and Step 4c 
or Model 1 and Model 3, and the significant X2 statistic of 101.12 (df=38, 49; 
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p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 4a 
and Step 4d or Model 1 and Model 4.  
The discussion on the results for the SZX data set in Table 6.3b and Table 6.4b, 
above, once again shows that 1) the LMM method fits the models better than the 
OLS method, and 2) Model 4 which considers the impact of all variables on 
capital structure fits the data better than other models in the case of both LDE 
and ARCHDTA.  
6.4.1.3. Model Fit of Capital Structure Relationships in the SHX Data Set 
In the SHX data set, the modelling using the LMM method has captured the 
repeated measure effect, the fixed effect and the random effect and has improved 
model fit after considering each of the three effects. 
In the context where LDE dependent variable is used (Table 6.3c, below), there is 
a strong repeated measures effect evidenced by the significant X2 statistic of 
4,049.78 (df=1, 1; p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood 
between Step 1 and Step 2, a strong fixed effect also evidenced by the significant 
X2 statistic of 2,558.65 (df=1, 28; p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted 
Log Likelihood between Step 2 and Step 3,  and a random effect evidenced by 
the significant X2 statistic of 600.58 (df=28, 39; p<0.001) on the difference in the  -
2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 3 and  Step 4a.  
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Table 6.3c: Model Fit of LMM Method Using LDE as Dependent Variable - SHX 
 Model 0a Model 0b Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 no repeated repeated     
 measures measures     
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3    
FIFS = -2Restricted Log Likelihood 3710.94 1686.06 406.73 387.00 365.00 355.00 
change in FIFS from Model 1  -2024.89 -1279.33 -19.73 -41.73 -51.73 
χ2  4049.78 2558.65 39.46 83.46 103.46 
   Step 4a Step 4b Step 4c Step 4d 
RIRS = -2Restricted Log Likelihood 2598.51 1681.48 106.44 84.00 62.00 51.00 
change in RIRS from Model1  -917.03 -1575.04 -22.44 -44.44 -55.44 
χ2  1834.06 3150.08 44.88 88.88 110.88 
RIRS – FIFS -1112.43 -4.58 -300.29 -303.00 -303.00 -304.00 
χ2 2224.87 9.15 600.58 606.00 606.00 608.00 
df in fixed effect  1.00 1.00 28.00 35.00 32.00 39.00 
df in random effect 1.00 1.00 39.00 46.00 43.00 50.00 
 
Following Hox Steps 4a, 4b and 4c, the LMM method has improved the model fit 
significantly in terms of the significant X2 statistic of 44.88 (df=39, 46; p<0.001) on 
the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 4a and Step 4b 
or between Model 1 and Model 2, the significant X2 statistic of 88.88 (df=39, 43; 
p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 4a 
and Step 4c or Model 1 and Model 3, and the significant X2 statistic of 110.88 
(df=39, 50; p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood 
between Step 4a and Step 4d or Model 1 and Model 4.  
In the context where ARCDTA dependent variable is used (Table 6.4c, below), 
there is a strong repeated measures effect evidenced by the significant X2 
statistic of 4,767.00 (df=1, 1; p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log 
Likelihood between Step 1 and Step 2, a strong fixed effect also evidenced by the 
significant X2 statistic of 878.88 (df=1, 28; p<0.001) on the difference in the  -2 
Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 2 and Step 3  and a random effect 
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evidenced by the significant X2 statistic of 155.92 (df=28, 39; p<0.001) on the 
difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 3 and  Step 4a.  
Table 6.4c: Model Fit of LMM Method Using ARCDTA as Dependent Variable - SHX 
 Model 0a Model 0b Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 no repeated repeated     
 measures measures     
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3    
FIFS -1354.10 -3737.60 -4177.04 -4193.00 -4244.00 -4256.00 
change in FIFS from Model 1  -2383.50 -439.44 -15.96 -66.96 -78.96 
χ2  4767.00 878.88 31.92 133.92 157.92 
   Step 4a Step 4b Step 4c Step 4d 
RIRS -2623.80  -3788.00 -4255.00 -4368.00 -4377.00 -4389.00 
change in RIRS from Model1  -1164.20 -467.00 -113.00 -122.00 -134.00 
χ2  2328.40 934.00 226.00 244.00 268.00 
RIRS - FIFS -1269.70 -50.40 -77.96 -175.00 -133.00 -133.00 
χ2 2539.40 100.80 155.92 350.00 266.00 266.00 
df in fixed effect   1  28.00 35.00 32.00 39.00 
df in random effect  1 39.00 46.00 43.00 50.00 
 
Following Hox Steps 4a, 4b and 4c, the LMM method has improved the model fit 
significantly in terms of the significant X2 statistic of 226.00 (df=39, 46; p<0.001) 
on the difference in the  -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 4a and Step 
4b or between Model 1 and Model 2, the significant X2 statistic of 244.00 (df=39, 
43; p<0.001) on the difference in the -2 Restricted Log Likelihood between Step 
4a and Step 4c or Model 1 and Model 3, and the significant X2 statistic of 268.00 
(df=39, 50; p<0.001) on the difference in the -2 Restricted Log Likelihood 
between Step 4a and Step 4d or Model 1 and Model 4.  
The discussion on the results for the SHX data set in Table 6.3c and Table 6.4c , 
above, show that 1) the LMM method has improved model fit of the OLS method, 
and 2) Model 4 which considers the impact of all variables on capital structure fits 
the data better than other models in the case of LDE and of ARCHDTA.  
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6.4.2. The Influence of Explanatory Variables on Capital Structure 
The use of the LMM method allows the models to capture the repeated measures 
effect, separates fixed effect from random effect and overcomes the dependence 
problem in the OLS method. The LMM method has improved the model fit of the 
OLS method. Also the LMM method has improved the model fit of four models 
along each step of the model building procedure and Model 4 fits the data set 
better than other models. The discussion of the significance of coefficients below 
is based on the results of Model 4, which considers all financial, business 
strategy and corporate governance variables. The detailed results of the LMM 
method using LDE as the dependent variable are listed in Table 6.3 (p. 226) and 
the detailed results of the LMM method using ARCDTA as the dependent variable 
are displayed in Table 6.4 (p. 227). 
6.4.2.1. The Influence of Financial Variables on Capital Structure  
Table 6.5, below, displays the results that will be used as the basis for the 
discussion to follow. 
Table 6.5: The Influence of Financial Variables in Model 4 on Capital Structure: 
Using the LMM Method 
Time-Varying 
Financial Variables Hypotheses SZXSHX SZX SHX 
  LDE ARCDTA LDE ARCDTA LDE ARCDTA
TXER H1.1 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., +
PROF H1.2  Sig., + Sig., +
SIZE H1.3 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., -
GROW H1.4 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., +
TANG H1.5  Sig., - Sig., -
CAPI H1.6 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + Sig., +
RISK H1.7 Sig.,- Sig., - 
DURA H1.8 Sig., + Sig., + 
Note: Significance: p<0.05 
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In the joint data set of SZXSHX, the coefficients of the financial variables are 
significant for four common determinants of capital structure in both cases of the 
OLS and LMM methods using both the LDE and the ARCDTA dependent 
variables. Tax, growth, capital intensity are positively related to capital structure 
and size is negatively related to capital structure. Compared with the OLS 
method, the significance of profitability is lost in the LMM method.  
In the SZX data set, the coefficients are significant for six financial determinants 
of capital structure in the case of both the OLS and LMM methods using both the 
LDE and ARCDTA dependent variables. Tax, growth, capital intensity and 
duration are positively related to capital structure. Size and risk are negatively 
related to capital structure. However the significance of profitability is lost in the 
LMM method.  
In the SHX data set, the coefficients are significant for six financial determinants 
of the capital structure in the case of both the OLS and the LMM methods using 
LDE and ARCDTA dependent variables. Tax, profitability, growth, and capital 
intensity are positively related to capital structure. Size and tangibility are 
negatively related to capital structure. The coefficient of profitability is positive in 
the LMM method, but negative in the OLS method.  
Overall across the three data sets in the case of both the OLS and the LMM 
methods, there are four common financial determinants of capital structure of the 
Chinese listed companies. Tax, growth and capital intensity are positively related 
to capital structure, and size is negatively related to capital structure.  
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6.4.2.2. The Influence of Business Strategy Variables on Capital Structure 
The results that form the basis for the discussion to follow are presented in Table 
6.6, below. 
Table 6.6:  The Influence of Business Strategy Variables in Model 4 on Capital 
Structure: Using the LMM Method 
Non-Time-Varying 
Financial Variables Hypotheses SZXSHX SZX SHX 
  LDE ARCDTA LDE ARCDTA LDE ARCDTA
PROD1 H21  
PROD2 H2.2  Sig., +
PROD3 H2.3 Sig., +  Sig., + Sig., +
PROD4 H2.4 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., + 
ASSET1 H2.5  
ASSET2 H2.6 Sig., - Sig., - 
ASSET3 H2.7 Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - Sig., - 
Note: Significance: p<0.05 
In the joint data set of SZXSHX, when LDE is applied, PROD4 is positively 
related to LDE, and ASSET3 is negatively related to LDE in the case of both the 
OLS and the LMM methods. The significance of PROD2, PROD3 and ASSET2 
that exists in the OLS method is lost in the LMM method. When ARCDTA is 
applied, the significance is restored for PROD3, which is positively related to 
ARCDTA, and for ASSET3, which remains negatively related to ARCDTA. 
However, the significance of PROD2, PROD4 and ASSET2 that exists in the OLS 
method remains lost in the LMM method. The general finding of the LMM method 
is consistent, in a weak form, with that of the OLS method for the joint data set of 
SZXSHX. 
In the SZX data set, when LDE is applied, PROD4 is positively related to LDE 
and ASSET2 and ASSET3 are negatively related to LDE. The significance of 
PROD2 that exists in the OLS method is lost in the LMM method. When ARCDTA 
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is applied, the significance of the same three dummy variables remains. The 
results of the LMM method are consistent with the results of the OLS method for 
the SZX data set. 
In the SHX data set, when the LDE dependent variable is applied, PROD2 and 
PROD3 are positively related to LDE and the significance of ASSET2 and 
ASSET3 that exists in the OLS method is lost in the LMM method. When the 
ARCDTA dependent variable is applied, the significance of PROD2 together with 
ASSET2 and ASSET3 is lost in the LMM method. No evidence is found on the 
significance of asset specificity for the capital structure in the LMM method. The 
results of the LMM method are not consistent with the results of the OLS method 
for the SHX data set. 
6.4.2.3. The Influence of Corporate Governance Variables on Capital 
Structure  
The results that form the basis for the discussion to follow are presented in Table 
6.7, below. 
Table 6.7:  The Influence of Corporate Governance Variables in Model 4 on  
Capital Structure: Using the LMM Method 
Time-Varying 
Financial Variables Hypotheses SZXSHX SZX SHX 
  LDE ARCDTA LDE ARCDTA LDE ARCDTA
PROD1 H21  
PROD2 H2.2  Sig., +
PROD3 H2.3  Sig., +
PROD4 H2.4 Sig., + Sig., + Sig., +
ASSET1 H2.5  Sig., -
ASSET2 H2.6 Sig., - Sig., +
ASSET3 H2.7 Sig., - Sig., - 
Note: Significance: p<0.05 
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In the joint data set of SZXSHX, there is a considerable difference in the 
significance of coefficients of corporate governance variables between the OLS 
and LMM methods. Only one of the four variables is identified as a common 
variable that is significant in both the OLS and LMM methods where both LDE 
and ARCDTA are used. EQU1 is positively related to both LDE and ARCDTA. 
The significance of GOV, GOVL and EQU10 that exists in the OLS method is lost 
in the LMM method. The results of the LMM method are weakly consistent with 
those of the OLS method. 
In the SZX data set, none of the four variables is identified as being significant in 
either the OLS method or the LMM method where LDE and ARCDTA are used. 
The results of the LMM method are consistent with those of the OLS method. 
In the SHX data set, there is little consistency in the results of Model 3 in the 
corporate governance approach between OLS and LMM. Only EQU1 is positively 
related to both LDE and ARCDTA in LMM. The results of the LMM approach do 
not support the corporate governance approach as strongly as does OLS. No 
evidence is found on the implication of corporate governance factors for capital 
structure. In the corporate governance approach, LMM produces a set of results 
being different not only between OLS and LMM but also between LDE and 
ARCDTA dependent variables. 
In general, the comparative results of the LMM and OLS methods demonstrate 
the following two points:  
• At the level of model fit, the LMM method improves model fit of the OLS 
method. The LMM method has taken into account significant repeated 
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measures effect, fixed effect and random effect despite the lack of 
independence of variables in the panel data, something assumed away in 
OLS.  
• At the level of the significance of the coefficients, the LMM method is 
consistent with 75% of significant variables in the OLS method. Most 
financial variables significant in the OLS method remain significant in the 
LMM method. Some business strategy variables that are significant in the 
OLS method also remain significant in the LMM method. However, most 
corporate governance variables significant in the OLS method are no 
longer significant in the LMM method. 
The above two findings are consistent across models, dependent variables and 
data sets. 
The key findings of the modelling using the LMM method are: 
• The modelling using the LMM method confirms the results of the modelling 
using the OLS method; that is, 1) the capital structure of Chinese listed 
companies in both the SZX and SHX markets is positively related to tax, 
growth and capital intensity and negatively related to size according to the 
financial approach; and 2) the capital structure of the listed companies, 
particularly in the SZX market, is positively related to product 
diversification and negatively related to asset specificity according to the 
business strategy approach. 
• The modelling using the LMM method confirms the results of the modelling 
using the OLS method weakly; that is, that the capital structure of the 
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companies listed on the SHX market is positively related to government 
ownership and ownership by the largest shareholder, and negatively 
related to legal person ownership and ownership by the ten largest 
shareholders according to the corporate governance approach. 
6.5. Discussion on the Determinants of Capital Structure of Chinese 
Listed Companies 
The discussions on the results of the modelling using both the OLS and LMM 
methods with both the LDE and the ARCDTA dependent variables as the 
dependent variables across three data sets have been presented in sections 6.2–
6.4. The analysis of the results of the modelling of the three data sets using the 
OLS and LMM methods with the LDE and ARCDTA dependent variables has 
facilitated the identification of a number of key determinants of capital structure of 
the Chinese listed companies. In the financial model, the four common financial 
determinants of capital structure in the Chinese listed companies in both SZX and 
SHX are tax, growth, capital intensity and size. The significance of another 
common determinant (profitability), which is demonstrated in the modelling using 
the OLS method, is not evidenced in the modelling using the LMM method.  
6.5.1. The Impact of Tax 
There is consistent evidence in this study to support that tax is a significant 
determinant of the capital structure of Chinese listed companies, and that tax is 
positively related to capital structure. This is consistent with trade-off theory. This 
finding is consistent with the empirical studies focusing on Western market 
economies (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Chiarella, 
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1991). The studies on Chinese capital structure have neglected tax as a 
significant determinant, and only one of these studies found that tax is negatively 
related to debt level (Chen & Xu, 2004a).  
6.5.2. The Impact of Growth 
There is consistent evidence in this study to support that firms’ growth is a 
significant determinant of the capital structure of Chinese listed companies and 
that growth is positively related to the capital structure. This is consistent with 
trade-off theory. This finding is not only consistent with the result of study in the 
Western economies (Kester, 1986) but also with the result of the studies on 
Chinese capital structure (Liu, 1999; Huang & Song, 2002; Chen & Xu, 2004a, 
2004b; Lei, 2007).  
6.5.3. The Impact of Capital Intensity 
There is consistent evidence in this study to support that firms’ capital intensity is 
a significant determinant of the capital structure of Chinese listed companies and 
that capital intensity is positively related to the capital structure. This is consistent 
with trade-off theory. This finding is consistent with the result of studies in the 
Western economies (Lang, 1988; Long & Malitz, 1985; Anderson, 1990). No 
existing literature on Chinese capital structure has examined the relationship 
between capital intensity and capital structure.  
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6.5.4. The Impact of Size 
There is consistent evidence in this study to support that firms’ size is a 
significant determinant of the capital structure of Chinese listed companies and 
that firms’ size is negatively related to the capital structure. This is consistent with 
pecking order theory. This finding is consistent with the result of studies in the 
Western economies (Warner, 1977; Ang et al., 1982). However, this finding is not 
consistent with the existing literature on Chinese capital structure. Although most 
scholars of Chinese capital structure such as Liu (1999), Huang and Song (2002), 
Chen and Xu (2004a) and Lei (2007) found that firms’ size is positively related to 
capital structure; Chen and Xu (2004b) also found that size is negatively related 
to capital structure.   
This study has not found consistent evidence beyond any doubt to support the 
relationship between determinants such as profitability, tangibility, risk and 
duration and the capital structure of Chinese listed companies. However, the 
impact of these determinants has been detected in some aspects of the analysis.  
Overall results show that the pecking order theory is supported in the case of the 
Chinese listed companies and the asymmetric information may be the underlying 
explanation to the strong equity preference of the Chinese listed companies and 
the low debt ratios in the capital structure of the Chinese listed companies.  
As discussed in the literature review (Chapter Two), the Western literature on 
pecking order theory contains the argument that because the issuing of equity 
can be a negative signal (the issuing of debt can be a positive signal) to the 
financial performance of a company, the company issuing equity will be expected 
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to pay a premium on equity. Therefore, a company with higher profitability and/or 
of a large size tends to finance its investments with internal funds whenever the 
internal cash flow is available in order to avoid the high cost of equity. Pecking 
order theory on the basis of Western experiences predicts an order of internal 
funding first, debt next, and equity last. 
This is not the case in China. The data analysed covers the commencement 
period of the Chinese stock markets, from 1991 to 2000. During this period, the 
markets had not developed fully. Profitability and size of a company may be 
regarded more as positive information for investors about equity issues than for 
creditors about debt issues. Also, equity in undeveloped financial markets is often 
regarded as ‘soft money’ for a company, because there is no fixed interest 
payment. Most Chinese businesses do not like to operate with large amounts of 
debt; it is perceived as a financial burden because it incurs an interest payment. 
In addition, the negative concept of debt is deeply rooted in Chinese culture, so 
the issuing of debt is a negative signal to a company rather than a positive signal 
(the benefit of financial gearing (Chui et al., 2002). Pecking order theory in the 
context of the Chinese experience reflects on a reversed order of equity first, debt 
second, and internal funding last. 
6.5.5. The Impact of Product Diversification and Asset Specificity 
There is strong evidence to support that product diversification and asset 
specificity are significant determinants of the capital structure of Chinese listed 
companies. Product diversification is positively related to capital structure, while 
asset specificity is negatively related to the capital structure of the Chinese listed 
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companies, particularly in the SZX market. This finding is consistent with the 
product diversification view and transaction cost economics theory and the 
empirical studies of capital structure in the United Kingdom (Lowe et al., 1994; 
Jordan et al., 1998; Vilasuso & Minkler, 2001; Pek, 2004). However, no existing 
literature on Chinese capital structure has examined the relationship between 
capital intensity and capital structure.  
Both product diversification view and transaction cost economic theory are 
supported in the case of the Chinese listed companies. Product diversification 
and asset specificity may be the underlying explanation to the higher debt ratios 
that the listed companies listed on the SZX market have undertaken (when 
compared to SHX), because the companies listed on the SZX market have higher 
product diversification and lower asset specificity than the companies on SHX. 
The descriptive statistics in Chapter Five have evidenced this relationship. 
6.5.6. The Impact of Ownership Structure and Ownership Concentration 
There is significant evidence to support that the ownership structure between 
government ownership and legal personal ownership, and the ownership 
concentration between the ownership by the single largest shareholder and the 
ownership by the ten largest shareholders are significant determinants of the 
capital structure of Chinese listed companies, particularly in the SHX market. This 
finding is consistent with agency cost theory and the empirical studies of capital 
structure (McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Leech & Leahy, 1991). However, the 
literature on Chinese capital structure has produced inconclusive results on the 
relationship between the ownership structure and ownership concentration and 
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capital structure. Xu and Wang (1997) argued that ownership structure and 
concentration are important to capital structure, while Liu Tong (1999) argued that 
ownership structure and concentration are insignificant to capital structure. Chen 
and Xu (2004a, 2004b) found that the relationship between ownership structure 
and capital structure is non-linear. 
The result of this research supports agency cost theory in the case of the 
Chinese listed companies. The agency costs of debt and equity may be the 
underlying explanation to the lower debt ratios of the companies listed on SHX 
when compared to those listed on SZX. The significance of corporate governance 
variables is not detected in the SZX data set. This may imply that the choice of 
debt or equity may not be influenced by the corporate governance variables. The 
evidence on the significance of corporate governance variables is found in the 
SHX data set, and this also implies that the choice of debt or equity by the listed 
companies in SHX market may be influenced by these corporate governance 
variables. 
6.6. The Implication of Capital Structures for the Value of Firms  
The relationship between capital structure and the value of a firm is debatable. 
However, by comparing the descriptive statistics in Table 6.8 (p. 250) between 
SZX and SHX, we can gain an insight into the following relationship: 
• the implications of the different capital structure determinants for the 
different capital structure patterns between SZX and SHX; and 
• the implications of the different capital structure determinants for the 
different  performance of the listed companies between SZX and SHX.  
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6.6.1.  Different Capital Structure Determinants and Different Capital 
Structure Patterns between SZX and SHX  
The annual average values of DE, LDE, DTA and ARCDTA presented in Table 
6.8 (overleaf) show that the companies listed on SHX have taken lower debt 
ratios than those listed on SZX over time. Examination of the relationship of 
different debt levels with different capital structure determinants between SZX 
and SHX gives an insight into the reasons.  
In the financial approach (Model 1), the companies listed on SHX that have taken 
lower debt ratios than those on SZX have:  
• paid less tax with a positive relationship to debt level;  
• earned more profit with a negative relationship to debt level;  
• were larger in size with a negative relationship to debt level;  
• grew faster with a negative relationship to debt level;  
• possessed less tangible assets with a positive relationship to debt level;  
• had lower capital intensity with a positive relationship to debt level; 
• had higher risk with a negative relationship to debt level; and 
• had long duration with a negative relationship to debt level.  
The observed relationships of debt levels with the financial determinants of 
capital structure differ sharply between SHX and SZX. This demonstrates that 
capital structure is related to financial determinants. In particular, the problem of 
asymmetric information in SHX implied by the negative coefficients of the 
determinants PROF, GROW and SIZE may have induced a lower debt level in 
SHX than SZX.  
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Table 6.8:  Implications of Different Capital Structure Determinants 
for Different Capital Structure Patterns between SZX and SHX 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
               
 Relationship   YEAR 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 average Difference   
 with capital structure              
                
DE  SHX 0.7662 0.8744 1.1082 1.2917 1.2472 1.0589 1.1815 1.2443 1.1323 1.0207 1.0925 lower   
  SZX  1.6021 1.5045 1.4609 1.4269 1.2128 1.1534 1.1438 1.0551 1.0707 1.2922 higher   
  SZXSHX 0.7662 0.9066 1.2904 1.3703 1.3317 1.1313 1.1678 1.1983 1.0972 1.0465 1.1306   
 
LDE  SHX -0.3079 -0.2543 -0.1241 -0.0125 -0.0099 -0.0942 -0.0686 -0.0648 -0.0849 -0.1204 -0.1142 lower  
  SZX  0.1776 0.0135 0.05 0.0576 -0.0466 -0.0698 -0.084 -0.1133 -0.1175 -0.0147 higher  
  SZXSHX -0.3079 -0.2352 -0.0607 0.0165 0.0219 -0.0718 -0.0692 -0.0736 -0.0978 -0.1189 -0.0997   
 
DTA  SHX 0.3587 0.3847 0.4444 0.4934 0.4967 0.4522 0.4714 0.4775 0.4617 0.4384 0.4478 lower   
  SZX  0.5981 0.5151 0.5298 0.5336 0.4809 0.4700 0.4625 0.4466 0.4425 0.4977 higher  
  SZXSHX 0.3587 0.3934 0.4769 0.5103 0.5141 0.4657 0.4707 0.4706 0.4548 0.4405 0.4556   
 
ARCHDTA  SHX 0.629 0.6566 0.7220 0.777 0.7795 0.7332 0.7521 0.7579 0.7412 0.7195 0.7268 lower  
  SZX  0.8855 0.7982 0.815 0.8189 0.7629 0.7511 0.7434 0.7271 0.7234 0.7806 higher  
  SZXSHX 0.629 0.6667 0.7571 0.7946 0.7981 0.7472 0.7516 0.7513 0.7348 0.7215 0.7352   
 
TXER + SHX 0.2398 0.2025 0.1742 0.1843 0.1794 0.1547 0.3138 0.2723 0.2271 0.1912 0.2139 lower   
  SZX  0.1961 0.1882 0.1939 0.2035 0.1847 0.2883 0.2808 0.2967 0.1976 0.2255 higher  
  SZXSHX 0.2398 0.2022 0.1806 0.1888 0.1907 0.1688 0.3014 0.2762 0.2587 0.1945 0.2202   
 
PROF + SHX 0.0946 0.0854 0.1032 0.1049 0.0945 0.0835 0.133 0.1083 0.0862 0.0696 0.0963 lower   
  SZX  0.1094 0.1119 0.106 0.0921 0.0813 0.1346 0.1127 0.1065 0.0657 0.1022 higher  
  SZXSHX 0.0946 0.0865 0.1072 0.1054 0.0933 0.0825 0.1338 0.1103 0.0954 0.0676 0.0977   
 
SIZE - SHX 5.8550 5.7079 5.8027 6.0467 6.2304 6.4673 6.5611 6.6771 6.8492 7.0846 6.3281 larger  
  SZX  4.6255 5.7882 5.9999 6.1829 6.4441 6.4966 6.6402 6.8045 7.0559 6.2264 smaller  
  SZXSHX 5.8550 5.6592 5.7961 6.0249 6.2081 6.4564 6.5297 6.6602 6.8289 7.0698 6.3088   
 
GROW - SHX 5.0716 5.0951 5.3647 5.5499 5.7176 5.7943 5.9516 5.9813 6.0639 6.2119 5.7478 faster   
  SZX  4.5668 5.2417 5.3698 5.5175 5.6009 5.6981 5.768 5.8756 6.0699 5.4780 slower  
  SZXSHX 5.0716 5.0718 5.3081 5.4662 5.6235 5.7034 5.8283 5.8838 5.9784 6.1385 5.6074   
 
TANG + SHX 1.5539 1.4705 1.0297 0.7645 0.6245 0.5482 0.9395 0.7628 0.6536 0.6157 0.8963 less   
  SZX  3.5839 3.4301 2.3205 1.6202 0.9552 1.6654 1.4520 1.1509 0.6967 1.8749 more  
  SZXSHX 1.5539 1.5638 2.1334 1.4872 1.0927 0.7396 1.2927 1.0779 0.8795 0.6576 1.2478   
 
CAPI + SHX 3.5303 3.2965 2.2598 2.1581 2.2887 2.5223 2.3815 2.6254 3.0348 3.2003 2.7298 less   
  SZX  1.4889 2.5454 2.7265 2.8781 3.2824 3.6618 3.5758 3.7242 3.8837 3.0852 more   
  SZXSHX 3.5303 3.2166 2.3911 2.4221 2.5659 2.8797 3.0044 3.0656 3.3479 3.5535 2.9972   
 
RISK - SHX 0.3173 0.2945 0.3289 0.3465 0.3772 0.3602 0.3110 0.2973 0.2936 0.2924 0.3219 higher   
  SZX  -0.0472 0.3827 0.3896 0.3316 0.3232 0.2374 0.1892 0.2201 0.2171 0.2493 lower  
  SZXSHX 0.3173 0.2794 0.3536 0.3665 0.3557 0.3428 0.2752 0.2479 0.2602 0.2535 0.3052   
 
PRODTYPE + SHX 2.2623 2.2428 2.2422 2.2233 2.2251 2.2251 2.3291 2.2356 2.2353 2.2696 2.2490 less  
  SZX  2.2212 2.4472 2.4104 2.4275 2.4275 2.2367 2.2113 2.198 2.2114 2.2856 more  
  SZXSHX 2.2623 2.2325 2.3364 2.3102 2.3203 2.3203 2.2842 2.2245 2.2183 2.2395 2.2748   
 
ASSETTYPE - SHX 2.0656 2.0462 2.0623 2.0615 2.0611 2.0611 1.9706 1.9339 1.9345 1.8848 2.0082 higher  
  SZX  1.7500 1.8741 1.9104 1.913 1.9058 1.9204 1.9276 1.9232 1.9268 1.8946 lower  
  SZXSHX 2.0656 2.0331 1.9757 1.9913 1.9915 1.9881 1.9462 1.9317 1.9294 1.9065 1.9758   
 
GOV + SHX 0.4205 0.4401 0.4348 0.4427 0.4442 0.4435 0.5896 0.5995 0.5996 0.5834 0.4998 lower.  
  SZX  0.4788 0.5624 0.5684 0.5468 0.5729 0.5903 0.5691 0.5806 0.5564 0.5584 higher  
  SZXSHX 0.4205 0.4419 0.4935 0.5011 0.4924 0.5043 0.5899 0.5856 0.5916 0.5695 0.5190   
 
GOVL - SHX 0.6389 0.7454 0.7270 0.7233 0.7266 0.7360 0.7359 0.7173 0.7381 0.7142 0.7203 higher.  
  SZX  0.6177 0.5918 0.5915 0.5914 0.5908 0.6388 0.6391 0.6381 0.6195 0.6131 lower  
  SZXSHX 0.6389 0.6233 0.6540 0.6524 0.6555 0.6591 0.6861 0.6749 0.6835 0.6685 0.6596   
 
EQU1 + SHX 0.7047 0.6439 0.6611 0.6649 0.6659 0.6661 0.708 0.7111 0.7123 0.7112 0.6849 lower  
  SZX  0.7046 0.6914 0.6944 0.6949 0.6949 0.7184 0.7182 0.7197 0.7263 0.7068 higher  
  SZXSHX 0.7047 0.7019 0.6767 0.6807 0.6812 0.6813 0.7134 0.7149 0.7164 0.7185 0.6990   
 
EQU10 - SHX 0.4135 0.4126 0.4303 0.4352 0.4367 0.4367 0.4934 0.5238 0.5244 0.5389 0.4644 higher  
  SZX  0.4135 0.3946 0.4023 0.4002 0.4303 0.4817 0.4903 0.4916 0.4884 0.4403 lower  





DE %,  detbt-equity ratio      LDE  log DE ratio 
DTA %,  debt-total asset ratio   ARCDTA  archsined square-rooted DTA 
TXER %,  tax amount to gross profit ratio  PROF %,  gross profit to total asset ratio 
SIZE  log total asset    GROW  log revenue 
TANG %,  tangible asset to total asset ratio   CAPI %,  total asset to revenue ratio  
RISK %,  variations between earnings PS  DURA  
PRODTYPE  1=single,2=dominant,3=related,4=unrelated ASSETTYPE  1=general,2medium,3=high specificity  
GOV %  government shareholdings    GOVL %  government and legal persons shareholdings 





In the business strategy approach (Model 2), the listed companies in SHX that 
have taken lower debt ratios than those in SZX have: 
• produced less diversified products and services with a positive relationship 
to debt level; and  
• possessed more highly specific assets with a negative relationship to debt 
level.  
The observed relationships of debt levels with the business strategy determinants 
of capital structure differ sharply between SHX and SZX. This demonstrates that 
capital structure is related to business strategy determinants. In particular, the 
problem of less product diversification and higher asset specificity in SHX may 
have induced a lower debt level in SHX than SZX.  
In the corporate governance approach (Model 3), the listed companies in SHX 
that have taken lower debt ratios than those in SZX have:  
• had lower government ownership (GOV) and a lower equity ownership 
concentration (EQU1) than SZX with a positive relationship to debt level 
which arises from the agency cost of debt; 
• had a higher institutional ownership (GL) and a higher equity ownership 
diversification (EQU10) with a negative relationship to debt level which 
arises from the existence of the agency cost of equity. 
The observed relationships of debt levels with the corporate governance 
determinants of capital structure differ sharply between SHX and SZX. This 
demonstrates that capital structure is related to the corporate governance 
determinants. In particular, the existence of equity agency cost and debt agency 
cost in SHX may have induced a lower debt level in SHX than SZX.  
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The comparative study of the differences in the relationships between debt levels 
and capital structure determinants between SZX and SHX demonstrates that the 
asymmetric information in the financial approach; less product diversification and 
higher asset specificity in the business strategy approach; and the high agency 
costs of equity and debt in the corporate governance approach may have 
affected the choice of debt or equity between SZX and SHX. The trend of lower 
debt ratios in SHX than SZX over the years indicates that the determinants of 
capital structure that have been identified in the three theoretical approaches are 
persistent over time in influencing the difference in capital structure patterns of 
SZX and SHX.  
6.6.2.  Difference in Financial Performance between SZX and SHX Listed 
Companies  
Different relationships between debt levels and capital structure determinants 
may also be related to a difference in the financial performances of the listed 
companies of SZX and SHX.  The descriptive statistics in Table 6.9 (overleaf) 
indicate that the companies listed on SZX have performed considerably better 
than those on SHX. Compared with SZX on the basis of mean values, the SHX 
listed companies tend to: 
• be larger in size but take less debt;  
• earn more revenue but make less profit;  
• take more earnings but pay less tax;  
• have higher return to assets but produce lower net margin; and  
• have higher asset utilisation but produce lower return to equity.  
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Table 6.9: Differences in Financial Performance 
between SZX and SHX Listed Companies  
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Unit YEAR 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 AVERAGE MARKET VARIATION 
                 
TA RMB$ m SHX 812.300 696.520 697.080 847.800 988.170 1124.660 1222.100 1415.310 1613.610 1878.840 1129.639 larger 
  SZX  151.360 591.610 734.950 885.090 1092.980 1092.670 1226.860 1424.480 1790.560 998.951 smaller 
  SZXSHX 812.300 672.420 648.580 795.390 939.700 1109.760 1159.130 1329.140 1527.720 1833.220 1082.736  
 
E RMB$ m SHX 487.030 426.030 376.290 414.790 476.360 566.330 604.870 685.040 814.940 997.820 640.890 more equity 
  SZX  67.250 248.270 300.330 353.760 449.080 509.510 587.110 704.450 869.750 552.290 less equity 
  SZXSHX 487.030 410.170 317.430 361.620 418.710 511.200 558.470 640.260 764.770 931.640 600.770  
 
D RMB$ m SHX 325.280 270.480 320.780 433.020 511.810 558.330 623.470 730.270 798.670 881.010 619.890 less debt 
  SZX  84.120 343.340 434.630 531.330 643.900 583.160 639.750 720.030 920.810 636.870 more debt 
  SZXSHX 325.280 262.250 331.160 433.770 520.990 598.560 603.850 688.880 762.960 901.580 627.580  
 
DE % SHX 0.668 0.635 0.852 1.044 1.074 0.986 1.031 1.066 0.980 0.883 0.967 lower 
  SZX  1.251 1.383 1.447 1.502 1.434 1.145 1.090 1.022 1.059 1.153 higher 
  SZXSHX 0.668 0.639 1.043 1.200 1.244 1.171 1.081 1.076 0.998 0.968 1.045  
 
DTA & SHX 0.400 0.388 0.460 0.511 0.518 0.496 0.510 0.516 0.495 0.469 0.549 lower 
  SZX  0.556 0.580 0.591 0.600 0.589 0.534 0.521 0.505 0.514 0.638 higher 
  SZXSHX 0.400 0.390 0.511 0.545 0.554 0.539 0.521 0.518 0.499 0.492 0.580  
 
REV RMB$ m SHX 384.660 401.170 473.330 529.510 628.990 667.520 753.770 796.420 866.670 983.140 648.518 more revenue 
  SZX  157.310 393.760 424.360 502.410 533.040 593.540 634.910 742.100 915.220 544.072 less revenue 
  SZXSHX 384.660 390.390 436.750 480.670 569.480 604.290 675.810 722.570 810.100 948.040 602.276  
 
EXP RMB$ m SHX 337.920 358.150 410.340 456.920 554.140 591.890 638.950 690.830 761.880 869.100 567.012 more expense 
  SZX  143.610 335.170 360.950 442.260 466.420 471.880 505.370 591.210 805.830 458.078 less expenses 
  SZXSHX 337.920 348.670 375.780 412.350 501.540 532.890 557.660 606.040 684.370 836.400 519.362  
 
EBIT RMB$ m SHX 46.730 43.020 62.990 72.590 74.850 75.640 114.820 105.590 104.790 114.040 81.506 less profit 
  SZX  13.700 58.590 63.410 60.150 66.620 121.660 129.540 150.900 109.390 85.996 more profit 
  SZXSHX 46.730 41.720 60.970 68.330 67.940 71.400 118.150 116.540 125.730 111.630 82.914  
 
TAX  RMB$ m SHX 9.980 9.090 10.550 14.260 14.010 12.530 36.930 28.050 23.350 19.780 17.853 less tax 
  SZX  2.880 10.620 12.560 12.650 12.930 42.440 44.050 53.370 24.400 23.989 more tax 
  SZXSHX 9.980 8.810 10.580 13.470 13.370 12.720 39.610 35.370 36.980 22.170 20.306  
 
NP RMB$ m SHX 36.750 33.930 52.450 58.320 60.840 63.100 77.900 77.530 81.430 94.250 63.650 higher 
  SZX  10.820 47.970 50.850 47.500 53.690 79.230 85.490 97.530 84.980 62.007 lower 
  SZXSHX 36.750 32.910 50.390 54.850 54.570 58.680 78.540 81.170 88.740 89.460 62.606  
 
NM  RMB$ SHX 0.096 0.085 0.111 0.110 0.097 0.095 0.103 0.097 0.094 0.096 0.098 lower 
  SZX  0.069 0.122 0.120 0.095 0.101 0.133 0.135 0.131 0.093 0.114 higher 
  SZXSHX 0.096 0.084 0.115 0.114 0.096 0.097 0.116 0.112 0.110 0.094 0.104  
 
EPS  RMB$ SHX 0.320 0.290 0.330 0.350 0.380 0.360 0.310 0.300 0.290 0.290 0.322 more earnings 
  SZX  -0.050 0.380 0.390 0.330 0.320 0.240 0.190 0.220 0.220 0.249 less earnings 
  SZXSHX 0.320 0.280 0.350 0.370 0.360 0.340 0.280 0.250 0.260 0.250 0.306  
 
NAPS  RMB$ SHX 2.340 2.100 2.160 2.250 2.230 2.530 2.290 2.250 2.470 2.900 2.352 less net asset 
  SZX  2.430 2.500 2.530 2.400 2.190 2.450 2.700 2.480 2.280 2.440 more net asset 
  SZXSHX 2.340 2.120 2.320 2.380 2.310 2.370 2.370 2.450 2.480 2.580 2.372  
 
AU RMB$ SHX 0.474 0.576 0.679 0.625 0.637 0.594 0.617 0.563 0.537 0.523 0.574 higher 
  SZX  1.039 0.666 0.577 0.568 0.488 0.543 0.518 0.521 0.511 0.545 lower 
  SZXSHX 0.474 0.581 0.673 0.604 0.606 0.545 0.583 0.544 0.530 0.517 0.556  
 
ROA RMB$ SHX 17.403 19.542 35.615 36.425 38.726 37.452 48.047 43.628 43.736 49.318 36.541 higher 
  SZX 0.000 11.245 31.928 29.361 26.963 26.184 43.038 44.242 50.809 43.436 33.772 lower 
  SZXSHX 17.403 19.107 33.932 33.147 33.071 31.953 45.791 44.127 47.056 46.264 34.825  
 
LM times SHX 1.668 1.635 1.853 2.044 2.074 1.986 2.020 2.066 1.980 1.883 1.763 lower 
  SZX  2.251 2.383 2.447 2.502 2.434 2.145 2.090 2.022 2.059 1.809 higher 
  SZXSHX 1.668 1.639 2.043 2.200 2.244 2.171 2.076 2.076 1.998 1.968 1.802  
 
ROE RMB$ SHX 0.075 0.080 0.139 0.141 0.128 0.111 0.129 0.113 0.100 0.094 0.099 lower 
  SZX  0.161 0.193 0.169 0.134 0.120 0.156 0.146 0.138 0.098 0.112 higher 
  SZXSHX 0.075 0.080 0.159 0.152 0.130 0.115 0.141 0.127 0.116 0.096 0.104 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 




In general, the companies listed on SHX tend to be less efficient than those on 
SZX. The SHX listed companies produced a lower return on equity (ROE) at 
average over time than those listed on SZX.  The lower ROE in the SHX 
companies is due to a lower net margin and lower leverage multiplier than SZX 
companies despite SHX having a higher asset utilisation.  
This indicates that the differences in financial performance are related to different 
capital structure determinants and the resulting different capital structure patterns 
between SZX and SHX. The reasons why SHX did not perform well may be the 
same reasons that induced the different capital structure patterns in SHX.  
SHX suffered from greater problems arising from asymmetric information, less 
product diversification, higher asset specificity, and greater agency cost of equity 
and debt than SZX. These capital structure determinants that are significantly 
related to different debt levels are exactly the same factors that may have caused 
higher expenses and lower net margins being exacerbated by the lower leverage 
multiplier in SHX.   
The difference in financial performance between SZX and SHX is consistent with 
the difference in the capital structure determinants being identified according to 
the three theoretical approaches. This demonstrates that the capital structures 
are related to determinants such as asymmetric information, product diversity, 
asset specificity and agency costs, and that it is these same factors and the 
resulting capital structure patterns that influence the value of firms.  
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6.7. Concluding Remarks  
The comparative results of the modelling using both the OLS and LMM methods 
with both LDE and ARCHDTA as the dependent variables across the three data 
sets for the Shanghai Securities Exchange (SHX), the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZX), and the combined data set demonstrate three key findings:  
• Consistently, in both the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges, the 
capital structure of the listed companies is significantly related to five 
common financial variables. It is positively related to tax, growth, and 
capital intensity and negatively related to profit and size.     
• Interestingly, and mainly in the Shenzhen stock exchange, the capital 
structure of the listed companies is positively related to product 
diversification and negatively related to asset specificity.  
• Importantly, only in the Shanghai stock exchange, the capital structure of 
the listed companies is positively related to government ownership and 
high ownership concentration and negatively related to legal person 
ownership and low ownership concentration.  
These three findings and the associated evidence from this research have 
produced a convincing conclusion that the underlying factors that contribute to 
shaping the capital structure of Chinese listed companies are information 
asymmetry, product diversification, asset specificity and agency cost. These are 
exactly the issues we would predict would be present in a transitional economy of 
the sort that China has been under during the period from 1991 to 2000.  
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We also observe that there are different capital structure patterns for the listed 
companies in the two exchanges of SZX and SHX. We have concluded that these 
differences in capital structure are associated with different factors that may be 
determining them. We further observe that the listed companies in these two 
respective exchanges have different levels of financial performance. Specifically, 
Shenzhen companies are more profitable than Shanghai companies in terms of 
the return on equity. 
One conclusion that may be gleaned is that different levels of profit are related to 
capital structure, whilst capital structure variation itself is influenced by different 
patterns of determining factors such as product diversification, asset specificity, 
and corporate governance and information asymmetry in financial markets.   
In the original work on capital structure, Durand (1952) argued that capital 
structure influences the value of firms, although Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
disputed this conclusion for a set of restrictive assumptions about markets and 
imperfections. It is interesting to conjecture in the Chinese context that this 
research has investigated what effect capital structure has on the value of 
Chinese listed companies. In real world markets, capital structure can influence 
firms’ value through its impact on risk, profitability and dividends, and the growth 
potential of a business. We might expect that a firm’s value might be maximised 
in the Shenzhen listed companies compared to the Shanghai listed companies 
because of the higher gearing of the former. At the same time, if the gearing was 
perceived as a significant risk, then this might negatively affect the firms’ value. 
However, the research suggests this risk could be moderated adequately by the 






This chapter summarises the research undertaken in this thesis, examines the 
responses to the research question and highlights a number of issues not 
previously addressed in the literature. The contributions and the limitations in the 
research are discussed, and suggestions are put forward for future research. 
7.1 Contribution to Knowledge 
This thesis has examined the determinants of capital structure of Chinese listed 
companies for the period of 1991 to 2000. The study has extended the 
conventional financial approach to include business strategy and corporate 
governance factors. This was done with reference to the Chinese institutional 
context. The empirical work addresses the determinants of capital structure, and 
implicit in the modelling is an assumption that theoretical relationships will be 
moderated by the existence of underdeveloped financial markets and institutions, 
the nature of product and assets markets, and the state of corporate governance 
in Chinese corporate system. All these factors are assessed in terms of the 
choice of debt or equity in Chinese firms. The Chinese institutional factors have 
been in a state of transition and growth and this requires a consideration of cross 
sectional and time series effects. In addition, this study examines financial, 




A broad sample of Chinese listed companies was established and resulted in a 
large panel data set of 1,098 Chinese listed companies. This included 6,670 
cross sectional observations and time series for the period of up to 10 years. The 
nature of this sample and the research question addressed required both 
conventional OLS models and more powerful LMM models to be applied to 
analyse the data.  LMM is an important technique that is increasingly used to 
analyse panel data as it does not assume independence between the explanatory 
variables and is able to deal multiple levels of analysis and the issues of 
autoregression and multicollinearity. A comprehensive research process was 
followed estimating, testing and comparing two statistical methods and their 
associated results across four models using two dependent variables for three 
data sets. The main research findings follow.  
In the immediate post-Deng reform period (1980-1990), debt was overwhelmingly 
the dominant form of corporate finance. Between 1990 and 2000, the 
establishment of equity markets occurred, and debt levels in Chinese listed 
companies declined rapidly. Equity was provided through firstly the Shanghai 
Securities Exchange, and a year later, through the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
Whilst the two markets converged in terms of financial practices and the capital 
structure of their listed companies, there were times when the two markets were 
very different in the capital structures of the companies listed on them. In this 
research, this is acknowledged by the use of a combined data set and also the 
use of separate data sets for the two exchanges. From this background, the 
research found that: 
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1. The capital structure of Chinese listed companies is positively related to 
tax rate, growth and capital intensity as predicted by trade-off theory and 
negatively related to profit and size as predicted by pecking order theory. 
No significant relationships were established for tangibility, risk and 
duration. These five significant determinants were common across the two 
markets.  
2. The capital structure of Chinese listed companies, and particularly those 
listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, is positively related to product 
diversification and negatively related to asset specificity as predicted by 
product diversification view and transaction cost economics theory. Firms 
on the Shanghai Securities Exchange did not present business strategy 
factors as strongly as those on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
3. The capital structure of Chinese listed companies, but only of those listed 
on the Shanghai Securities Exchange, is positively related to government 
ownership and the concentration of ownership by the single largest 
shareholder and negatively related to legal person ownership and the 
concentration of ownership by the ten largest shareholders as predicted by 
the agency cost theory. This was not found on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. 
4. A conclusion of this research is that explanations underlying these 
relationships are consistent with information symmetry in both the 
Shenzhen and Shanghai markets; product diversification and asset 
specificity, particularly in the Shenzhen market; and the agency costs of 
debt and equity in the Shanghai market. 
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5. As noted above, the different capital structure determinants in the two 
markets have led to different capital structure patterns. The companies 
listed on the Shanghai Securities Exchange had lower debt ratios than 
those on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and, interestingly, subsequent 
financial performances were also different between the Shenzhen and 
Shanghai listed companies. 
6. Most of the results above are replicated when different dependent 
variables are used or when the LMM form of modelling is adopted. 
This research contributes to the general study of capital structure by 
substantiating previous research in a Chinese context and by explaining the 
impact of non-financial determinants of capital structure. It also offers a fresh 
insight into the behaviour of Chinese listed firms, in particular their capital 
structure and financing at a time of rapid change and transition  
As mentioned earlier, the growth and development of firms depend crucially on 
their access to, and sources of, financial capital. The access to and the efficient 
use of the sources of financial capital, however, depend on the fundamental 
capital structure determinants that exist within the institutions of an economy.  
As the Chinese economy continues to grow, China will need to improve financial 
regulation and information exposure for institutions and markets. Chinese listed 
companies may note that business strategy factors could also influence the way 
in which they are viewed by financial markets. Whilst Chinese financial and 
regulatory authorities are already reforming corporate governance, these 
measures will need to continue. 
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At the policy level, it is essential for China to develop and improve the institutions 
and supporting economic and regulatory infrastructure to promote the 
development of efficient markets and financial institutions, product and asset 
markets, and the mechanisms of corporate governance, so that firms’ choice of 
equity or debt may be made in a more informed and transparent market and 
institutional context.  
7.2  Some Limitations to the Research 
Like any other research, this thesis is subject to a number of limitations. Firstly, 
the panel data used is not balanced where the number of cross-sectional 
observations is not the same as the number of time series observations, thus 
causing some degrees of different weight in results between years. Hence there 
is only a small number of firms in the data set at the beginning of the period. 
Attrition led to some firms exiting before 2000, and peaks of entry onto the market 
— the result of central government intervention — has skewed the data set to a 
concentration of firms over particular periods in the data set. This is evidenced by 
the uneven distribution of observations according to years and durations. This 
problem will be resolved once the Chinese stock markets have operated for a 
prolonged period and when more data is available for research.   
Secondly, whilst every effort has been made to ensure absolute accuracy in data 
collection, the data collected was from secondary sources and from periods when 
Chinese accounting and financial reporting practices were developing. The very 
large sample used is some insurance against these factors leading to distortions, 
as it is assumed that any imperfections in the data caused by reporting practices 
were neutral between firms.  
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Nevertheless the data quality as to comprehensiveness and detail may have 
prevented the quantitative analysis from presenting a complete picture of the 
Chinese capital structure determinants. In particular, where the Chinese 
institutional context is characterised by a strong influence of government policies, 
regulations and instructions, the quantitative analysis alone may not be sufficient 
to answer the research question. Some alternative research methods such as 
case study and survey study could be used in the future to substantiate the 
results from the large scale empirical study. Given the scope of research in this 
thesis, these alternative research methods can only be considered in a separate 
research project.  
Thirdly, the LMM method needs to be refined with interaction effects to obtain a 
clearer picture of capital structure determinants. This thesis did not examine the 
interactive relationships between financial, business strategy and corporate 
governance factors. The possibility of this kind of research is evidenced by the 
discussed integrated theories of transaction cost economies and agency costs 
and the discussed integrated theories of information asymmetry and agency cost. 
However, given the scope of a large panel data set with a large number of 
dependent and independent variables, this research limited its analysis to the 
direct effects of variables on capital structure. 
Fourthly, the sometimes-observed inconsistent results between the OLS and 
LMM methods, particularly in the area of product and asset dummy variables, 
could have posed some statistical questions in relation to the implication of non-
time-varying factors for the random effect. Specifically, it might be argued that the 
dummy variables should all have been time varying, although it would have 
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involved a significant extra investment in data collection and transformation.  As it 
stands, this research analyses the determinants of capital structure without that 
level of micro analysis. This could well be the focus for new research.  
Finally, this research has focused on the analysis of Chinese capital structure 
determinants and patterns and has not sought to explain comparative differences 
between this data and that collected and analysed in different national and 
instituitional contexts, even though we know there are significant differences 
between Chinese and Western companies in their capital structure. Given the 
obvious differences between China and other countries, such a comparative 
study would be extremely valuable, but it is beyond the scope of this study.  
7.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
The area of research into Chinese capital structure has grown rapidly, particularly 
in the context of the short history of Chinese stock markets and Chinese listed 
companies. However, the theories derived from the study of capital structure in 
Western economies, whilst pertinent, may not fit the nature of the Chinese firm 
and the Chinese institutional context.  The development of theory in this area 
would greatly assist this work. As China is a very large country, the variations 
between ownership types, geographical areas, industries and temporal periods 
are significant and may impact capital structure decisions. Therefore, it is 
suggested the following directions for research on Chinese capital structure be 




1. This study is limited to the Chinese listed companies. The listed 
companies only account for no more than 10% of total companies in 
China. Further study can be done on the Chinese non-listed companies. A 
comparative analysis of the differences between these two groups of 
companies would be interesting. 
2. This study does not extend the geographical differences in securities and 
stock exchanges to the companies themselves. With major cultural, 
development and stakeholder differences across China, these locational 
differences could be important. Obviously, the geographical variations in 
economic characteristics are significant for firms’ operations. A 
comparative analysis of these differences between regions of companies 
would be interesting.  
3. Some capital structure scholars have examined the implications of industry 
classification for the study of capital structure at a deeper level than in this 
study. This may be particularly important in considerations of the impact of 
business diversification and asset specificity.  
4. This study has focused on the period of the first ten years of Chinese stock 
markets and listed companies. This period can be regarded as an early 
period of corporate history in China, where corporate behaviour and 
regulatory frameworks are still emerging. A study needs to be conducted 
on Chinese stock markets and listed companies for the periods beyond 
2000 to examine the relationships between equity or debt of the listed 
companies in a maturing system.      
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Notwithstanding these potential new avenues for research, this thesis has, by its 
broad data coverage, its intensive research methods, and its examination of 
evolving and complex relationships underpinning the nature of the firm, 
established clear evidence of corporate financing practices in China’s emerging 
economic system. This study offers a useful comparative benchmark for other 
empirical studies in other countries, and contributes to the broader debate on the 
overall determinants of capital structure in firms, in general, and in those in 











Table A1.1: Ownership Structure of Chinese Listed Companies (100 million shares), 1992-2003 
Share Type Nature of shares 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average 
A-share Tradable 10.93 61.34 143.76 179.94 267.32 442.68 608.03 813.18 1078.16 1318.13 1509.22 1714.73 678.95 
B-share Tradable 10.25 24.7 41.46 56.52 78.65 117.31 133.96 141.92 151.56 163.1 167.61 175.35 105.2 
H-share Tradable 0 21.84 40.82 65 83.88 111.45 119.95 124.54 124.54 331.94 360.07 377.62 146.8 
Sub-total Tradable 21.18 107.88 226.04 301.46 429.85 671.44 861.94 1079.64 1354.26 1813.17 2036.9 2267.7 930.96 
G-share Non-tradable 29 190.22 296.47 328.67 432.01 612.28 865.51 1116.07 1475.13 2410.61 2773.43 3046.53 1131.33 
L-share 1 Non-tradable 9.05 34.97 73.87 135.18 224.63 439.91 528.06 590.51 642.54 663.17 664.51 699.95 392.2 
L-share 2 Non-tradable 2.8 4.09 7.52 11.84 14.99 26.07 35.77 40.51 46.2 45.8 53.26 59.23 29.01 
L-share 3 Non-tradable 6.49 41.06 72.82 61.93 91.82 130.48 152.34 190.1 214.2 245.25 299.7 309.71 151.33 
Employee 
shares Non-tradable 0.85 9.32 6.72 3.07 14.64 39.62 51.7 36.71 24.29 23.75 15.62 10.97 19.77 
Others Non-tradable 0 0.19 1.1 6.27 11.6 22.87 31.47 33.2 35.07 16.28 32.02 34.36 18.7 
Sub-total Non-tradable 48.19 279.85 458.5 546.96 789.69 1271.23 1664.85 2007.1 2437.43 3404.86 3838.54 4160.75 1742.33 
Total Both tradable & non-tradable 69.37 387.73 684.54 848.42 1219.54 1942.67 2526.79 3086.74 3791.69 5218.03 5875.44 6428.45 2673.28 
Sub-total Tradable as % of total shares 0.31 0.28 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 
Sub-total Non-tradable as % of total shares 0.69 0.72 0.67 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66 
Source: China Securities Regulatory Commission, www.csrc.org.cn 
Note:  A-share is a type of share for Chinese citizens to buy and sell in the shanghai Securities Exchange (SHX) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
B-share is a type of share for only foreign citizens to buy and sell in the SZX and SHX markets. 
H-share is a type of share for Hong Kong citizens to buy and sell in Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
A-share is a type of share owned by Chinese government and is not tradable. 
L-share 1 is a type of share owned by Chinese sponsoring legal persons and is not tradable. 
L-share 2 is a type of share owned by foreign legal persons and is not tradable. 
L-share 3 is a type of share owned by Chinese social legal persons and is not tradable. 
Employee shares are a type of share owned by employees and is not tradable. 
Others is a type of share which does not belong to any of the above. 
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Table A1.2: The Change in Corporate Finance in China: 1991-2005 
Year GDP  
(RMB$100 million) 




Value of Stocks 
to GDP Ratio (%) 
Capital raised in 
Stock Markets 
(RMB$100 million) 
Capital raised in 





Loans to GDP 
Ratio 
1991 21781.50b 5.00b 0.02% 21337.80b 97.96% 
1992 26923.50b 1048.00c 3.89% 94.10b 0.35% 26322.90b 97.77% 
1993 35333.90b 3531.00c 9.99% 375.50b 1.06% 32943.10b 93.23% 
1994 48197.90b 3691.00c 7.66% 326.80b 0.68% 40810.10b 84.67% 
1995 60793.70b 4393.54a 7.23% 150.32b 0.25% 50538.00b 83.13% 
1996 71176.60b 11894.23a 16.71% 425.08b 0.60% 61152.80b 85.92% 
1997 78973.00b 19754.19a 25.01% 1293.82b 1.64% 74914.10b 94.86% 
1998 84402.30b 21245.12a 25.17% 841.50b 1.00% 86524.10b 102.51% 
1999 89677.10b 28735.97a 32.04% 944.60b 1.05% 93734.30b 104.52% 
2000 99214.60b 52103.35a 52.52% 2103.10b 2.12% 99371.07b 100.16% 
2001 109655.20b 48918.62a 44.61% 1252.30b 1.14% 112314.70b 102.43% 
2002 120332.70b 42819.32a 35.58% 961.80b 0.80% 131293.90b 109.11% 
2003 135822.80b 47885.15a 35.26% 1357.80b 1.00% 158996.20b 117.06% 
2004 159878.30b 41317.35a 25.84% 1510.90b 0.95% 178197.80b 111.46% 
2005 182320.60b  1882.60b 1.03% 194690.40b 106.78% 




Table A1.3: Financial Leverage in Developed and Developing Countries in 2001 
 Long Term Debt/ Equity 













Canada 0.990 0.539 1.600 0.479 0.045 0.014 0.064 
Finland 3.049 1.856 4.920 .0341 0.042 0.007 0.007 
France 1.417 2.108 3.613 0.234 0.043 0.014 0.094 
Germany 1.479 1.188 2.732 0.321 0.070 0.013 0.087 
Italy 1.114 1.954 3.068 0.327 0.041 0.014 0.080 
Japan 0.938 2.726 3.688 0.245 0.026 0.007 0.067 
UK 0.387 1.065 1.480 0.336 0.032 0.025 0.108 
USA 1.054 0.679 1.791 0.370 0.045 0.016 0.091 
Average 1.303 1.514 2.861 0.293 0.043 0.013 0.074 
Developing Countries 
Brazil 0.139 0.421 0.560 0.640 NA 0.002 0.057 
India 0.763 1.937 2.700 0.405 0.038 0.019 0.132 
Jordan 0.266 0.915 1.181 0.459 NA 0.033 0.073 
Korea 1.057 2.390 3.662 0.371 0.053 0.008 0.10 
Malaysia 0.284 0.639 0.935 0.405 0.021 0.026 0.087 
Mexico 0.375 0.442 0.817 0.579 NA NA 0.076 
Pakistan 0.595 2.358 2.953 0.384 0.038 0.028 0.115 
Thailand 0.518 1.769 2.315 0.380 0.030 0.029 0.129 
Turkey 0.485 1.511 1.996 0.414 NA 0.068 0.239 
Zimbabwe 0.187 0.615 0.801 NA 0.031 0.028 0.131 
Average 0.470 1.300 1.790 0.450 0.040 0.030 0.110 




Table A1.4: Trends in Capital Structure of Chinese Listed Companies: 1992–2003 
 Total Assets (RMB$100 million) 
Total Liabilities 
(RMB$100 million) 
Liabilities to Total Assets 
Ratio (%) 
Short Term Liabilities to 
Total Assets Ratio (%) 
1992 481.00 312.73 65.02 50.1 
1993 1821.00 888.00 48.76 37.1 
1994 3309.00 1681.00 50.80 38.8 
1995 4295.00 2337.00 54.41 42.0 
1996 6352.00 3412.00 53.72 40.6 
1997 9660.58 4835.81 50.06 38.8 
1998 12407.52 6140.76 49.49 38.1 
1999 16107.36 8468.01 52.57 39.0 
2000 21673.88 11594.11 53.49 40.2 
2001 37215.95 22025.59 59.18 45.3 
2002 44400.01 27931.56 62.91 50.2 
2003 53371.31 34630.81 64.89 51.5 
Average   55.44 42.64 




Table A1.5: Capital Structure of Chinese Listed Companies: 1999-2000 
Debt to Total Asset Ratio Number of Companies, 1999 % of Total Companies Number of Companies, 2000 % of Total Companies 
0-30% 247 26.00 267 24.50 
30%-50% 328 34.50 409 37.60 
50%-80% 331 34.90 350 32.20 
80% and above 43 4.60 62 5.70 
Total 949 100.00 1088 100.00 
Sources: Yan, Yan Yang (2006, pp.87, 88 & 96) 
 
Table A1.6: Un-weighted Average Gross Financing of Non-Financial Enterprises (%): International Comparison, 1970-1985  
 Canada Finland France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
Retention 54.2 42.1 44.1 55.2 38.5 33.7 72.0 66.9 
Capital transfers 0.0 0.1 1.4 6.7 5.7 0.0 2.9 0.0 
Short-term securities 1.4 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 NA 2.3 1.4 
Loans 12.8 27.2 41.5 21.1 38.6 40.7 21.4 23.1 
Trade Credit 8.6 17.2 4.7 2.2 0.0 18.3 2.8 8.4 
Bonds 6.1 1.8 2.3 0.7 2.4 3.1 0.8 9.7 
Shares 11.9 5.6 10.6 2.1 10.8 3.5 4.9 0.8 
Other 4.1 6.9 0.0 11.9 1.6 0.7 2.2 -6.1 
Statistical adjustment 0.8 -3.5 -4.7 0.0 2.3 NA -9.4 -4.1 
Total 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 100.0 99.9 100.1 




Table A1.7: Pecking Order of Funding in Developed Countries (%): 1984–1991 
USA UK Japan Germany 
Internal Financing 77 51 44 67 
Debt Financing 31 35 48 29 
Equity Financing -8 14 8 4 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Sources: Yan, Yan Yang (2006, p.87) 
Table A1.8: Corporate Finance in Chinese Listed Companies, 1995-2000 
 Profit > zero   Profit < zero   
 Internal funding External funding  Internal funding External funding  
  Equity funding Debt funding  Equity funding Debt funding 
1995 12.40 51.48 36.13 9.50 48.78 41.73 
1996 14.75 49.40 35.85 3.23 39.38 57.40 
1997 15.43 52.23 32.35 -3.28 47.05 56.23 
1998 13.73 46.18 40.10 -10.55 50.63 59.93 
1999 14.23 51.15 34.63 -15.83 55.33 60.50 
2000 19.19 53.23 27.59 NA NA NA 
Average 14.95 50.61 34.44 -3.38 48.23 55.15 
Sources: Guo Xin Securities Co. (2002); Yan, Yan Yang (2006, p.87, 97) 
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Table A2.1: General Survey of Literature on Capital Structure (cont’d over page) 
Countries and Regions under 
Study 
Authors 
International Study:  
Asian Companies Aggarwal, R. (1990) 
Asia Pacific Region Deesomsak, R., K. Paudyal and G. Pescetto (2004) 
East Asia Allayannis, G., G. W. Brown and L. F. Klapper (2003); Driffield, N. (2007) 
Emerging Economies Aggarwal, S. (1999) 
Developed & Emerging Markets Glen, J. and A. Singh (2004) 
Developing Countries Demirguc-Kunt, A. and V. Maksimovic (1994); Aylward, A. (1997) Booth, L.V. A., A. Demirguc-Kunt, and V. Maksimovic (2001) 
Arab Countries Alimari, M.,  and H. Barakat (2003) 
OECD Countries Song, J. Y. (2004) 
European Countries Bancel, F. and U.R. Mittoo (2004); Dirk Brounen, Deb de Jong and Kees Koedijk (2005) 
G-7 Aggarwal, R. and S. Jamdee (2003) 
Baltic Countries Norvaisience, R. and J.Stankevicience (2007) 
International  Rajan, R. G. and L. Zingales (1995)  
Global Atkin, M. and J. Glen (1992) 
World de Jong, A., R. Kabir and T. T. Nguyen (2006) 
Developed Countries  
United States Auerbach, A.J. (1985); Friedman, B.M. (1985); Hatfield, G. B., L. T.W. Cheng and W. N. Davidson (1994); Frank, M. Z.  and V. K. Goyal (2003); 
Strebulaev, I. A. (2003) 
United Kingdom Short, H. and K. Keasey (1997); Jordon, J.,  J. Lowe and P. Taylor (1998); Bevan, A. A.  and J. Danbolt (2000); Ozkan, A. (2001); Fattouth, B., H. 
Laurence and S. Pasquale (2004); Chkir, I. E. and J.-C. Cosset (2007)  
Germany Schmidt, R. H.  (1976) 
Canada King, M. R.  and E. Santor (2007) 
Australia Allen, D.E. (1991); Shuetrim, G., P. Lowe and S. Morling (1993); Lowe, J., T. Naughton and P. Taylor (1994); Gatward, P. and I. G. Sharpe (1996); 
Cassar, G. and S. Holmes (2003); Akhtar, S. (2004);  Arsiraphongphisit, O. and M. Ariff (2007) 
United States and Japan Taninure, K. J.  (2001) 
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Table A2.1: General Survey of Literature on Capital Structure (cont’d) 
Japan Nishioka, S. and N. Baba (2004); Yonezawa, Y., H. Yamaguchi, T.Yamamoto and T. Nambu (2006) 
Spain Mira, F. S.  (2002); Benito, A.  (2003); Menendez-Alonso, E. J.  (2003) 
Portugal Nunes, P. J. M. and Z.M.  Serrasqueiro (2007)   
France and Greece Daskalakis, N. and M. Psillaki (2007) 
Greece Eriotis, N., D. Vasiliou and Z. Ventoura-Neokosmidi (2007) 
Turkey Senel, K., I. and B. Pamukcu (2004) 
Italy M. L. Rocca, Al. Cariola and T. La Rocca (2007) 
Switzerland Drobetz, W. and R. Fix (2003) 
Sweden Rademark, A.  (2006);  Gardangen, M. (2007) 
Developing Countries  
India Kakani, R. K. and V.N. Reddy (1998); Majumdar, S. K.  and C. Pradeep (1999); Bhaduri, S.N. (2002); Green, C. , V. Murinde and J. Suppakijarak 
(2002) 
South Korea Y. R. Choi (2003); Fattouth, B., H. Laurence and S. Pasquale (2005) 
Chile Ghaddar, S. (2003) 
Thailand Wiwattanakantang, Y. (2000); Luvisuth, L., R. Firchild and R. S. Rathinasamy (2007) 
Thailand and Malaysia Prasad, S., C. J. Green and V. Murinde (2001) 
Malaysia Chu, E. Y. (2006) 
Pakistan Saeed, A. (2007) 
Ghana Abor, J. (2007a); Abor, J. (2007b) 
Libya Buferna, F., K. Bangassa and L. Hodgkinson (2000) 
Egypt Ismail, M. A.  and T. I. Eldomiaty (2004) 
Brazil Zonenschain, C. N. (2004); Iquiapaza, R. A., A. A. de Souza and H. F. Amaral (2007) 
Former Socialist Countries  
Czechslavakia Clasessens, S., S. Djankov and G. Pohl (1996); Palata, M. (2003) 
Poland Hussain, Q. and E. Nivorozhkin (1997) 
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Table A2.2: Trade-off between Debt (HighTax Benefits) and Equity (Low Bankruptcy Costs) 
  Debt Tax Benefits Debt Bankruptcy Costs 
 
Low Debt-Equity Ratio 
(less debt than equity) 
 
Companies with low debt-equity ratios may 
not benefit from debt tax shields and non-
debt tax shields. 
 
Low debt-equity ratio is recommended for 
the companies with little debt tax shields 
and little non-debt tax shields. 
 
 
Companies with low debt-equity ratios may 
not suffer from bankruptcy costs and 
information costs. 
 
Low debt-equity ratio is recommended for 
the companies with high bankruptcy costs 











High Debt-Equity Ratio 
(more debt than equity) 
 
 
Companies with high debt-equity ratios may 
benefit from debt tax shields and non-debt 
tax shields. 
 
High debt-equity ratio is recommended for 
the companies with much debt tax shields 
and much non-debt tax shields. 
 
 
Companies with high debt-equity ratios may 
suffer from bankruptcy costs and information 
costs. 
 
High debt-equity ratio is recommended for 
the companies with low bankruptcy costs 
and low information costs. 
 
Note: 
• The use of debt may enable companies to benefit from tax deduction but it may increase the possibility of company’s bankruptcy. 
• The use of equity may decrease the possibility of company’s bankruptcy but it may lose company’s benefit of tax deduction. 
• The choice of debt or equity is a balance between debt tax benefits and debt bankruptcy costs. 
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Table  A2.3: Trade-off between Debt (Debt Agency Cost) and Equity (Equity Agency Cost) 
   High Ownership Concentration & 
High Government Ownership 
(Debt Agency Cost) 
Low Ownership Concentration & 
High Non-Government Ownership 









Low Debt-Equity Ratio 
(less debt than equity) 
 
Companies with high ownership 
concentration and high government 
ownership tend to take a high debt-equity 
ratio due to debt agency cost. 
 
When these companies adopt a low debt-
equity ratio, they may not suffer from debt 
agency cost but they may suffer from equity 
agency cost. 
Companies with low ownership concentration and 
high non-government ownership tend to take low 
debt-equity ratio due to equity agency cost. 
 
These companies adopt a low debt-equity ratio, 
they may suffer from equity agency cost but they 
may not suffer from debt agency cost. 
 High Debt-Equity Ratio 
(more debt than equity) 
 
Companies with high ownership 
concentration and high government 
ownership tend to take a high debt-equity 
ratio due to debt agency cost. 
 
When these companies adopt a high debt-
equity ratio, they may suffer from debt agency 
cost but they may not suffer from equity 
agency cost. 
Companies with low ownership concentration and 
high non-government ownership tend to take low 
debt-equity ratio due to equity agency cost. 
 
These companies adopt a high debt-equity ratio, 
they may not suffer from equity agency cost but 
they may suffer from debt agency cost. 
 
Note: 
• The use of debt may enable companies to reduce equity agency cost to shareholders arising from low ownership concentration and high non-
government ownership but it may increase debt agency cost to creditors. 
• The use of equity may enable companies to reduce debt agency cost to creditors arising from high ownership concentration and low non-
government ownership but it may increase equity agency cost to shareholders. 
• The Choice of debt or equity is a balance between low ownership concentration (equity agency cost) and high ownership concentration (debt 
agency cost) and between high government ownership (equity agency cost) and high non-government ownership (debt agency cost). 
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Table A2.4: Trade-off between Debt (Product Diversification) and Equity (Product Specialisation) 
  Product Diversification (Low Debt Cost With High Production Cost) 
Product Specialisation (High Debt Cost 








Low Debt-Equity Ratio 
(less debt than equity) 
When companies with high product diversification 
take low debt-equity ratio, they may not benefit 
from low debt costs and they may also suffer 
from high production costs.  
 
Low debt-equity ratio is recommended for the 
companies with low product diversification. 
When companies with high product specialisation 
take low debt-equity ratio, they may benefit from 
avoiding high debt costs and they may also benefit 
from low production costs.  
 
Low debt-equity ratio is recommended for the 
companies with high product specialisation. 
 High Debt-Equity Ratio 
(more debt than equity) 
 
 
When companies with high product diversification 
take high debt-equity ratio, they may benefit from 
low debt costs but they may suffer from high 
production costs.  
 
High debt-equity ratio is recommended for the 
companies with high product diversification. 
When companies with high product specialisation 
take high debt-equity ratio, they may suffer from high 
debt costs but they may benefit from low production 
costs.  
 
High debt-equity ratio is recommended for the 
companies with low product specialisation. 
 
Note: 
• The use of debt may enable companies to benefit from product diversification (low business risk and low debt cost) but product diversification 
may increase production cost. 
• The use of equity may enable companies to benefit from product specialisation (low production cost) but product specialisation may increase 
business risk and debt cost. 
• The choice of debt or equity is a balance between product specialisation (low production cost) and product diversification (low debt cost). 
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Table A2.5: Trade-off between Debt (Asset Generality) and Equity (Asset Specificity)  
  Asset Specificity (High Transaction Cost 
With High Efficiency Benefit ) 
Asset Generality (Low Transaction Cost 









Low Debt-Equity Ratio 
(less debt than equity) 
 
Low debt-equity ratio is recommended for the 
companies with high asset specificity. 
 
When companies adopt a low debt-equity ratio in 
financing assets with high specificity, they may 
suffer from high transaction costs of debt but they 
may benefit from high efficiency benefit. 
Low debt-equity ratio is recommended for the 
companies with low asset generality. 
 
When companies adopt a low debt-equity ratio in 
financing assets with high generality, they may 
not suffer from high transaction costs of debt but 
they may not receive high efficiency benefits. 
 High Debt-Equity Ratio 




High debt-equity ratio is recommended for the 
companies with high asset specificity. 
 
When companies adopt a high debt-equity ratio in 
financing assets with high specificity, they may 
benefit from high efficiency benefits but they also 
suffer from high transaction costs. 
 
High debt-equity ratio is recommended for the 
companies with high asset generality. 
 
When companies adopt a high debt-equity ratio 
in financing assets with high generality, they may 
benefit from low transaction costs of debt but 
they receive low efficiency benefits. 
Note: 
• The use of debt may enable companies to benefit from the employment of general assets (low debt transaction costs) but it may discourage 
companies to benefit from the employment of specific assets (benefit of high efficiency). 
• The use of equity may enable companies to benefit from the employment of specific assets (benefit of high efficiency) but it may discourage 
companies to benefit from the employment of general assets (low debt transaction cost). 




Table A2.6: Trade-Off between Debt and Equity through Interactions among Financial, Strategy and Governance Factors 
   Debt vs Equity 
Three Approaches to Capital 
Structure Study 






Financial Approach Trade Off Theory Tax Benefits High Low  
   Bankruptcy Costs High Low  
 Asymmetric Information Hypothesis Positive Signal to investors High Low 
  Negative Signal to investors Low High 
Business Strategy Approach Product Diversification View Business Diversification Benefits High  Low 
   Specialisation Costs High Low 
  Transaction Cost Economics Transaction Cost with General 
Asset 
Low High 
   Transaction Cost with Specific 
Asset 
High  Low 
Corporate Governance  Approach Agency Cost Theory Debt Agent Cost  High  Low 
   Equity Agency Cost Low High 
The choice of debt or equity is a balance between the benefits of using debt or equity and the costs of using debt or equity in relation to financial, 
business strategy and corporate governance factors. 
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Table A2.7: Trade-off between Debt and Equity through Interaction of Information Asymmetry and Agency Costs  
Capital Structure Agency costs Market signals 
 
Low Debt-Equity Ratio 
(less debt than equity) 
 
 
Companies taking low debt-equity ratio may reduce debt 
agency cost but may suffer from high equity agency cost. 
 
 
In taking low debt-equity ratio, companies with low debt agency 
cost may give a good signal to markets. 
 
In taking low debt-equity ratio, companies with high equity 
agency cost may give a bad signal to markets. 
 
 
High Debt-Equity Ratio 
(more debt than equity) 
 
 
Companies taking high debt-equity ratio may reduce equity 
agency cost but may suffer from high debt agency cost. 
 
 
In taking high debt-equity ratio, companies with low equity 
agency cost may give a good signal to markets. 
 
In taking high debt-equity ratio, companies with high debt 
agency cost may give a bad signal to markets. 
 
Note: 
• The use of debt may enable companies to benefit from reducing equity agency cost (giving a good signal to markets) but increasing debt agency 
cost (giving a bad signal to markets). 
• The use of equity may enable companies to benefit from reducing debt agency cost (giving a good signal to markets) but increasing equity 
agency cost (giving a bad signal to markets). 




Table A2.8: Trade-off between Debt and Equity through Interaction of Transaction Costs and Agency Costs  
  High Debt Transaction Cost  Low Debt Transaction Cost 








Low Debt-Equity Ratio 
(less debt than equity) 
 
 
Companies with high asset specificity take 
low debt-equity ratio, they may avoid high 
debt transaction cost and they may suffer 
from high equity agency cost. 
 
 
High Debt-Equity Ratio 




Companies with low asset specificity 
take low debt-equity ratio, they may 
lose the benefit of low debt transaction 
cost but they may benefit from low 








High Debt-Equity Ratio 
(more debt than equity) 
 
 
Companies with high asset specificity take 
high debt-equity ratio, they may suffer from 
high debt transaction cost but they may 
benefit from low equity agency cost. 
 
 
Low Debt-Equity Ratio 
(less debt than equity) 
 
 
Companies with high low specificity 
take high debt-equity ratio, they may 
benefit from low debt transaction cost 





• The use of debt may enable companies to benefit from the employment of general assets (low debt transaction costs) but it may increase 
debt agency cost. 
• The use of equity may enable companies to benefit from the employment of specific assets (low equity transaction costs) but it may increase 
equity agency cost. 




Table A2.9a: Summary of Main Hypothesised Relationships Identified in Financial Approach   
Research Approaches 
and Main Explanatory 
Factors 
Hypothesised Sign of 
Coefficient to Capital 
Structure 
Main Institutional Conditions for the 




Institutional Conditions where sign may be 
reversed 
Financial Approach     
• Tax Positive Transparent and consistent tax system; 
Profit maximising behavior of managers 
TOT Less transparent and in consistent tax 
system; 
Non-profit maximising behaviors of managers 
• Profitability Positive 
 




Less transparent and in consistent tax 
system; 
Information asymmetry 
• Size Positive 
 
Developed debt markets and financial institutions 




Under-developed debt markets and financial 
institutions 
little bankruptcy threat 
Information asymmetry 
• Growth Positive 
 
Developed debt markets and financial institutions 




Under-developed debt markets and financial 
institutions 
little bankruptcy threat 
Information asymmetry 
• Tangibility Positive Developed asset markets TOT Underdeveloped asset markets 
• Capital Intensity Positive Developed asset markets 
Established intellectual rights protection 
TOT Underdeveloped asset markets 
Little intellectual rights protection 
• Volatility or risk Negative Developed stock markets TOT Underdeveloped stock markets 
• Duration Positive Developed stock markets TOT Underdeveloped stock markets 
 Note: TOT for Trade-Off Theory; POT for Pecking Order Theory; PDV for Product Diversification View; TCE for Transaction Cost Theory; ACD for 
Debt Agency Cost Theory and ACE for Equity Agency Cost Theory. 
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Table A2.9b:  Summary of Main Hypothesised Relationships Identified in Business Strategy and Corporate Governance Approaches 
Research Approaches and 
Main Explanatory Factors 
Hypothesised Sign of 
Coefficient to Capital 
Structure 
Main Institutional Conditions for the 
Implication of Effect 
Five Relevant 
Theories 




    
• Product diversification Positive Developed product market 
Strong market competition 
PDV Under-developed product market 
Little market competition 
• Asset specificity Negative Developed asset markets 
low transaction cost 
TCE Under-developed asset market 
High transaction cost 
Corporate Governance 
Approach 
    




High debt agency cost 
Poor corporate governance with severe conflict 
of interest between shareholders and creditors 
ACD No debt agency cost 
Good corporate governance 
• Ownership structure: 
legal person ownership 
Negative 
 
High equity agency cost 
Poor corporate governance with severe conflict 
of interest between shareholders and managers 
ACE No equity agency cost 






High debt agency cost 
Poor corporate governance with severe conflict 
of interest between shareholders and creditors 
ACD No debt agency cost 






High equity agency cost 
Poor corporate governance with severe conflict 
of interest between shareholders and managers 
ACE No equity agency cost 
Good corporate governance 
Note: TOT for Trade-Off Theory; POT for Pecking Order Theory; PDV for Product Diversification View; TCE for Transaction Cost Theory; ACD for Debt 
Agency Cost Theory and ACE for Equity Agency Cost Theory. 
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Table A2.10a: Summary of Main Relationships Identified in Research Literature in Chinese Context 






Qian, et.al. (2007) Lei (2007)  
Research Approaches 
and Main Explanatory 
Factors 
Hyopthesise






































Institutional Conditions where sign 
may be reversed 
Financial Approach         
• Tax Positive   Negative   Negative Less transparent and in consistent 
tax system; Non-profit maximising 
behaviours of managers 
• Profitability Positive Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Less transparent and in consistent 
tax system; Information asymmetry 
• Size Positive Positive Positive Positive Negative Positive Positive Under-developed debt markets and 
financial institutions 
Little bankruptcy threat 
Information asymmetry 
• Growth Positive Positive  Positive Positive Negative Positive Under-developed debt markets and 
financial institutions 
Little bankruptcy threat 
Information asymmetry 
• Tangibility Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Underdeveloped asset markets 
• Capital Intensity Positive       Underdeveloped asset markets 
Little intellectual rights protection 
• Volatility or risk Negative  Positive Negative  Negative Negative Underdeveloped stock markets 
• Duration Positive       Underdeveloped stock markets 
• Non-debt tax 
• shields 
Negative  Negative Negative  Negative Negative  
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  Liu  
(1999) 























































Conditions where sign 
may be reversed 
Business Strategy Approach         




• Asset specificity Negative       Under-developed 
asset market 
High transaction cost 
Corporate Governance 
Approach 
        
• Ownership structure: 
government ownership 
Positive     Positive Positive No debt agency cost 
Good corporate 
governance 
• Ownership structure:  
legal person ownership 
Negative      Positive No equity agency cost 
Good corporate 
governance 
• Ownership concentration: 
one largest shareholder 
Positive       No debt agency cost 
Good corporate 
governance 
• Ownership concentration: 
ten largest shareholders 
Negative       No equity agency cost 
Good corporate 
governance 
Note: TOT for Trade-Off Theory; POT for Pecking Order Theory; PDV for Product Diversification View; TCE for Transaction Cost Theory; ACD for Debt 




Table A3.1: Increased Autonomy for State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 1980–1989 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Base retention rate (1) 7 19 22 30 34 37 39 38 39 39 
Marginal retention rate (2) 11 12 11 14 17 17 19 23 26 27 
Autonomy in production decisions (3) 7 8 10 14 25 35 40 53 64 67 
Wage discretion (3) 1 1 1 2 5 9 12 20 32 35 
Management Responsibility System (3) 0 0 0 1 2 4 8 42 83 88 
New Management appointed after 1980 (3) 9 9 15 25 40 40 61 75 85 94 
 
(1) Portion of profits that could be retained if profits did not exceed a specific base level  
(2) Portion of profits that could be retained if profits exceeded the base level  
(3) Share of firms in the sample  




Table A3.2a: Sources of Government Revenue (RMB$100 million), 1976-1998 
 Tax Revenue Enterprise Profit Borrowing Special Tax Other Enterprise Subsidy TOTAL 
1976 407.96 338.06   30.56  776.58 
1977 468.27 402.35   3.84  874.46 
1978 519.28 571.99   29.85  1121.12 
1979 537.82 492.90 35.31  37.24  1103.27 
1980 571.70 435.24 43.01  35.28  1085.23 
1981 629.89 353.68 73.08  32.81  1089.46 
1982 700.02 296.47 83.86  43.62  1123.97 
1983 775.59 240.52 79.41 93.00 60.47  1248.99 
1984 947.35 276.77 77.34 122.45 77.95  1501.86 
1985 2040.79 43.75 89.85 146.79 52.24  2373.42 
1986 2090.73 42.04 138.25 157.07 156.95 -324.78 2260.26 
1987 2140.36 42.86 169.55 180.18 212.38 -376.43 2368.90 
1988 2390.47 51.12 270.78 185.93 176.18 -446.46 2628.02 
1989 2730.59 60.99 407.97 198.12 184.56 -599.76 2982.47 
1990 2821.86 78.30 375.45  299.53 -578.88 2996.26 
1991 2990.17 74.69 461.40  240.10 -510.24 3256.12 
1992 3296.91 59.97 669.68  265.15 -444.96 3846.75 
1993 4255.30 49.49 739.22  191.04 -411.29 4823.76 
1994 5126.88 0.00 1175.25  280.18 -366.22 6216.09 
1995 6038.04 0.00 1549.76  396.19 -327.77 7656.22 
1996 6909.82 0.00 1967.28  724.66 -337.40 9264.36 
1997 8234.04 0.00 2476.82  682.30 -368.49 11024.67 
1998 9262.80 0.00 3310.93  833.30 -333.49 13073.54 
Sources:  China Statistical Year Book, 1990, (Chinese), p. 232, Table 6-4; China Statistical Year Book, 1999, (Chinese), p. 267, Table 8-3; China 
Statistical Year Book, 1999, (Chinese), p. 284, Table 8-16 borrowing 
  
288 
Table A3.2b: Sources of Government Revenue (%), 1976-1998 
 Tax Revenue Enterprise Profit Borrowing Special Tax Other Enterprise Subsidy TOTAL 
 % % % % % % % 
1976 52.53 43.53 0.00 0.00 3.94 0.00 100.00 
1977 53.55 46.01 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 100.00 
1978 46.32 51.02 0.00 0.00 2.66 0.00 100.00 
1979 48.75 44.68 3.20 0.00 3.38 0.00 100.00 
1980 52.68 40.11 3.96 0.00 3.25 0.00 100.00 
1981 57.82 32.46 6.71 0.00 3.01 0.00 100.00 
1982 62.28 26.38 7.46 0.00 3.88 0.00 100.00 
1983 62.10 19.26 6.36 7.45 4.84 0.00 100.00 
1984 63.08 18.43 5.15 8.15 5.19 0.00 100.00 
1985 85.99 1.84 3.79 6.18 2.20 0.00 100.00 
1986 92.50 1.86 6.12 6.95 6.94 -14.37 100.00 
1987 90.35 1.81 7.16 7.61 8.97 -15.89 100.00 
1988 90.96 1.95 10.30 7.07 6.70 -16.99 100.00 
1989 91.55 2.04 13.68 6.64 6.19 -20.11 100.00 
1990 94.18 2.61 12.53 0.00 10.00 -19.32 100.00 
1991 91.83 2.29 14.17 0.00 7.37 -15.67 100.00 
1992 85.71 1.56 17.41 0.00 6.89 -11.57 100.00 
1993 88.22 1.03 15.32 0.00 3.96 -8.53 100.00 
1994 82.48 0.00 18.91 0.00 4.51 -5.89 100.00 
1995 78.86 0.00 20.24 0.00 5.17 -4.28 100.00 
1996 74.58 0.00 21.23 0.00 7.82 -3.64 100.00 
1997 74.69 0.00 22.47 0.00 6.19 -3.34 100.00 
1998 70.85 0.00 25.33 0.00 6.37 -2.55 100.00 
Sources: China Statistical Year Book, 1990, (Chinese), p. 232, Table 6-4; China Statistical Year Book, 1999, (Chinese), p. 267, Table 8-3; 
China Statistical Year Book, 1999, (Chinese), p. 284, Table 8-16 borrowing 
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Table A3.3: Two Sources of Revenue to Government, 1976-1998 
Year Revenue In Budget Revenue Outside Budget Revenue in Budget Revenue Outside Budget 
 RMB$100 m RMB$100 m % % 
1976 776.58 275.32 100.00 35.45 
1977 874.46 311.31 100.00 35.60 
1978 1121.12 347.11 100.00 30.96 
1979 1067.96 452.85 100.00 42.40 
1980 1042.22 557.40 100.00 53.48 
1981 1016.38 601.07 100.00 59.14 
1982 1083.94 802.74 100.00 74.06 
1983 1211.16 967.68 100.00 79.90 
1984 1467.05 1188.48 100.00 81.01 
1985 1837.16 1530.03 100.00 83.28 
1986 2184.52 1737.31 100.00 79.53 
1987 2262.42 2028.80 100.00 89.67 
1988 2489.41 2270.00 100.00 91.19 
1989 2785.00    
 




Table A3.4 Sources of Investment in Capital Construction, 1981-1998 (cont’d over page) 
Year Government budget Loan Foreign investment Own funds Others Total 
 RMB$100 million RMB$100 million RMB$100 million RMB$100 million RMB$100 million RMB$100 million 
       
1981 269.76 122.00 36.36 532.89 0.00 961.01 
1982 279.26 176.12 60.51 714.51 0.00 1230.40 
1983 339.71 175.50 66.55 848.30 0.00 1430.06 
1984 421.00 258.47 70.66 1082.74 0.00 1832.87 
1985 407.80 510.27 91.48 1533.64 0.00 2543.19 
1986 440.63 638.31 132.16 1488.51 320.00 3019.61 
1987 475.54 835.94 175.37 1745.18 408.83 3640.86 
1988 402.68 914.59 254.51 2416.94 457.87 4446.59 
1989 341.62 716.36 274.15 2355.50 450.09 4137.72 
1990 393.03 885.45 284.61 2954.41  4517.50 
1991 380.43 1314.73 318.89 3580.44  5594.49 
1992 347.46 2214.03 468.66 5049.95  8080.10 
1993 483.67 3071.99 954.28 8562.36  13072.30 
1994 529.57 3997.64 1768.95 11530.96  17827.12 
1995 621.05 4198.73 2295.89 13409.19  20524.86 
1996 625.88 4573.69 2746.60 15412.40  23358.57 
1997 696.74 4782.55 2683.89 17096.49  25259.67 
1998 1197.39 5542.89 2617.03 19359.61  28716.92 
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Table A3.4 Sources of Investment in Capital Construction, 1981-1998(cont’d) 
 Government budget Loan Foreign investment Own funds Others Total 
 % % % % % % 
1981 28.07 12.69 3.78 55.45 0.00 100.00 
1982 22.70 14.31 4.92 58.07 0.00 100.00 
1983 23.75 12.27 4.65 59.32 0.00 100.00 
1984 22.97 14.10 3.86 59.07 0.00 100.00 
1985 16.03 20.06 3.60 60.30 0.00 100.00 
1986 14.59 21.14 4.38 49.29 10.60 100.00 
1987 13.06 22.96 4.82 47.93 11.23 100.00 
1988 9.06 20.57 5.72 54.35 10.30 100.00 
1989 8.26 17.31 6.63 56.93 10.88 100.00 
1990 8.70 19.60 6.30 65.40 0.00 100.00 
1991 6.80 23.50 5.70 64.00 0.00 100.00 
1992 4.30 27.40 5.80 62.50 0.00 100.00 
1993 3.70 23.50 7.30 65.50 0.00 100.00 
1994 2.97 22.42 9.92 64.68 0.00 100.00 
1995 3.03 20.46 11.19 65.33 0.00 100.00 
1996 2.68 19.58 11.76 65.98 0.00 100.00 
1997 2.76 18.93 10.63 67.68 0.00 100.00 
1998 4.17 19.30 9.11 67.42 0.00 100.00 
 
Sources: China Statistical Year Book, 1990, (Chinese), p. 153, Table 5-1; China Statistical Year Book, 1999, (Chinese), p. 185, Table 6-3 
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Table A3.5 Sources of Investment in Capital Construction Owned by the People (Government), 1976-1998 
 Total Government budget Outside the Budget Total Government budget Outside the Budget 
 RMB$100 m RMB$100 m RMB$100 m % % % 
1976 376.44 310.93 65.51 100.00 82.60 17.40 
1977 382.37 299.23 83.14 100.00 78.26 21.74 
1978 500.99 389.21 111.78 100.00 77.69 22.31 
1979 523.48 396.92 126.56 100.00 75.82 24.18 
1980 558.89 300.11 258.78 100.00 53.70 46.30 
1981 442.91 222.62 220.29 100.00 50.26 49.74 
1982 555.53 232.48 323.05 100.00 41.85 58.15 
1983 594.13 295.97 298.16 100.00 49.82 50.18 
1984 743.02 359.85 383.17 100.00 48.43 51.57 
1985 1074.37 381.18 693.19 100.00 35.48 64.52 
1986 1176.11 417.39 758.72 100.00 35.49 64.51 
1987 1343.10 438.52 904.58 100.00 32.65 67.35 
1988 1574.31 381.66 1192.65 100.00 24.24 75.76 
1989 1551.74 323.33 1134.35 100.00 26.90 73.10 
1990 1703.81 363.59 1265.29 100.00 25.74 74.26 
1991 2115.80 348.45 1734.14 100.00 18.04 81.96 
1992 3012.65 307.87 2689.32 100.00 10.73 89.27 
1993 4615.50 431.76 4251.91 100.00 7.88 92.12 
1994 6436.74 434.57 6088.29 100.00 5.41 94.59 
1995 7403.62 491.67 7095.75 100.00 4.16 95.84 
1996 8570.79 521.11 8139.03 100.00 5.04 94.96 
1997 9917.02 574.51 9482.45 100.00 4.38 95.62 
1998 11916.42 1021.32 11424.75 100.00 4.13 95.87 
Sources: China Statistical Year Book, 1990, (Chinese), p. 157, Table 5-5; China Statistical Year Book, 1999, (Chinese), p. 189, Table 6-6 
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Table A3.6: Investment in Capital Construction by Ownership, 1980-1998 
Year Public Collective Individual Total Public Collective Individual Total 
 RMB$100 million RMB$100 million RMB$100 million RMB$100 million % % % % 
1980 745.90 46.00 119.00 910.90 81.89 5.05 13.06 100.00 
1981 667.50 115.20 178.30 961.00 69.46 11.99 18.55 100.00 
1982 845.30 174.30 210.80 1230.40 68.70 14.17 17.13 100.00 
1983 951.96 156.33 321.77 1430.06 66.57 10.93 22.50 100.00 
1984 1185.18 238.69 409.00 1832.87 64.66 13.02 22.31 100.00 
1985 1680.51 327.46 535.22 2543.19 66.08 12.88 21.05 100.00 
1986 1978.50 391.74 649.38 3019.62 65.52 12.97 21.51 100.00 
1987 2297.99 547.01 795.86 3640.86 63.12 15.02 21.86 100.00 
1988 2762.76 711.71 1022.08 4496.55 61.44 15.83 22.73 100.00 
1989 2535.48 569.99 1032.26 4137.73 61.28 13.78 24.95 100.00 
1990 2986.30 529.50 1001.20 4517.00 66.11 11.72 22.17 100.00 
1991 3713.80 697.80 1182.90 5594.50 66.38 12.47 21.14 100.00 
1992 5498.70 1359.40 1222.00 8080.10 68.05 16.82 15.12 100.00 
1993 7925.90 2317.30 1476.20 11719.40 67.63 19.77 12.60 100.00 
1994 9615.00 2758.90 1970.60 14344.50 67.03 19.23 13.74 100.00 
1995 10898.20 3289.40 2560.20 16747.80 65.07 19.64 15.29 100.00 
1996 12006.20 3651.50 3211.20 18868.90 63.63 19.35 17.02 100.00 
1997 13091.70 3850.90 3429.40 20372.00 64.26 18.90 16.83 100.00 
1998 15369.30 4192.20 3744.40 23305.90 65.95 17.99 16.07 100.00 
Sources: China Statistical Year Book, 1990, (Chinese), p. 153, Table 5-1; China Statistical Year Book, 1999, (Chinese), p. 184, Table 6-2 
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Table A5.4a: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables in SZXSHX 
de        lde        
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991 122 0.7662 0.0329 3.9963 0.7667 1.9946 4.2654 1991 122 
-
0.3079 -1.4833 0.6017 0.4310 -0.2858 0.0581 
1992 181 0.9066 0.0329 3.9963 0.8557 1.5777 2.0892 1992 181 
-
0.2352 -1.4833 0.6017 0.4385 -0.3510 -0.1343 
1993 535 1.2904 0.0092 12.0128 1.2133 3.0200 16.7626 1993 535 
-
0.0643 -2.0352 1.0796 0.4366 -0.9731 2.2857 
1994 577 1.3703 0.0100 8.3551 1.0774 2.2155 8.0350 1994 577 0.0131 -2.0000 0.9220 0.3516 -0.7410 2.1571 
1995 587 1.3317 0.0100 9.3876 0.9446 2.4518 12.9814 1995 587 0.0184 -2.0000 0.9726 0.3315 -0.9792 2.8351 
1996 587 1.1313 0.0100 10.8440 0.9834 3.6819 24.5445 1996 587 
-
0.0751 -2.0000 1.0352 0.3537 -0.6265 1.6235 
1997 929 1.1678 0.0204 9.9638 0.9812 3.2883 21.3542 1997 929 
-
0.0692 -1.6907 0.9984 0.3731 -0.6835 0.8162 
1998 1087 1.1983 0.0000 10.9049 1.0616 2.9331 15.3968 1998 1087 
-
0.0753 -6.1139 1.0376 0.4311 -3.0723 35.7109 
1999 1090 1.0973 0.0100 14.8124 0.9944 4.5265 43.5629 1999 1090 
-
0.1013 -2.0000 1.1706 0.3802 -0.8355 2.1625 
2000 952 1.0466 0.0100 13.1864 1.0315 4.1263 29.7003 2000 952 
-
0.1209 -2.0000 1.1201 0.3546 -0.2873 1.3133 
total 6647 1.1681 0.0000 14.8124 1.0302 3.3060 21.7323 total 6647 
-
0.0770 -6.1139 1.1706 0.3878 -1.2463 10.1207 
dta        arcdta        
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991 122 0.3587 0.0318 0.7999 0.1910 0.4000 -0.6226 1991 122 0.6290 0.1793 1.1070 0.2133 0.1461 -0.5191 
1992 181 0.3934 0.0318 0.7999 0.2001 0.2040 -0.9056 1992 181 0.6667 0.1793 1.1070 0.2210 -0.0010 -0.7229 
1993 535 0.4769 0.0000 0.9232 0.1975 -0.2148 -0.7092 1993 535 0.7570 0.0000 1.2899 0.2175 -0.4396 0.0248 
1994 577 0.5103 0.0000 0.8931 0.1728 -0.2968 -0.4534 1994 577 0.7946 0.0000 1.2377 0.1853 -0.4408 0.2818 
1995 587 0.5141 0.0000 0.9037 0.1635 -0.4795 -0.2164 1995 587 0.7981 0.0000 1.2553 0.1751 -0.6509 0.6761 
1996 587 0.4657 0.0000 0.9156 0.1715 -0.1852 -0.4428 1996 587 0.7472 0.0000 1.2760 0.1851 -0.3459 0.1728 
1997 929 0.4707 0.0200 0.9088 0.1798 -0.2901 -0.5975 1997 929 0.7516 0.1418 1.2640 0.1942 -0.4301 -0.1574 
1998 1087 0.4706 0.0000 0.9368 0.1845 -0.2137 -0.5193 1998 1087 0.7513 0.0000 1.3167 0.2017 -0.4096 0.1596 
1999 1090 0.4548 0.0000 0.9483 0.1780 -0.1664 -0.5310 1999 1090 0.7348 0.0000 1.3414 0.1944 -0.3762 0.1786 
2000 952 0.4405 0.0000 0.9295 0.1722 0.1412 -0.4296 2000 952 0.7215 0.0000 1.3021 0.1858 0.0022 0.0698 
total 6647 0.4669 0.0000 0.9483 0.1811 -0.1810 -0.5801 total 6647 0.7478 0.0000 1.3414 0.1967 -0.3599 0.0309 
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Table A5.4b: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables in SZX 
De       lde        
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
                
1992 8 1.6021 0.7714 2.5687 0.5733 0.1668 0.0557 1992 8 0.1776 -0.1127 0.4097 0.1699 -0.6337 -0.0422 
1993 246 1.5045 0.0127 12.0128 1.4096 3.2006 16.5834 1993 246 0.0135 -1.8978 1.0796 0.4231 -1.0811 2.8420 
1994 268 1.4609 0.0332 8.3551 1.0909 2.2242 8.5750 1994 268 0.0500 -1.4784 0.9220 0.3414 -0.7882 1.6793 
1995 276 1.4269 0.0606 9.3876 1.0178 3.0318 17.3455 1995 276 0.0576 -1.2177 0.9726 0.3102 -0.7571 1.4948 
1996 276 1.2128 0.0540 10.8440 1.0652 4.0436 28.7719 1996 276 -0.0466 -1.2679 1.0352 0.3577 -0.5642 0.6383 
1997 452 1.1534 0.0204 9.7466 0.9618 3.5543 25.2765 1997 452 -0.0698 -1.6907 0.9889 0.3657 -0.6935 1.0028 
1998 497 1.1438 0.0260 10.9049 1.0261 3.4146 21.4368 1998 497 -0.0840 -1.5851 1.0376 0.3752 -0.6173 1.1045 
1999 495 1.0551 0.0188 14.8124 1.0612 6.2087 66.5763 1999 495 -0.1133 -1.7264 1.1706 0.3616 -0.6808 2.2254 
2000 492 1.0707 0.0307 13.1864 1.1159 4.6261 35.1849 2000 492 -0.1175 -1.5132 1.1201 0.3605 -0.1907 0.7061 
total 3010 1.2099 0.0127 14.8124 1.0920 3.9248 28.7262 total 3010 -0.0551 -1.8978 1.1706 0.3680 -0.6364 1.3504 
dta        arcdta         
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
                
1992 8 0.5981 0.4355 0.7198 0.0934 -0.7576 0.0000 1992 8 0.8855 0.7207 1.0130 0.0955 -0.6975 -0.0240 
1993 246 0.5151 0.0125 0.9232 0.1921 -0.4240 -0.3361 1993 246 0.7982 0.1120 1.2899 0.2112 -0.6014 0.4572 
1994 268 0.5298 0.0322 0.8931 0.1687 -0.4775 -0.1593 1994 268 0.8150 0.1803 1.2377 0.1804 -0.5743 0.3997 
1995 276 0.5336 0.0571 0.9037 0.1565 -0.6029 0.1249 1995 276 0.8189 0.2413 1.2553 0.1661 -0.6578 0.6185 
1996 276 0.4809 0.0512 0.9156 0.1752 -0.3297 -0.4307 1996 276 0.7629 0.2283 1.2760 0.1884 -0.4228 -0.0406 
1997 452 0.4700 0.0200 0.9069 0.1771 -0.2837 -0.6193 1997 452 0.7511 0.1418 1.2608 0.1908 -0.4220 -0.1565 
1998 497 0.4625 0.0253 0.9160 0.1791 -0.1609 -0.5180 1998 497 0.7434 0.1599 1.2768 0.1941 -0.3155 -0.0372 
1999 495 0.4466 0.0184 0.9368 0.1702 -0.0563 -0.3719 1999 495 0.7271 0.1362 1.3166 0.1848 -0.2438 0.2563 
2000 492 0.4425 0.0298 0.9295 0.1753 0.0984 -0.4833 2000 492 0.7234 0.1734 1.3021 0.1889 -0.0032 -0.1019 




Table A5.4c: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables in SHX 
de       Lde       
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991 122 0.7662 0.0329 3.9963 0.7667 1.9946 4.2654 1991 122 -0.3079 -1.4833 0.6017 0.4310 -0.2858 0.0581 
1992 173 0.8744 0.0329 3.9963 0.8540 1.7037 2.5108 1992 173 -0.2543 -1.4833 0.6017 0.4379 -0.2925 -0.1130 
1993 289 1.1082 0.0092 7.2518 0.9832 1.9499 6.2433 1993 289 -0.1306 -2.0352 0.8604 0.4376 -0.9381 2.1725 
1994 309 1.2917 0.0100 7.2518 1.0611 2.2447 7.8038 1994 309 -0.0190 -2.0000 0.8604 0.3578 -0.7025 2.5955 
1995 311 1.2473 0.0100 5.9590 0.8674 1.5509 4.2317 1995 311 -0.0163 -2.0000 0.7752 0.3461 -1.0887 3.4384 
1996 311 1.0589 0.0100 7.9085 0.9002 3.0655 15.3797 1996 311 -0.1003 -2.0000 0.8981 0.3489 -0.7107 2.6365 
1997 477 1.1815 0.0372 9.9638 1.0000 3.0691 18.3505 1997 477 -0.0686 -1.4300 0.9984 0.3804 -0.6768 0.6746 
1998 590 1.2443 0.0000 9.7963 1.0893 2.5970 11.5741 1998 590 -0.0681 -6.1139 0.9911 0.4733 -4.0460 45.2169 
1999 595 1.1323 0.0100 8.3344 0.9346 2.4891 11.8633 1999 595 -0.0914 -2.0000 0.9209 0.3951 -0.9461 2.1362 
2000 460 1.0207 0.0100 8.4280 0.9335 3.0714 14.6558 2000 460 -0.1245 -2.0000 0.9257 0.3486 -0.4048 2.0681 
total 3637 1.1335 0.0000 9.9638 0.9749 2.5410 11.6499 total 3637 -0.0951 -6.1139 0.9984 0.4026 -1.6121 14.9201 
Dta       arcdta       
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991 122 0.3587 0.0318 0.7999 0.1910 0.4000 -0.6226 1991 122 0.6290 0.1793 1.1070 0.2133 0.1461 -0.5191 
1992 173 0.3840 0.0318 0.7999 0.1988 0.2855 -0.8096 1992 173 0.6566 0.1793 1.1070 0.2200 0.0710 -0.6596 
1993 289 0.4444 0.0000 0.8788 0.1965 -0.0482 -0.8402 1993 289 0.7220 0.0000 1.2152 0.2171 -0.3274 -0.1336 
1994 309 0.4934 0.0000 0.8788 0.1748 -0.1463 -0.5750 1994 309 0.7770 0.0000 1.2152 0.1880 -0.3301 0.2859 
1995 311 0.4967 0.0000 0.8563 0.1678 -0.3669 -0.4109 1995 311 0.7795 0.0000 1.1820 0.1809 -0.6190 0.6794 
1996 311 0.4522 0.0000 0.8877 0.1673 -0.0662 -0.3653 1996 311 0.7332 0.0000 1.2291 0.1814 -0.2960 0.4667 
1997 477 0.4714 0.0358 0.9088 0.1824 -0.2971 -0.5765 1997 477 0.7521 0.1904 1.2640 0.1976 -0.4384 -0.1537 
1998 590 0.4775 0.0000 0.9368 0.1888 -0.2635 -0.5108 1998 590 0.7579 0.0000 1.3167 0.2079 -0.4875 0.3018 
1999 595 0.4617 0.0000 0.9483 0.1841 -0.2554 -0.6179 1999 595 0.7412 0.0000 1.3414 0.2019 -0.4762 0.1425 
2000 460 0.4384 0.0000 0.9212 0.1691 0.1898 -0.3579 2000 460 0.7195 0.0000 1.2862 0.1826 0.0062 0.2878 




Table A5.5a: Descriptive Statistics for Financial Variables in SZXSHX (cont’d over page) 




      
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991 122 0.2398 -0.3084 0.5329 0.1603 -0.5461 0.4660 1991 122 1.5539 0.2691 14.5459 2.1041 4.0779 18.5246 
1992 181 0.2022 0.0000 0.5500 0.1279 0.6973 -0.1523 1992 181 1.5638 0.1609 14.5459 1.8801 3.7347 17.1795 
1993 535 0.1806 0.0000 0.5437 0.1089 0.8155 0.5892 1993 535 2.1334 -0.8581 70.0228 5.3232 7.4928 71.5084 
1994 577 0.1888 -0.1221 0.5447 0.1127 0.8055 0.3889 1994 577 1.4872 -4.2330 34.6080 3.2131 6.4512 50.6052 
1995 587 0.1907 0.0000 0.5481 0.1080 0.6987 0.2195 1995 587 1.0927 -0.6876 19.0107 1.7183 5.0711 34.5731 
1996 587 0.1688 -2.1326 0.6076 0.1356 -8.1653 142.0415 1996 587 0.7396 -0.7102 7.7566 0.8607 4.1349 23.0818 
1997 929 0.3014 -3.5237 0.8883 0.1956 -8.0843 156.4429 1997 929 1.2927 -5.4177 61.7960 3.1714 12.2571 195.1134 
1998 1087 0.2762 -7.2208 0.8870 0.2842 -17.7288 453.1077 1998 1087 1.0779 -1.8335 77.2010 3.1430 16.4779 348.7095 
1999 1090 0.2587 -4.1061 0.9121 0.2330 -9.1700 157.3854 1999 1090 0.8795 -0.1640 24.3299 1.4591 7.7843 90.0206 
2000 952 0.1945 -0.3508 0.6257 0.1414 0.2863 -0.2400 2000 952 0.6576 -0.6718 9.4795 0.9417 5.7848 41.5962 
total 6647 0.2302 -7.2208 0.9121 0.1953 -12.4272 397.5989 total 6647 1.1291 -5.4177 77.2010 2.7071 13.2794 260.5283 




      
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991 122 0.0946 0.0003 1.3040 0.1840 4.9217 26.3990 1991 122 3.5303 0.1058 41.0506 5.5042 4.8965 28.5708 
1992 181 0.0865 0.0010 1.1314 0.1045 6.2962 56.5817 1992 181 3.2166 0.1706 49.3364 5.4140 5.0073 33.1620 
1993 535 0.1072 0.0048 0.8273 0.0847 3.4795 19.9890 1993 535 2.3911 0.1099 33.6547 2.9746 4.6998 31.9270 
1994 577 0.1054 0.0029 0.8797 0.0799 3.4790 21.6770 1994 577 2.4221 0.1194 30.6828 2.7876 5.1362 37.2970 
1995 587 0.0933 0.0008 0.9416 0.0742 3.4635 29.6059 1995 587 2.5659 0.2231 29.8100 3.0558 4.7681 32.2277 
1996 587 0.0825 0.0005 1.0474 0.0713 5.2703 59.7767 1996 587 2.8797 0.0753 39.6454 3.1800 5.9978 55.7868 
1997 929 0.1338 0.0027 4.7579 0.1945 15.3562 347.1976 1997 929 3.0044 0.0420 75.3488 5.0745 8.7595 99.1906 
1998 1087 0.1103 0.0009 1.3229 0.1039 4.6522 36.9339 1998 1087 3.0600 0.1141 56.6418 4.0424 7.0416 70.9545 
1999 1090 0.0954 0.0044 1.4491 0.0907 5.7131 60.5937 1999 1090 3.3479 0.1615 60.3183 4.4489 6.0072 50.6516 
2000 952 0.0676 0.0004 1.5240 0.0834 9.8646 140.8187 2000 952 3.5535 0.1491 68.5967 4.4875 6.8984 73.0448 




Table A5.5a: Descriptive Statistics for Financial Variables in SZXSHX (cont’d) 
size - szxshx      
risk – 
szxshx        
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991 122 5.8550 2.3496 9.4782 1.1863 0.3835 1.1977 1991 122 0.3173 0.0170 1.4900 0.2340 2.1937 7.5686 
1992 181 5.6592 2.3496 9.6244 1.1952 0.3655 0.7590 1992 181 0.2794 -3.2500 2.0100 0.3648 -3.9684 51.6699 
1993 535 5.7961 2.6407 9.6396 1.0825 0.2883 0.7716 1993 535 0.3536 -1.0000 2.1640 0.2705 1.5999 6.7909 
1994 577 6.0249 2.9395 9.8000 1.0456 0.4260 0.7371 1994 577 0.3665 -0.1800 4.9500 0.3168 6.9912 84.8329 
1995 587 6.2081 3.7689 9.9190 1.0093 0.6356 0.6811 1995 587 0.3557 -0.3820 3.9000 0.3465 4.7793 37.0614 
1996 587 6.4564 4.0966 10.3097 0.9243 0.7636 1.0280 1996 587 0.3428 -1.1750 5.7885 0.3663 6.2331 85.9444 
1997 929 6.5297 1.8405 10.3513 0.9245 0.4339 1.7915 1997 929 0.2752 -2.6800 1.8950 0.2784 -1.5665 22.4548 
1998 1087 6.6602 1.8532 10.5715 0.9191 0.4390 1.8513 1998 1087 0.2479 -5.3140 4.6800 0.3616 -3.1308 81.4561 
1999 1090 6.8289 1.9416 10.7335 0.9047 0.4281 1.5948 1999 1090 0.2602 -1.6400 6.1500 0.3006 6.1387 139.1399 
2000 952 7.0698 4.8058 11.1158 0.8430 0.5899 1.1155 2000 952 0.2535 -3.2500 5.3100 0.4391 4.0202 67.9025 
total 6647 6.5036 1.8405 11.1158 1.0364 0.1705 0.9331 Total 6647 0.2934 -5.3140 6.1500 0.3439 2.6276 77.6069 
grow - szxshx      
dura - 
szxshx        
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991 122 5.0716 -0.0834 8.6500 1.4212 -0.5794 1.5173 1991 122 9.5000 5.0000 10.0000 0.6711 -2.6684 15.2301 
1992 181 5.0718 -0.7133 8.5520 1.4364 -0.5201 1.2420 1992 181 9.1878 8.0000 10.0000 0.7212 -0.2989 -1.0343 
1993 535 5.3081 1.3856 9.0198 1.2611 -0.0835 0.0591 1993 535 8.2935 6.0000 10.0000 0.8289 0.7143 0.1172 
1994 577 5.4662 1.7328 9.1553 1.1734 0.0587 0.2690 1994 577 8.1889 6.0000 10.0000 0.8862 0.5224 0.1285 
1995 587 5.6235 2.3501 9.3978 1.1480 0.2444 0.1961 1995 587 8.1499 5.0000 10.0000 0.9281 0.3019 0.3140 
1996 587 5.7034 1.8740 9.4095 1.1287 0.2663 0.3066 1996 587 8.1499 5.0000 10.0000 0.9281 0.3019 0.3140 
1997 929 5.8283 1.3863 9.6597 1.1334 0.0520 0.8952 1997 929 6.6146 2.0000 10.0000 2.1461 -0.1929 -1.4864 
1998 1087 5.8838 1.7102 10.2316 1.1236 0.1205 0.9830 1998 1087 6.0892 2.0000 10.0000 2.3580 0.0315 -1.5820 
1999 1090 5.9784 1.3191 10.2515 1.1551 0.0396 1.0196 1999 1090 6.0495 2.0000 10.0000 2.3802 0.0402 -1.5710 
2000 952 6.1385 2.0873 10.3398 1.1480 0.1657 0.4973 2000 952 5.8057 2.0000 10.0000 2.3990 0.2441 -1.5266 
total 6647 5.7695 -0.7133 10.3398 1.2000 -0.0275 0.8135 total 6647 6.9862 2.0000 10.0000 2.2013 -0.5985 -0.9866 
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Table A5.5b: Descriptive Statistics for Financial Variables in SZX (cont’d over page) 
txre - szx       
tang - 
szx 
       
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1992 8 0.2019 0.1368 0.3286 0.0724 1.2313 0.0969 1992 8 3.5830 0.8447 9.8640 2.9539 1.5234 2.6655 
1993 246 0.1882 0.0002 0.5437 0.1094 0.7722 0.4006 1993 246 3.4301 -0.8581 70.0228 7.5963 5.1271 32.9152 
1994 268 0.1939 0.0010 0.5447 0.1165 0.8029 0.1854 1994 268 2.3205 -4.2330 34.6080 4.5529 4.3593 22.5573 
1995 276 0.2035 0.0007 0.5372 0.1125 0.6449 -0.0778 1995 276 1.6202 -0.6876 19.0107 2.3737 3.4465 15.7960 
1996 276 0.1847 0.0004 0.5402 0.1005 0.8865 0.6227 1996 276 0.9552 -0.7102 7.7566 1.1943 2.7723 9.8981 
1997 452 0.2883 0.0073 0.5497 0.1484 0.0996 -1.0629 1997 452 1.6654 -5.4177 61.7960 4.3951 9.1632 104.8942 
1998 497 0.2808 0.0055 0.5493 0.1489 0.0931 -1.0525 1998 497 1.4520 -1.8335 77.2010 4.5364 11.7281 171.5748 
1999 495 0.2967 0.0019 0.5496 0.1456 -0.0529 -1.0261 1999 495 1.1509 -0.1640 24.3299 2.0459 5.6769 46.8197 
2000 492 0.1976 0.0001 0.5487 0.1150 0.7654 0.2102 2000 492 0.6967 -0.6718 9.4795 1.2561 4.2849 21.9171 
total 3010 0.2395 0.0001 0.5497 0.1383 0.4909 -0.6741 total 3010 1.5256 -5.4177 77.2010 3.8690 9.6481 132.3876 
prof - szx       
capi - 
szx 
       
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1992 8 0.1094 0.0513 0.2351 0.0657 1.3788 0.7202 1992 8 1.4889 0.3324 5.1578 1.5646 2.3120 5.6380 
1993 246 0.1119 0.0049 0.8273 0.0951 4.1172 24.4198 1993 246 2.5454 0.1099 33.6547 3.3601 5.1278 35.7937 
1994 268 0.1060 0.0029 0.8797 0.0864 4.2239 29.1832 1994 268 2.7265 0.1194 30.6828 3.4963 4.8270 29.1008 
1995 276 0.0921 0.0008 0.9416 0.0819 4.6345 41.7571 1995 276 2.8781 0.2344 29.8100 3.6092 4.3078 24.3729 
1996 276 0.0813 0.0005 0.4887 0.0624 2.2277 9.9141 1996 276 3.2824 0.0774 39.6454 4.0531 5.5912 41.9004 
1997 452 0.1346 0.0027 4.7579 0.2390 16.2709 312.0109 1997 452 3.6618 0.0420 75.3488 6.8843 6.8450 56.5072 
1998 497 0.1127 0.0035 0.5740 0.0823 1.9986 6.3400 1998 497 3.5758 0.3529 56.6418 5.3678 6.0664 46.4465 
1999 495 0.1065 0.0044 0.9618 0.0874 3.9584 28.0093 1999 495 3.7242 0.2576 45.0668 5.1048 4.8782 29.1931 
2000 492 0.0657 0.0004 1.1732 0.0770 7.7892 94.3077 2000 492 3.8837 0.2460 68.5967 5.5060 6.5733 58.9143 




Table A5.5b: Descriptive Statistics for Financial Variables in SZX (cont’d) 
size - szx       
risk - 
szx 
       
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1992 8 4.6255 3.4603 6.2013 0.9165 0.6483 -0.3641 1992 8 -0.0472 -3.2500 2.0100 1.4518 -1.4990 4.6047 
1993 246 5.7882 2.6533 9.1403 1.0624 0.0888 0.3747 1993 246 0.3827 -1.0000 1.5960 0.3121 0.8615 2.8778 
1994 268 5.9999 3.1977 9.6478 1.0347 0.2554 0.4484 1994 268 0.3896 -0.1800 4.9500 0.3753 7.3564 82.5950 
1995 276 6.1829 3.8517 9.9190 1.0094 0.4727 0.3652 1995 276 0.3316 -0.3820 2.0700 0.2758 1.7498 6.9373 
1996 276 6.4441 4.4196 10.3097 0.9319 0.6753 0.8193 1996 276 0.3232 -1.1750 1.6600 0.3137 0.0138 3.8886 
1997 452 6.4966 1.8405 10.3513 0.9317 0.1153 2.3334 1997 452 0.2374 -2.6800 1.8950 0.3301 -2.4129 19.6275 
1998 497 6.6402 1.8532 10.5715 0.9021 0.1374 2.2869 1998 497 0.1892 -5.3140 4.6800 0.4893 -2.6069 50.7485 
1999 495 6.8045 1.9416 10.7335 0.8952 0.0705 2.2670 1999 495 0.2201 -1.6400 6.1500 0.3975 5.9106 101.9666 
2000 492 7.0559 4.8058 11.1158 0.8370 0.5452 0.9940 2000 492 0.2171 -3.2500 5.3100 0.5846 3.4291 41.6966 
total 3010 6.5217 1.8405 11.1158 1.0112 0.0373 1.0086 total 3010 0.2645 -5.3140 6.1500 0.4290 1.5860 57.1632 
grow - szx       
dura - 
szx 
       
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1992 8 4.5668 3.0525 5.9807 1.1153 0.0723 -1.7201 1992 8 8.8750 8.0000 9.0000 0.3536 -2.8284 8.0000 
1993 246 5.2417 1.5732 8.6383 1.2231 -0.0770 0.1354 1993 246 7.9756 7.0000 9.0000 0.2847 -0.8105 9.3748 
1994 268 5.3698 1.8258 8.7315 1.1912 -0.1347 0.2315 1994 268 7.8955 7.0000 9.0000 0.3826 -1.0411 2.8596 
1995 276 5.5175 2.3501 9.1062 1.1679 0.1120 -0.0572 1995 276 7.8406 6.0000 9.0000 0.4935 -1.7929 4.6142 
1996 276 5.6009 1.8740 8.9948 1.1453 0.1053 0.2401 1996 276 7.8406 6.0000 9.0000 0.4935 -1.7929 4.6142 
1997 452 5.6981 1.3863 9.1012 1.1832 -0.2327 1.0175 1997 452 6.3296 2.0000 9.0000 1.9380 -0.3728 -1.7305 
1998 497 5.7680 1.7102 9.1293 1.1601 -0.1625 1.1786 1998 497 6.0282 2.0000 9.0000 2.0808 -0.2075 -1.7841 
1999 495 5.8756 1.3191 9.3460 1.1926 -0.1164 1.1918 1999 495 6.0061 2.0000 9.0000 2.0954 -0.1936 -1.7856 
2000 492 6.0699 2.0873 9.6407 1.1906 0.0444 0.6656 2000 492 6.0305 2.0000 9.0000 2.0831 -0.2104 -1.7766 




Table A5.5c: Descriptive Statistics for Financial Variables in SHX (cont’d over page) 
txre - shx       
tang - 
shx 
       
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991 122 0.2398 -0.3084 0.5329 0.1603 -0.5461 0.4660 1991 122 1.5539 0.2691 14.5459 2.1041 4.0779 18.5246 
1992 173 0.2025 0.0000 0.5500 0.1301 0.6837 -0.2216 1992 173 1.4705 0.1609 14.5459 1.7736 4.1410 21.5712 
1993 289 0.1742 0.0000 0.5279 0.1082 0.8634 0.8127 1993 289 1.0297 0.0221 8.0245 0.8913 3.8424 21.5701 
1994 309 0.1843 -0.1221 0.5392 0.1094 0.7980 0.5912 1994 309 0.7645 0.0254 3.5626 0.4569 2.3130 8.6967 
1995 311 0.1794 0.0000 0.5481 0.1026 0.7215 0.5194 1995 311 0.6245 0.0309 3.2203 0.3397 2.5135 12.9008 
1996 311 0.1547 -2.1326 0.6076 0.1592 -9.5899 138.2296 1996 311 0.5482 0.0725 1.8625 0.2388 1.5286 5.5753 
1997 477 0.3138 -3.5237 0.8883 0.2312 -9.6944 159.2269 1997 477 0.9395 0.0135 13.2224 1.0239 6.8682 61.6955 
1998 590 0.2723 -7.2208 0.8870 0.3609 -15.9713 321.2937 1998 590 0.7628 0.0059 11.5284 0.8169 8.2728 85.1084 
1999 595 0.2271 -4.1061 0.9121 0.2823 -9.2162 129.7422 1999 595 0.6536 0.0149 6.9817 0.5567 7.9038 74.4423 
2000 460 0.1912 -0.3508 0.6257 0.1652 0.1281 -0.7394 2000 460 0.6157 0.0168 7.6480 0.3827 13.6763 249.3102 
total 3637 0.2224 -7.2208 0.9121 0.2318 -13.6061 364.0001 total 3637 0.8009 0.0059 14.5459 0.8771 7.8247 83.6339 
prof - shx       
capi - 
shx 
       
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991 122 0.0946 0.0003 1.3040 0.1840 4.9217 26.3990 1991 122 3.5303 0.1058 41.0506 5.5042 4.8965 28.5708 
1992 173 0.0854 0.0010 1.1314 0.1059 6.3338 56.3137 1992 173 3.2965 0.1706 49.3364 5.5164 4.9154 31.8696 
1993 289 0.1032 0.0048 0.4735 0.0747 2.1195 5.5994 1993 289 2.2598 0.1592 18.4174 2.6007 3.5821 15.6362 
1994 309 0.1049 0.0047 0.5274 0.0740 2.3947 8.5433 1994 309 2.1581 0.2175 15.2426 1.9455 3.1658 13.7692 
1995 311 0.0945 0.0020 0.3350 0.0667 1.4535 2.5386 1995 311 2.2887 0.2231 28.0550 2.4356 5.0191 42.2007 
1996 311 0.0835 0.0010 1.0474 0.0784 6.4990 73.9206 1996 311 2.5223 0.0753 14.8832 2.0664 2.5607 8.8501 
1997 477 0.1330 0.0055 1.3129 0.1401 3.7195 20.9029 1997 477 2.3815 0.0578 25.2192 2.1214 4.2006 31.7981 
1998 590 0.1083 0.0009 1.3229 0.1192 5.1690 38.2767 1998 590 2.6254 0.1141 17.5162 2.3349 3.0448 12.1387 
1999 595 0.0862 0.0052 1.4491 0.0925 7.1617 86.4075 1999 595 3.0348 0.1615 60.3183 3.7945 7.7048 94.6550 
2000 460 0.0696 0.0034 1.5240 0.0899 11.1408 163.3395 2000 460 3.2003 0.1491 30.2447 3.0088 3.5942 20.7113 




Table A5.5c Descriptive Statistics for Financial Variables in SHX (cont’d) 
size - shx       
risk - 
shx 
       
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991 122 5.8550 2.3496 9.4782 1.1863 0.3835 1.1977 1991 122 0.3173 0.0170 1.4900 0.2340 2.1937 7.5686 
1992 173 5.7070 2.3496 9.6244 1.1869 0.3545 0.8467 1992 173 0.2945 0.0170 1.4900 0.2198 2.2915 8.1619 
1993 289 5.8027 2.6407 9.6396 1.1012 0.4404 1.0778 1993 289 0.3289 0.0200 2.1640 0.2270 2.8431 16.1413 
1994 309 6.0467 2.9395 9.8000 1.0562 0.5649 0.9684 1994 309 0.3465 0.0290 2.9730 0.2544 4.5908 38.9280 
1995 311 6.2304 3.7689 9.7853 1.0102 0.7836 0.9637 1995 311 0.3772 0.0300 3.9000 0.3981 5.3744 37.7377 
1996 311 6.4673 4.0966 9.8536 0.9189 0.8503 1.2527 1996 311 0.3602 0.0033 5.7885 0.4071 8.5537 104.5869 
1997 477 6.5611 4.0897 10.1640 0.9174 0.7561 1.1972 1997 477 0.3110 0.0220 1.6960 0.2126 2.3989 10.8380 
1998 590 6.6771 3.3416 10.5274 0.9336 0.6656 1.5095 1998 590 0.2973 0.0085 1.6786 0.1846 2.2677 10.4378 
1999 595 6.8492 4.8308 10.4998 0.9127 0.7077 1.0440 1999 595 0.2936 0.0154 1.5500 0.1784 1.8304 6.6119 
2000 460 7.0846 4.8267 10.5705 0.8500 0.6364 1.2536 2000 460 0.2924 0.0200 1.4700 0.1759 1.8503 6.7977 
total 3637 6.4887 2.3496 10.5705 1.0567 0.2706 0.8849 total 3637 0.3173 0.0033 5.7885 0.2503 6.4121 93.5272 
grow - shx       
dura - 
shx 
       
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991 122 5.0716 -0.0834 8.6500 1.4212 -0.5794 1.5173 1991 122 9.5000 5.0000 10.0000 0.6711 -2.6684 15.2301 
1992 173 5.0951 -0.7133 8.5520 1.4478 -0.5542 1.3038 1992 173 9.2023 8.0000 10.0000 0.7310 -0.3346 -1.0690 
1993 289 5.3647 1.3856 9.0198 1.2919 -0.1027 0.0186 1993 289 8.5640 6.0000 10.0000 1.0224 -0.0074 -1.0517 
1994 309 5.5499 1.7328 9.1553 1.1531 0.2594 0.2111 1994 309 8.4434 6.0000 10.0000 1.0964 -0.0556 -0.9445 
1995 311 5.7176 2.5574 9.3978 1.1236 0.4032 0.3842 1995 311 8.4244 5.0000 10.0000 1.1187 -0.1294 -0.7589 
1996 311 5.7943 2.8669 9.4095 1.1077 0.4482 0.2911 1996 311 8.4244 5.0000 10.0000 1.1187 -0.1294 -0.7589 
1997 477 5.9516 3.1843 9.6597 1.0709 0.4945 0.3361 1997 477 6.8847 3.0000 10.0000 2.2957 -0.1971 -1.5176 
1998 590 5.9813 2.8289 10.2316 1.0833 0.4562 0.5478 1998 590 6.1407 3.0000 10.0000 2.5690 0.1170 -1.6092 
1999 595 6.0639 1.4375 10.2515 1.1168 0.2307 0.7319 1999 595 6.0857 2.0000 10.0000 2.5946 0.1271 -1.5907 
2000 460 6.2119 3.4782 10.3398 1.0971 0.3694 0.1372 2000 460 5.5652 2.0000 10.0000 2.6777 0.5774 -1.3455 




Table A5.6a: Descriptive Statistics for Business Strategy Variables in SZXSHX 
prodtype - szxshx     asset type - szxshz        
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991 122 2.2623 1.0000 4.0000 1.2047 0.1423 -1.6085 1991 122 1.9508 1.0000 3.0000 0.8116 0.0907 -1.4751 
1992 181 2.2320 1.0000 4.0000 1.2024 0.2216 -1.5621 1992 181 1.9779 1.0000 3.0000 0.8094 0.0405 -1.4713 
1993 535 2.3383 1.0000 4.0000 1.2053 0.1255 -1.5569 1993 535 2.0075 1.0000 3.0000 0.7861 -0.0132 -1.3802 
1994 577 2.3102 1.0000 4.0000 1.1986 0.1615 -1.5386 1994 577 2.0104 1.0000 3.0000 0.7839 -0.0182 -1.3710 
1995 587 2.3203 1.0000 4.0000 1.2028 0.1497 -1.5483 1995 587 2.0119 1.0000 3.0000 0.7826 -0.0209 -1.3657 
1996 587 2.3186 1.0000 4.0000 1.2040 0.1513 -1.5506 1996 587 2.0136 1.0000 3.0000 0.7815 -0.0238 -1.3609 
1997 929 2.2831 1.0000 4.0000 1.1802 0.1906 -1.4986 1997 929 2.0248 1.0000 3.0000 0.7868 -0.0436 -1.3826 
1998 1087 2.2263 1.0000 4.0000 1.1683 0.2713 -1.4482 1998 1087 2.0304 1.0000 3.0000 0.7948 -0.0542 -1.4146 
1999 1090 2.2220 1.0000 4.0000 1.1651 0.2766 -1.4399 1999 1090 2.0312 1.0000 3.0000 0.7942 -0.0557 -1.4123 
2000 952 2.2426 1.0000 4.0000 1.1542 0.2406 -1.4335 2000 952 2.0147 1.0000 3.0000 0.7889 -0.0260 -1.3919 




Table A5.6b: Descriptive Statistics for Business and Governance Variables in SZX 
prodtype - szx       asset type - szx       
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
                
1992 8 2.0000 1.0000 4.0000 1.0690 0.9354 0.3500 1992 8 2.0000 1.0000 3.0000 0.9258 0.0000 -2.1000 
1993 246 2.4512 1.0000 4.0000 1.1796 0.0123 -1.5001 1993 246 2.0244 1.0000 3.0000 0.7110 -0.0351 -1.0098 
1994 268 2.4104 1.0000 4.0000 1.1754 0.0634 -1.4910 1994 268 2.0075 1.0000 3.0000 0.7137 -0.0108 -1.0259 
1995 276 2.4275 1.0000 4.0000 1.1810 0.0411 -1.5036 1995 276 2.0036 1.0000 3.0000 0.7109 -0.0052 -1.0109 
1996 276 2.4239 1.0000 4.0000 1.1838 0.0438 -1.5099 1996 276 2.0072 1.0000 3.0000 0.7084 -0.0103 -0.9961 
1997 452 2.2345 1.0000 4.0000 1.1717 0.2666 -1.4538 1997 452 2.0265 1.0000 3.0000 0.7320 -0.0412 -1.1285 
1998 497 2.2153 1.0000 4.0000 1.1674 0.2996 -1.4282 1998 497 2.0443 1.0000 3.0000 0.7392 -0.0703 -1.1640 
1999 495 2.2061 1.0000 4.0000 1.1637 0.3123 -1.4148 1999 495 2.0444 1.0000 3.0000 0.7380 -0.0704 -1.1578 
2000 492 2.2175 1.0000 4.0000 1.1679 0.2939 -1.4331 2000 492 2.0386 1.0000 3.0000 0.7392 -0.0613 -1.1642 
total 3010 2.2917 1.0000 4.0000 1.1747 0.2035 -1.4721 total 3010 2.0286 1.0000 3.0000 0.7277 -0.0437 -1.1105 
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Table A5.6c: Descriptive Statistics for Business Strategy and Governance Variables in SHX 
prodtype - shx      asset type - shz       
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991 122 2.2623 1.0000 4.0000 1.2047 0.1423 -1.6085 1991 122 1.9508 1.0000 3.0000 0.8116 0.0907 -1.4751 
1992 173 2.2428 1.0000 4.0000 1.2099 0.1997 -1.5868 1992 173 1.9769 1.0000 3.0000 0.8066 0.0422 -1.4603 
1993 289 2.2422 1.0000 4.0000 1.2205 0.2310 -1.5785 1993 289 1.9931 1.0000 3.0000 0.8457 0.0132 -1.6038 
1994 309 2.2233 1.0000 4.0000 1.2135 0.2554 -1.5583 1994 309 2.0129 1.0000 3.0000 0.8412 -0.0245 -1.5880 
1995 311 2.2251 1.0000 4.0000 1.2158 0.2548 -1.5618 1995 311 2.0193 1.0000 3.0000 0.8422 -0.0366 -1.5909 
1996 311 2.2251 1.0000 4.0000 1.2158 0.2548 -1.5618 1996 311 2.0193 1.0000 3.0000 0.8422 -0.0366 -1.5909 
1997 477 2.3291 1.0000 4.0000 1.1876 0.1198 -1.5303 1997 477 2.0231 1.0000 3.0000 0.8361 -0.0434 -1.5690 
1998 590 2.2356 1.0000 4.0000 1.1700 0.2483 -1.4659 1998 590 2.0186 1.0000 3.0000 0.8392 -0.0352 -1.5800 
1999 595 2.2353 1.0000 4.0000 1.1671 0.2478 -1.4605 1999 595 2.0202 1.0000 3.0000 0.8386 -0.0380 -1.5779 
2000 460 2.2696 1.0000 4.0000 1.1401 0.1839 -1.4293 2000 460 1.9891 1.0000 3.0000 0.8388 0.0205 -1.5794 











       equity1 
- 
szxshz 
       




Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991 122 0.4205 0.0000 0.9558 0.2673 -0.2875 -1.1177 1991 122 0.7047 0.2023 0.9927 0.2093 -0.5778 -0.7245 
1992 181 0.4419 0.0000 0.9558 0.2500 -0.3862 -0.7264 1992 181 0.7025 0.2211 0.9927 0.2060 -0.4145 -1.0236 
1993 535 0.4935 0.0000 1.0000 0.2501 -0.4357 -0.3502 1993 535 0.6767 0.2075 0.9952 0.2132 -0.2341 -1.1145 
1994 577 0.5011 0.0000 1.0000 0.2448 -0.5096 -0.2911 1994 577 0.6807 0.2075 0.9952 0.2171 -0.2445 -1.1571 
1995 587 0.4924 0.0000 1.0000 0.2545 -0.4460 -0.4779 1995 587 0.6812 0.2075 0.9952 0.2165 -0.2480 -1.1508 
1996 587 0.5043 0.0000 1.0000 0.2413 -0.4810 -0.1938 1996 587 0.6813 0.2075 0.9952 0.2165 -0.2488 -1.1493 
1997 929 0.5899 0.0000 1.0000 0.2008 -0.5130 0.6425 1997 929 0.7134 0.2023 0.9966 0.2207 -0.4076 -1.0882 
1998 1087 0.5856 0.0000 1.0000 0.1958 -0.6546 1.1168 1998 1087 0.7149 0.0826 0.9975 0.2226 -0.4445 -1.0355 
1999 1090 0.5910 0.0000 1.0000 0.2048 -0.7240 0.9327 1999 1090 0.7164 0.0826 0.9975 0.2225 -0.4553 -1.0240 
2000 952 0.5695 0.0000 1.0000 0.2017 -0.6169 0.8020 2000 952 0.7185 0.0826 0.9975 0.2238 -0.4687 -1.0165 
total 6647 0.5477 0.0000 1.0000 0.2257 -0.6417 0.3130 total 6647 0.7029 0.0826 0.9975 0.2200 -0.3703 -1.0875 
gl - 
szxshz 
       equity1
0 - 
szxshz 
       




Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991 122 0.6389 0.0000 0.9646 0.1917 -0.8264 1.5335 1991 122 0.2068 0.0031 0.7847 0.1460 1.3640 2.2882 
1992 181 0.6234 0.0000 0.9646 0.1865 -0.7349 1.2609 1992 181 0.2067 0.0006 0.7847 0.1436 1.2154 1.5963 
1993 535 0.6540 0.0000 1.0000 0.1843 -1.0041 2.0710 1993 535 0.2069 0.0006 0.8946 0.1403 1.1073 1.2682 
1994 577 0.6524 0.0000 1.0000 0.1833 -1.1119 2.3700 1994 577 0.2100 0.0006 0.8946 0.1415 1.0311 0.9830 
1995 587 0.6550 0.0000 1.0000 0.1842 -1.0862 2.2981 1995 587 0.2098 0.0006 0.8946 0.1414 1.0318 0.9699 
1996 587 0.6591 0.0000 1.0000 0.1817 -1.0891 2.4976 1996 587 0.2097 0.0006 0.8946 0.1415 1.0310 0.9679 
1997 929 0.6861 0.0000 1.0000 0.1597 -0.6011 1.7365 1997 929 0.2439 0.0006 0.8946 0.1573 0.7474 -0.0479 
1998 1087 0.6749 0.0000 1.0000 0.1572 -0.5872 1.8133 1998 1087 0.2540 0.0000 0.9801 0.1640 0.8518 0.6251 
1999 1090 0.6835 0.0000 1.0000 0.1626 -0.7021 2.0338 1999 1090 0.2548 0.0000 0.9801 0.1640 0.8429 0.6098 
2000 952 0.6685 0.0000 1.0000 0.1563 -0.5523 1.8277 2000 952 0.2562 0.0000 0.9801 0.1654 0.8241 0.5397 




Table A5.7b: Descriptive Statistics for Business and Governance Variables in SZX 
gov – szx 
       equity1 - 
szx 
       
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991        1991        
1992 8 0.4788 0.0000 0.8319 0.2406 -0.8817 2.1401 1992 8 0.6439 0.3638 0.9867 0.2851 0.4684 -2.1811 
1993 246 0.5624 0.0000 1.0000 0.2375 -0.4159 -0.0077 1993 246 0.6611 0.2075 0.9944 0.2176 -0.1091 -1.1239 
1994 268 0.5684 0.0000 1.0000 0.2271 -0.4255 -0.0443 1994 268 0.6649 0.2075 0.9944 0.2237 -0.1309 -1.1980 
1995 276 0.5468 0.0000 1.0000 0.2547 -0.4287 -0.3902 1995 276 0.6659 0.2075 0.9944 0.2226 -0.1395 -1.1882 
1996 276 0.5729 0.0000 1.0000 0.2185 -0.2541 -0.0696 1996 276 0.6661 0.2075 0.9944 0.2225 -0.1412 -1.1856 
1997 452 0.5903 0.0000 1.0000 0.2444 -0.3357 -0.3163 1997 452 0.7080 0.2069 0.9966 0.2239 -0.3692 -1.1104 
1998 497 0.5691 0.0000 1.0000 0.2427 -0.3301 -0.0626 1998 497 0.7111 0.2069 0.9966 0.2235 -0.4022 -1.0840 
1999 495 0.5806 0.0000 1.0000 0.2599 -0.4617 -0.3354 1999 495 0.7123 0.2069 0.9966 0.2233 -0.4130 -1.0685 
2000 492 0.5564 0.0000 1.0000 0.2451 -0.3368 -0.2406 2000 492 0.7112 0.2069 0.9966 0.2215 -0.3934 -1.0836 
total 3010 0.5696 0.0000 1.0000 0.2436 -0.3752 -0.2009 total 3010 0.6942 0.2069 0.9966 0.2235 -0.2935 -1.1507 
gl – szx        equity10 - 
szx 
       
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1991        1991        
1992 8 0.7454 0.6166 0.8562 0.0889 -0.1950 -1.7150 1992 8 0.2067 0.0432 0.4245 0.1429 0.5126 -1.3625 
1993 246 0.7270 0.1055 1.0000 0.1488 -0.5373 0.6106 1993 246 0.1973 0.0021 0.5598 0.1347 0.8836 -0.2092 
1994 268 0.7233 0.1055 1.0000 0.1470 -0.6385 0.9516 1994 268 0.2011 0.0021 0.5598 0.1383 0.8211 -0.3581 
1995 276 0.7266 0.1459 1.0000 0.1492 -0.6296 0.8227 1995 276 0.2001 0.0021 0.5598 0.1375 0.8317 -0.3292 
1996 276 0.7360 0.3354 1.0000 0.1366 -0.2096 -0.3396 1996 276 0.2000 0.0021 0.5598 0.1376 0.8307 -0.3312 
1997 452 0.7359 0.0000 1.0000 0.1659 -0.6310 0.8318 1997 452 0.2409 0.0021 0.7222 0.1573 0.7026 -0.2706 
1998 497 0.7173 0.0000 1.0000 0.1720 -0.5641 0.5491 1998 497 0.2451 0.0021 0.7222 0.1566 0.6300 -0.3870 
1999 495 0.7381 0.0000 1.0000 0.1777 -0.9506 1.6664 1999 495 0.2458 0.0021 0.7222 0.1564 0.6298 -0.3842 
2000 492 0.7142 0.0000 1.0000 0.1657 -0.5648 0.8106 2000 492 0.2442 0.0021 0.7222 0.1560 0.6443 -0.3492 




Table A5.7c: Descriptive Statistics for Corporate Governance Variables in SHX 
gov - shx                
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
equity1 - shx        
1991 122 0.4205 0.0000 0.9558 0.2673 -0.2875 -1.1177 Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1992 172 0.4401 0.0000 0.9558 0.2510 -0.3718 -0.7601 1991 122 0.7047 0.2023 0.9927 0.2093 -0.5778 -0.7245 
1993 289 0.4348 0.0000 0.9024 0.2459 -0.4909 -0.7775 1992 172 0.7053 0.2211 0.9927 0.2023 -0.4674 -0.9273 
1994 309 0.4427 0.0000 0.9024 0.2449 -0.5636 -0.7270 1993 289 0.6900 0.2211 0.9952 0.2089 -0.3420 -1.0744 
1995 311 0.4442 0.0000 0.9024 0.2448 -0.5730 -0.7183 1994 309 0.6944 0.2211 0.9952 0.2106 -0.3412 -1.1000 
1996 311 0.4435 0.0000 0.9024 0.2446 -0.5677 -0.7180 1995 311 0.6949 0.2211 0.9952 0.2104 -0.3426 -1.0969 
1997 477 0.5896 0.0000 0.9491 0.1484 -1.0741 2.1722 1996 311 0.6949 0.2211 0.9952 0.2104 -0.3426 -1.0969 
1998 590 0.5995 0.0000 1.0000 0.1436 -1.1808 2.6855 1997 477 0.7184 0.2023 0.9957 0.2178 -0.4449 -1.0648 
1999 595 0.5996 0.0000 1.0000 0.1433 -1.1761 2.6633 1998 590 0.7182 0.0826 0.9975 0.2221 -0.4816 -0.9892 
2000 460 0.5834 0.0000 0.8858 0.1404 -1.2729 2.8319 1999 595 0.7197 0.0826 0.9975 0.2220 -0.4920 -0.9814 
total 3636 0.5296 0.0000 1.0000 0.2081 -1.0964 0.7453 2000 460 0.7263 0.0826 0.9975 0.2263 -0.5515 -0.9298 
gl - shx        total 3637 0.7101 0.0826 0.9975 0.2168 -0.4349 -1.0221 
Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
equity10 - shx        
1991 122 0.6389 0.0000 0.9646 0.1917 -0.8264 1.5335 Year N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1992 172 0.6177 0.0000 0.9646 0.1881 -0.6897 1.1969 1991 122 0.2068 0.0031 0.7847 0.1460 1.3640 2.2882 
1993 289 0.5918 0.0000 0.9563 0.1890 -1.1454 2.0412 1992 172 0.2067 0.0006 0.7847 0.1440 1.2455 1.6983 
1994 309 0.5910 0.0000 0.9563 0.1896 -1.2475 2.2400 1993 289 0.2151 0.0006 0.8946 0.1447 1.2505 2.1021 
1995 311 0.5914 0.0000 0.9563 0.1891 -1.2556 2.2731 1994 309 0.2176 0.0006 0.8946 0.1440 1.1924 1.9007 
1996 311 0.5908 0.0000 0.9563 0.1895 -1.2417 2.2202 1995 311 0.2183 0.0006 0.8946 0.1445 1.1821 1.8303 
1997 477 0.6388 0.0000 0.9491 0.1379 -1.2487 4.0289 1996 311 0.2183 0.0006 0.8946 0.1445 1.1821 1.8303 
1998 590 0.6391 0.0000 1.0000 0.1334 -1.2958 4.4773 1997 477 0.2467 0.0006 0.8946 0.1573 0.7930 0.1681 
1999 595 0.6381 0.0000 1.0000 0.1328 -1.3017 4.4353 1998 590 0.2615 0.0000 0.9801 0.1698 0.9818 1.1332 
2000 460 0.6195 0.0000 0.9180 0.1288 -1.5070 4.8870 1999 595 0.2622 0.0000 0.9801 0.1698 0.9647 1.0993 
total 3636 0.6194 0.0000 1.0000 0.1602 -1.3280 3.4735 2000 460 0.2690 0.0000 0.9801 0.1741 0.9265 0.9679 
        total 3637 0.2414 0.0000 0.9801 0.1601 1.0583 1.2841 
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Table A5.8a: Correlation Coefficients among Dependent Variables and Independent Variables in SZXSHX 
    De LDE Dta Archdta Txre prof size grow tang capi risk duration prodtype assettype gov gl equity1 equity10 
de Pearson Correlation                   
 Sig. (2-tailed)                   
lde Pearson Correlation 0.8002**                  
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000                  
dta Pearson Correlation 0.8358** 0.9706**                 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000                 
archdta Pearson Correlation 0.8301** 0.9837** 0.9968**                
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000                
txre Pearson Correlation 0.0749** 0.0784** 0.0902** 0.0868**               
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000               
prof Pearson Correlation -0.0725** -0.0654** -0.0694** -0.0688** 0.1263**              
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000              
size Pearson Correlation 0.1574** 0.1374** 0.1368** 0.1388** -0.0178 -0.2057**             
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1464 0.0000             
grow Pearson Correlation 0.1470** 0.1955** 0.1943** 0.1966** 0.0226 0.0932** 0.7509**            
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0658 0.0000 0.0000            
tang Pearson Correlation -0.0457** -0.0592** -0.0625** -0.0620** 0.0422** 0.1688** -0.3313** -0.2408**           
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000           
capi Pearson Correlation 0.0563** -0.0348** -0.0298* -0.0317** -0.0316* -0.2178** 0.1038** -0.4121** -0.0133          
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0045 0.0152 0.0098 0.0100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2785          
risk Pearson Correlation -0.0023 0.0080 0.0043 0.0054 -0.0015 0.2246** 0.0169 0.1747** -0.0026 -0.1966**         
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8514 0.5158 0.7288 0.6595 0.9031 0.0000 0.1678 0.0000 0.8324 0.0000         
duration Pearson Correlation 0.0362** 0.0214 0.0243* 0.0238 -0.0948** -0.1333** -0.0744** -0.1031** 0.0044 0.0586** -0.0582**        
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0032 0.0816 0.0473 0.0528 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7206 0.0000 0.0000        
prodtype Pearson Correlation 0.0274* 0.0275* 0.0279* 0.0283* -0.0295* -0.0394** -0.0159 -0.0574** 0.0074 0.0418** -0.0389** 0.0769**       
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0254 0.0249 0.0229 0.0212 0.0160 0.0013 0.1949 0.0000 0.5470 0.0006 0.0015 0.0000       
assettype Pearson Correlation -0.0570** -0.0673** -0.0730** -0.0723** -0.0241* 0.0063 -0.0440** -0.1139** 0.0184 0.0634** -0.0168 -0.0391** 0.1051**      
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0493 0.6101 0.0003 0.0000 0.1330 0.0000 0.1700 0.0014 0.0000      
gov Pearson Correlation 0.0270* 0.0355** 0.0382** 0.0374** 0.0744** 0.0023 0.1357** 0.1063** 0.0013 0.0070 0.0108 -0.2312** -0.0449** -0.0079     
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0276 0.0038 0.0019 0.0023 0.0000 0.8517 0.0000 0.0000 0.9166 0.5697 0.3798 0.0000 0.0003 0.5221     
gl Pearson Correlation 0.0228 0.0278* 0.0260* 0.0270* 0.0598** -0.0061 0.1022** 0.0635** 0.0262* 0.0292* -0.0210 -0.0712** 0.0074 -0.0148 0.6495**    
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0633 0.0234 0.0340 0.0279 0.0000 0.6192 0.0000 0.0000 0.0326 0.0174 0.0875 0.0000 0.5486 0.2282 0.0000    
equity1 Pearson Correlation -0.0018 -0.0005 -0.0059 -0.0050 0.0305* 0.0658** 0.1781** 0.2472** -0.0694** -0.1005** 0.1038** -0.1273** -0.1139** -0.0769** 0.1300** 0.0392**   
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8827 0.9697 0.6287 0.6822 0.0130 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014   
equity10 Pearson Correlation 0.0197 0.0101 0.0095 0.0090 0.0498** 0.1124** 0.2246** 0.2817** -0.0472** -0.0865** 0.0883** -0.2753** -0.1447** -0.0450** 0.2560** 0.1961** 0.7090**  
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1083 0.4096 0.4394 0.4627 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
N  6647 6647 6647 6647 6647 6647 6647 6647 6647 6647 6647 6647 6647 6647 6646 6646 6647 6647 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).                




Table A5.8b: Correlation Coefficients among Dependent Variables and Independent Variables in SZX 
    De LDE dta archdta txre prof size grow tang capi Risk duration prodtype assettype gov gl equity1 equity10 
 
de Pearson Correlation                   
 Sig. (2-tailed)                  
lde Pearson Correlation 0.8008**                  
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000                  
dta Pearson Correlation 0.8093** 0.9866**                 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000                 
archdta Pearson Correlation 0.8095** 0.9951** 0.9978**                
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000                
txre Pearson Correlation 0.0532** 0.0942** 0.0994** 0.0975**               
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0035 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000               
prof Pearson Correlation -0.0748** -0.0582** -0.0624** -0.0613** 0.1528**              
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0014 0.0006 0.0008 0.0000              
size Pearson Correlation 0.1772** 0.1440** 0.1378** 0.1409** 0.1018** -0.1563**             
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000             
grow Pearson Correlation 0.1296** 0.1840** 0.1770** 0.1802** 0.1841** 0.1960** 0.7426**            
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000            
tang Pearson Correlation -0.0166 -0.0337 -0.0330 -0.0336 0.0645** 0.1192** -0.4368** -0.3073**           
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3616 0.0642 0.0700 0.0653 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000           
capi Pearson Correlation 0.1001** 0.0056 0.0100 0.0085 -0.0642** -0.2411** 0.0797** -0.4419** -0.0259          
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.7592 0.5841 0.6407 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1560          
risk Pearson Correlation -0.0400* -0.0166 -0.0255 -0.0221 -0.0017 0.1640** 0.0094 0.1944** -0.0003 -0.2122**         
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0281 0.3621 0.1614 0.2253 0.9266 0.0000 0.6046 0.0000 0.9886 0.0000         
duration Pearson Correlation 0.1345** 0.1322** 0.1430** 0.1392** -0.1696** -0.1320** -0.1041** -0.1574** 0.0103 0.0895** -0.0877**        
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5725 0.0000 0.0000        
prodtype Pearson Correlation 0.0873** 0.0691** 0.0673** 0.0683** -0.0788** -0.0636** -0.0215 -0.0881** -0.0053 0.0641** -0.0812** 0.1687**       
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0005 0.2389 0.0000 0.7700 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000       
assettype Pearson Correlation -0.0872** -0.1399** -0.1354** -0.1376** -0.0326 -0.0105 -0.0657** -0.1406** 0.0114 0.0551** -0.0116 -0.0341 0.0330      
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0733 0.5633 0.0003 0.0000 0.5330 0.0025 0.5240 0.0614 0.0702      
gov Pearson Correlation -0.0044 0.0096 0.0092 0.0093 0.1429** -0.0204 0.0086 -0.0128 0.0199 0.0140 0.0075 -0.0185 -0.0050 -0.0190     
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8109 0.5981 0.6123 0.6114 0.0000 0.2638 0.6361 0.4823 0.2746 0.4413 0.6808 0.3092 0.7849 0.2978     
gl Pearson Correlation 0.0056 0.0191 0.0185 0.0187 0.0716** -0.0223 -0.0106 -0.0231 -0.0056 -0.0008 0.0071 -0.0167 0.0093 -0.0352 0.6678**    
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7601 0.2950 0.3102 0.3052 0.0001 0.2221 0.5608 0.2049 0.7567 0.9655 0.6976 0.3603 0.6085 0.0532 0.0000    
equity1 Pearson Correlation 0.0036 0.0211 0.0172 0.0185 0.1285** 0.1104** 0.1688** 0.2756** -0.0874** -0.1297** 0.1274** -0.2009** -0.1090** -0.0595** -0.0011 -0.0016   
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.8423 0.2462 0.3464 0.3106 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0011 0.9529 0.9292   
equity10 Pearson Correlation 0.0060 0.0157 0.0133 0.0141 0.1346** 0.1579** 0.1844** 0.2843** -0.0438* -0.1151** 0.1160** -0.2846** -0.1409** -0.0569** -0.0054 0.0072 0.7673**  
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7434 0.3881 0.4662 0.4380 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0162 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.7677 0.6920 0.0000  
N  3010 3010 3010 3010 3010 3010 3010 3010 3010 3010 3010 3010 3010 3010 3010 3010 3010 3010 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).               
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).               
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Table A5.8c: Correlation Coefficients among Dependent Variables and Independent Variables in SHX 
    de LDE Dta ARCHDTA txre prof size grow tang capi risk duration prodtype ASSETTYPE GOV GL equity1 EQUITY10 
de Pearson Correlation                   
 Sig. (2-tailed)                   
LDE Pearson Correlation 0.8067**                  
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000                  
dta Pearson Correlation 0.8635** 0.9594**                 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000                 
ARCHDTA Pearson Correlation 0.8529** 0.9758** 0.9961**                
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000                
Txre Pearson Correlation 0.0898** 0.0704** 0.0862** 0.0819**               
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000               
Prof Pearson Correlation -0.0716** -0.0746** -0.0783** -0.0782** 0.1201**              
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000              
Size Pearson Correlation 0.1399** 0.1316** 0.1351** 0.1361** -0.0760** -0.2533**             
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000             
Grow Pearson Correlation 0.1679** 0.2101** 0.2136** 0.2152** -0.0536** -0.0035 0.7613**            
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.8327 0.0000            
Tang Pearson Correlation -0.2335** -0.2461** -0.2672** -0.2624** 0.0323 0.5036** -0.3189** -0.1956**           
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0518 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000           
Capi Pearson Correlation -0.0165 -0.1005** -0.0960** -0.0984** -0.0206 -0.1966** 0.1425** -0.3956** -0.0316          
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.3201 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2137 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0564          
Risk Pearson Correlation 0.0650** 0.0503** 0.0547** 0.0526** 0.0053 0.3406** 0.0318 0.1531** 0.0605** -0.1417**         
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0001 0.0024 0.0010 0.0015 0.7481 0.0000 0.0548 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000         
Duration Pearson Correlation -0.0266 -0.0349* -0.0405* -0.0382* -0.0615** -0.1365** -0.0547** -0.0789** 0.0643** 0.0558** -0.0545**        
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.1094 0.0352 0.0145 0.0213 0.0002 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0001 0.0008 0.0010        
Prodtype Pearson Correlation -0.0287 -0.0051 -0.0047 -0.0045 -0.0079 -0.0173 -0.0120 -0.0306 0.0479** 0.0114 0.0202 0.0230       
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0837 0.7599 0.7777 0.7874 0.6338 0.2958 0.4685 0.0652 0.0038 0.4925 0.2236 0.1663       
Assettype Pearson Correlation -0.0343* -0.0208 -0.0310 -0.0289 -0.0218 0.0199 -0.0294 -0.0941** 0.0532** 0.0790** -0.0233 -0.0403* 0.1565**      
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0385 0.2098 0.0612 0.0818 0.1889 0.2309 0.0765 0.0000 0.0013 0.0000 0.1598 0.0150 0.0000      
GOV Pearson Correlation 0.0545** 0.0506** 0.0576** 0.0557** 0.0353* 0.0240 0.2532** 0.2332** -0.1492** -0.0245 0.0353* -0.3870** -0.0869** -0.0007     
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0010 0.0023 0.0005 0.0008 0.0333 0.1476 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1392 0.0335 0.0000 0.0000 0.9669     
GL Pearson Correlation 0.0176 0.0071 0.0055 0.0066 0.0394* -0.0038 0.1930** 0.1735** -0.0739** 0.0058 -0.0018 -0.0570** -0.0040 -0.0083 0.6512**    
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.2888 0.6683 0.7388 0.6923 0.0176 0.8189 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7260 0.9155 0.0006 0.8110 0.6154 0.0000    
Equity1 Pearson Correlation -0.0044 -0.0140 -0.0218 -0.0209 -0.0154 0.0237 0.1871** 0.2203** -0.0409* -0.0591** 0.0712** -0.0882** -0.1172** -0.0896** 0.2690** 0.1009**   
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.7908 0.3983 0.1894 0.2075 0.3533 0.1538 0.0000 0.0000 0.0137 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
Equity10 Pearson Correlation 0.0348* 0.0098 0.0102 0.0089 0.0148 0.0743** 0.2563** 0.2773** -0.0784** -0.0496** 0.0532** -0.2815** -0.1466** -0.0361* 0.5074** 0.3898** 0.6625**  
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0358 0.5536 0.5379 0.5936 0.3720 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0028 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0294 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
N  3637 3637 3637 3637 3637 3637 3637 3637 3637 3637 3637 3637 3637 3637 3636 3636 3637 3637 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).              
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